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Abstract 
 
 
Recent reform agendas have emphasised a perceived need to bring the 
European Union (EU) institutions and the citizens of the member states and 
closer together, as a means of enhancing the legitimacy of EU governance. The 
debate on the future of the EU, the initiative which led to the signing of the 
constitutional treaty in October 2004, addressed the challenge of ‘bringing 
closer’ by incorporating civil society in to the treaty reform process. In this 
thesis I investigate the role played by transnational civil society organisations 
in helping to bring citizens and institutions closer together. I employ the notion 
of democratic linkage to describe and explain the downward-facing 
interactions between civil society organisations and ordinary citizens, which 
have sometimes been neglected, as well as their upward-facing interactions 
with elite decision-makers. Drawing upon data from qualitative interviews with 
25 civil society organisations and six officials from various EU institutions I 
find serious discrepancies between the rhetoric of the EU institutions on 
bringing citizens closer, and the capacities and willingness of the civil society 
actors involved as well as the opportunities for doing so.  
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Chapter 1  
 
 
Introduction: Bringing citizens and the EU closer together 
 
 
1.1 ‘Bringing closer’? Assessing and addressing the gap between 
citizens and the EU 
 
 
The notion that citizens and political institutions in the European Union (EU) need 
to be brought closer together has permeated reform discourses in recent years. It is 
based on the assumption that there is a ‘gap’ between citizens and EU institutions 
which must be minimised. This gap between the citizens of the member states and 
the EU institutions is nothing new, nor is it a phenomenon unique to the EU 
context. But it has become the driving force behind attempts to strengthen the 
legitimacy of EU governance. In this thesis I outline my investigation of the 
contribution made by civil society, in the context of the debate on the future of the 
EU, to bringing citizens and EU institutions closer together, in terms of 
strengthening democratic linkage. Drawing upon data from semi-structured 
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interviews with 25 civil society organisations and six officials from various EU 
institutions I find serious discrepancies between the rhetoric of the EU institutions 
on bringing citizens closer and the capacities and willingness of the civil society 
actors involved as well as the opportunities for doing so. 
 
In 2001 the EU institutions launched a ‘debate on the future of the EU’. This 
debate initiative incorporated the post-Nice process of treaty reform alongside a 
broader debate outside the formal framework of the Intergovernmental 
Conference. The outcome of the debate would be reformed governance1 structures 
which would allow for a closer relationship between the EU institutions and the 
citizens of the member states. In addition, the actual process of discussing the 
EU’s future was also intended to bring citizens and institutions closer together. 
Two components of the debate provide the context for this investigation: the 
Convention and Futurum. The European Council, in its Laeken declaration of 
December 2001, convened the Convention on the future of the EU, defining its 
characteristics and the questions it would address. The Convention met during 
2002 and 2003 and in July 2003 presented a Draft Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe to the European Council. Running concurrently was the 
Futurum initiative, managed by the European Commission. Futurum was an online 
repository of material relating the debates both inside and outside the Convention, 
and hosted online and offline discussions on the EU’s future.  
 
                                          
1
 The polit ical system of the European Union is often discussed in terms of ‘governance’ as 
opposed to ‘governm ent ’. The term  ‘governance’ denotes a system  of non-hierarchical decision-
m aking character ised by the part icipat ion of public and pr ivate actors (Kohler-Koch & Rit tberger 
2006) . See also Rhodes (1996) , Kohler-Koch & Eising (1999) , Jachtenfuchs (2001) . 
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One of the defining features of both the Convention and Futurum (and indeed the 
debate initiative in general) was an attempt to involve ‘civil society’ as a means of 
bringing the debates closer to citizens. In practice this meant that a range of – 
largely transnational – organisations from different sectors of civil society were 
involved in the Convention and Futurum debates. The exact way in which civil 
society was intended to bring the debate closer to citizens was not entirely clear in 
the reform rhetoric. In order to better understand this I conducted qualitative 
interviews with organisations that were involved in either or both of the debates. 
The data from these interviews on the organisations’ perspectives on reform and 
linkage, and data from interviews with six Union officials who were also involved 
in the debates, provides much of the basis of my explanation and analysis of the 
contribution of civil society to democratic linkage. 
 
The idea that citizens and institutions need to be brought closer together is rather 
abstract but I explore it empirically through the notion of democratic linkage, or in 
other words, the connections that exist between the governed and the governing 
(Aarts 1998). Democratic linkage occurs through various mechanisms, three of 
which provide the analytical framework for this research: participation, 
representation and communication. The concepts of participation, representation 
and communication describe and explain the linkage role played by civil society in 
the debate. They provide different, though not mutually exclusive, explanations of 
the ways in which civil society organisations provide linkage in the Convention 
and Futurum. 
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This investigation should be seen in the context of a broader research agenda on 
the legitimacy of EU governance. The relationship between the institutions of the 
European Union and the citizens of the member states was, for much of the history 
of integration, not a major concern for either the architects of integration or the 
academics who studied them. However, the events following the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 were viewed as evidence of a ‘legitimacy crisis’ 
suffered by the process of integration and the institutions governing it. These 
events also prompted the emergence of a ‘normative turn’ in EU studies (Bellamy 
& Castiglione 2003) whereby the legitimacy of EU governance became an 
important explanatory variable alongside the more conventional concerns of EU 
studies with economic interests and functional efficiency. In turn this has led to the 
flourishing of research into issues such as democracy (Lord 1998, Warleigh 2003, 
Siedentop 2001, Anderson & Eliasssen 1996), representation (Blondel, Sinnott & 
Svennson 1994, Schmitt & Thomassen 1999), accountability (Peterson 1997), 
participation (Wallace & Young 1997) and citizenship (Meehan 1993, Shaw 1998, 
Bellamy & Warleigh 2001).  
 
In this introductory chapter I begin by placing my investigation in the context of 
political and academic debates about citizens and legitimacy in the European 
Union. The role of citizens within the EU political system has changed since the 
Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, a change which accelerated following the 
ratification problems surrounding the Maastricht treaty. The net effect of such 
changes has been that citizens are increasingly linked to the legitimacy of the EU 
and its governance according to liberal democratic principles. However, measured 
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against such principles the legitimacy of the EU can appear to be lacking. The 
resultant ‘legitimacy crisis’ from which the EU is said to suffer has attracted a 
great deal of academic attention. Yet for all the normative scholarship produced, 
there has been far less empirical research on the EU’s legitimacy crisis and the 
attempts to overcome it. In the latter part of the chapter I outline the methodology 
of my investigation which contributes to the empirical analysis of the legitimacy of 
EU governance. Empirical research on this issue is crucial because, as the 
European Council acknowledged in the Laeken declaration, the need to bring the 
European institutions closer to the citizens is one of the primary challenges facing 
the Union (European Council 2001a). It has been for many years (despite the 
comfort blanket provided by the ‘permissive consensus’) and as the troubled 
ratification of the constitutional treaty suggested, it is likely to remain so. 
 
 
1.2 Citizens and Legitimacy in the EU 
 
 
One of the defining features of the post-Nice reform discourses was the 
prominence of the notion of ‘the citizen’, notably in the rhetoric on bringing 
citizens and EU institutions closer together. In many ways this was a break with 
the past as citizens have tended not to feature heavily in discussions about the 
EU’s future. The Maastricht ratification process is has been seen as a turning point 
for relations between citizens and EU institutions and the post-Maastricht era has 
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seen various strategies and initiatives aimed at connecting the EU institutions and 
the integration project more closely with citizens. During the same period of time, 
citizens have begun to feature more prominently in academic studies of the EU, 
and as a result normative issues of legitimacy and the democratic credentials of the 
EU are increasingly addressed. The following subsections locate my investigation 
in the context of a changing role for citizens, debates about the EU’s legitimacy, 
and the normative and analytical responses to these developments. 
 
 
1.2.1  The changing role of citizens in the European Union 
 
Despite the fact that the Treaty of Rome called for an ‘ever closer Union between 
the peoples of Europe’ (emphasis added), citizens have not always been as central 
to the concerns of EU leaders as they are today. In fact, historically speaking, 
citizens have been, for the most part, absent from the practice of and discussions 
about European integration (Neunreither 1995). The European institutions were 
constructed independently of national populations (Duchesne & Frognier 1995). 
They were designed to stress administration and regulation and to minimise the 
visibility of political choices at stake (Wallace 1996). Indeed, the EU was for 
much of its history an organisation characterised by technocracy, dominated by 
expertise and bargaining between sectarian interests and displaying a lack of 
openness, transparency and political accountability (Eriksen & Fossum 2000b).  
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Integration rested on the basis of a popular ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg & 
Scheingold 1971) which legitimated integrative action through a tacit assumption 
that the collective outcome was superior to what could otherwise be achieved 
through unilateral action. It relied on the ability of elites to persuade the mass 
publics that European integration was ‘a good thing’ (Laffan 1993) rather than 
through ongoing active or informed participation on the part of publics. Ernst Haas 
(1968) characterised the process as one involving governments, key economic 
actors and bureaucrats, not the public at large and, more importantly, without the 
need for majority support. Furthermore, Jean Monnet believed that it was wrong to 
consult the people of Europe about the nature of an emerging community of which 
they had no practical knowledge or experience (Blondel, Sinnot & Svensson 1998, 
Featherstone 1994).  
 
Observers often identify Maastricht as the point at which this began to change. 
Pascal Lamy, Delors’ Chef du Cabinet, remarked after the initial Danish rejection 
of the Maastricht Treaty:  
 
Europe was built in a St Simonian way from the beginning, this was 
Monnet’s approach. The people weren’t ready to agree to integration, 
so you had to get on without telling them too much about what was 
happening. Now St Simonianism is finished. It can’t work when you 
have to face democratic opinion. 
(quoted in Eriksen & Fossum 2000b:xii).  
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Lamy’s comments indicate an acknowledgement that the basis upon which EU 
governance was hitherto justified had become unsustainable. Major economic, 
social and political changes in the world and in Europe in particular had eroded 
traditional structures of power and thus, the original bases of EU integration 
(Wallace 2001b: 584). European integration pushed forward at the elite level, 
could no longer progress without public support because citizens increasingly had 
the ability and the willingness to constrain, modify and even forestall the 
integration process (Anderson & Kaltenhaler 1996).  
 
Maastricht is important as a symbolic turning point but its importance should not 
be overstated. Lack of support for and mistrust of EU institutions and structures of 
governance did not begin following Maastricht and was not caused (or more 
specifically was caused not only) by the Treaty on European Union. As 
highlighted above, there had always been a gap between the EU and the public, 
indeed this was built into the institutional architecture and decision-making 
structures of the EU from the very beginning. However only relatively recently 
and particularly following Maastricht has this gap been perceived as problematic, 
and its narrowing become a political objective of European policy-makers. Clearly 
therefore, Maastricht represents a break with the past in terms of the relationship 
between the political institutions of the EU and its citizens.  
 
A strengthening of the relationship between EU governance structures and the 
citizens within the member states has motivated successive reform processes. The 
conclusions of the Cardiff European Council meeting in 1998 argued that ‘a 
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sustained effort is needed by the member states and all the institutions to bring the 
Union closer to people by making it more open, more understandable and more 
relevant to daily life’ (European Council 1998). Since then, rhetoric on ‘bringing 
the EU institutions and the citizens closer together’ has permeated the reform 
agenda of the EU. The debate on the future of the EU was largely characterised by 
this idea of bringing citizens and institutions closer together. The Laeken 
declaration, which convened the Convention on the future of the EU, outlined that 
the need to connect more closely with citizens was one of the biggest challenges 
facing the Union. Similarly, more recent attempts by the Commission to 
‘communicate with the citizens’ (Commission 2006a) have been imbued with the 
idea that through communication, citizens and EU institutions can be brought 
closer together.  
 
Despite the prominence of rhetoric on ‘bringing closer’ what this actually means in 
practice has not been defined by the institutions with any great precision. The 
institutions have arguably established a discourse on ‘bringing closer’ citizens and 
EU institutions, or in the words of Fairclough, a ‘creation in language’ (2000:9). 
Yet the promotion of this discourse in the absence of a detailed exposition of what 
it actually means in practice invites a comparison between the language of the 
institutions and their behaviour – in other words between what they say and what 
they do. This was compounded by the rejection of the constitutional treaty in 
referenda in France and The Netherlands in 2005. These referenda exposed the gap 
between citizens and institutions even further, leading to the suggestion that the 
rhetoric of the debate was just that; merely empty rhetoric. 
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The idea of ‘bringing closer’ refers not to the spatial proximity between citizens 
and institutions although it has been suggested that the institutional geography of 
the EU, or where power is physically located, itself undermines legitimacy2. 
Despite any possible link between the perceived legitimacy of institutions and 
their geographical proximity to citizens, the rhetoric gives no indication of a 
concern with geographical location in this context. Increased closeness is linked to 
the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, which 
states that decisions should be taken as close as possible, i.e. at the lowest 
appropriate level of government, to citizens. But ‘closeness’ is also viewed here as 
a metaphor for a congruence of expectations and desires held by citizens and 
institutions regarding the European Union project. ‘Bringing closer’ in terms of 
reforming governance in the EU therefore refers to a process whereby these 
expectations and desires converge. In the absence of such convergence what exists 
is a ‘gap’ between the expectations and desires held by citizens and those held by 
institutions, or in shorthand, a gap simply between the citizens and institutions 
themselves.  
 
There are pragmatic and normative reasons why citizens have become so 
important in the process of reforming the EU. The turn towards citizens as the 
basis of reform on the part of the EU institutions can be partly interpreted as a 
                                          
2
 An art icle in Newropeans m agazine on 12 th June 2006 argued that  ‘The EU needs a dem ocrat ic 
reshuffling of it s inst itut ions’ geography’. I t  proposed that , in order to m ake the EU m ore 
democrat ic, the EU inst itut ions should be moved out  of Brussels and closer to cit izens rather than 
further away from  them . Full text  available at :  ht tp: / / www.newropeans-
magazine.org/ index.php?opt ion= com_content&task= view&id= 1174&I tem id= 84  
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pragmatic response by policy-makers to changing circumstances, notably the fact 
that citizens have the ability and the willingness to affect EU governance through 
their role in ratifying treaties. Ensuring successful outcomes at the EU level 
nowadays depends on appealing to citizens. However, there also appears to be a 
normative dimension to the attempts to bring people and politics in the EU closer 
together. Democratic values are central to the EU and were reiterated on the 50th 
anniversary of the signature of the treaty of Rome in the ‘Berlin Declaration’3. In 
this document, democracy is clearly stated as one of the justifications of the EU’s 
political authority, and the location of legitimacy, it implies, can be found in the 
citizens of the EU. A strengthening of the democratic relationship between citizens 
and EU institutions and structures of governance therefore has been, and continues 
to be a major theme of legitimating EU governance. 
 
 
1.2.2  Legitimating EU governance 
 
The changing role of citizens in the EU is bound up with issues of the legitimacy 
of EU governance. On the one hand, institutional and academic observers have 
identified falling levels of popular support for EU institutions and the process of 
integration since Maastricht as a symptom of a legitimacy deficit or legitimacy 
crisis from which the Union is thought to suffer. On the other hand, the perceived 
need to involve citizens more in EU politics or to ‘bring citizens and EU 
                                          
3
 The Berlin declarat ion was a joint  statement  was m ade by the presidents of the Council,  
Comm ission and Parliam ent  (Barroso, Merkel & Poet ter ing 2007)  on 25 th March 2007. 
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institutions closer together’ that has defined recent reform agendas is an attempt by 
the institutions to find part of the solution to the problems of legitimacy that the 
EU faces. Both of these issues have proved controversial among analysts of the 
EU’s legitimacy. 
 
The suggestion that the EU suffers from a crisis or deficit of legitimacy is also a 
relatively recent development which has become widespread in the post-
Maastricht era. A range of factors have been identified as symptoms of this 
legitimacy crisis: fluctuating levels of support for, and trust in EU institutions as 
reported in Eurobarometer surveys4; low and falling turnout for European 
Parliament elections5; problems with the ratification of EU treaties, both in 
referenda and using parliamentary methods; and non-, or variable compliance with 
EU on the part of member states to name a few. However, it has been argued that 
some of these symptoms may have been overstated (Føllesdal 2006: 153). 
Furthermore, the EU is not alone in experiencing a lack of popular support as 
research shows falling levels of political support across Europe and beyond 
(Dalton 1999), and because of the way in which EU and domestic politics are 
bound together, Euroscepticism and opposition to the EU indicates a more 
generalised ‘polity-scepticism’ or scepticism and opposition towards national 
modes of governance (Mair 2007:16). 
 
                                          
4
 See Jolly (2007)  for an analysis of fluctuat ions in levels of support  for and t rust  in EU 
inst itut ions. Raw Eurobarom eter data can be accessed online:  
ht tp: / / ec.europa.eu/ public_opinion/ index_en.htm   
5
 The European Parliam ent ’s website contains data on turnout  for all elect ions since 1979 as well 
as som e descr ipt ive stat ist ics:  ht tp: / / www.europarl.europa.eu/ elect ions2004/ ep-
elect ion/ sites/ en/ results1306/ turnout_ep/ turnout_table.htm l  
Bringing cit izens and the EU closer 13 
 
The extent to which the factors outlined above are constitutive of a crisis of 
legitimacy depends upon the appropriate legitimating basis for the EU, yet this is 
also contested. Beetham (1991:15-20) states that the political authority of any 
given system is legitimate to the extent that it meets three criteria: it is acquired 
and exercised according to established rules – in other words this refers to the 
legality of the system; the rules are justifiable according to socially accepted 
beliefs about the source and purpose of this authority – or normative justifiability; 
and the authority has the consent of the governed and the recognition of other 
legitimate authorities – or acts of legitimation. In other words a range of factors – 
rules, normative beliefs and actions or procedures – define the basis of a system’s 
legitimacy.  
 
Generally speaking, the rules or legality of the EU derive from the treaties and 
secondary legislation developed by the member states. Legitimation comes from 
the continued participation of the member states in the decision-making structures, 
and their compliance with its decisions, as well as the recognition of the EU by 
third parties – individual states and other intergovernmental organisations. 
However, the legality of the EU’s political authority and the way in which it is 
legitimated are not entirely uncontroversial. The supremacy of EU law over 
national law is generally accepted but the German Constitutional Court, the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel and the Danish Supreme Court have not accepted the 
notion that EU law is supreme to the national constitution or that the European 
Court of Justice has the final or only interpretation of the limits of EU authority as 
defined by the EU treaties (Alter 2001). The legality of the EU’s political authority 
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therefore has been and continues to be challenged and disputed. Furthermore, the 
need for the EU’s political authority to be legitimated poses questions of who 
legitimates it, since the boundaries of the EU are fluid and change over time and 
across issue area. These disagreements over legality and legitimation 
notwithstanding, more fundamental disagreements concern the normative 
justifiability of the EU’s political authority which in turn stem from conflicting 
ideas about what type of political actor the EU is or ought to be.  
 
Analysts such as Moravcsik see the EU as an international organisation, a 
collection of individual states working together to achieve a common goal (1993, 
1998). The normative justification for the political authority of the EU is, in this 
view, derived from the performance of the organisation, specifically the extent to 
which it guarantees outcomes that can not be secured by individual states acting 
alone. In this view, the democratic deficit is fatuous since democratic legitimacy 
derives from the decisions taken by democratically-elected national governments 
(Moravcsik 2002). By contrast, others have argued that the EU is a regulatory 
body (Majone 1997), which deals with a range of issues that are better addressed 
by actors with the relevant technical or scientific knowledge who are insulated 
from popular pressure. Here, the normative justifiability is again be seen in terms 
of performance – the idea being that regulation is best undertaken by independent 
bodies because they are better able to deliver effective outcomes. Again, claims 
about the existence of a democratic deficit are unfounded because of the nature of 
the decisions that are being taken. 
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Both of these models – the former an ‘intergovernmental’ model, the latter a 
‘technocratic’ model – are contested, as are the normative arguments they employ 
for justifying the EU’s political authority. An alternative model which claims that 
the EU can and ought to be subject to liberal democratic normative principles can 
be identified (Beetham & Lord 1998; Lord & Beetham 2001; Eriksen & Fossum 
2000a; Eriksen 2003; Habermas 2001). In contrast to the suggestions of the 
intergovernmental and technocratic models, for the liberal democratic model, the 
normative justifiability of the EU rests upon liberal democratic principles and does 
not depend solely on its performance. In this view the capacity to produce 
beneficial outputs may be necessary but it is not sufficient to justify the authority 
of the EU. Furthermore, according to the liberal democratic model, political 
authority cannot be justified solely by indirect mediation through elected state 
authorities. Both the intergovernmental and technocratic models imply that there is 
no need for direct legitimation of EU authority by citizens either because the 
issues dealt with are not those with which citizens can or should concern 
themselves, or because legitimation is mediated through directly elected state 
governments. In contrast, for the liberal democratic model, the EU and its 
governance requires direct legitimation from the citizens of the member states, 
who after all are directly affected by its activities. These two dimensions of 
legitimacy: the need for justification based on inputs as well as outputs, and the 
need for direct legitimation by citizens, are crucial to the investigation and are 
outlined further here. 
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The distinction between ‘output’ and ‘input’ legitimacy is established in David 
Easton’s model of the political system (1953) and is applied to the study of the 
EU’s political system by Fritz Scharpf (1999). Input-oriented legitimacy refers to 
the extent to which political decisions are derived from the preferences of those 
belonging to a particular political community. It implies the existence of 
procedures that include the voice of citizens in decision-making. Output-oriented 
legitimacy refers to the extent to which political decisions promote the common 
preferences of this community and implies that benefits can simply be derived 
from the performance of European governance and are visible to the largely silent 
general public (Scharpf 1999: 7-13).  
 
European Union governance has, in historical context, generally been legitimised 
in terms of the extent to which it has been able to produce effective outcomes. The 
EU political system, it has been argued, is more suited to output-oriented 
legitimising arguments because of its size, the lack of a collective identity, and 
because it is better able to derive legitimacy from ‘its capacity to solve problems 
requiring collective solutions because they could not be solved through individual 
action’ (Scharpf 1999: 11). Since Maastricht’s aftermath there has emerged a 
greater interest in citizens as the basis of EU legitimacy. The Laeken declaration 
gave a clear indication of a desire for the direct legitimation of Union governance 
in its call for a debate involving all citizens, and the debate on the future of the EU 
which followed tried to incorporate this.  
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The legitimating power of liberal democracy with its focus on inputs and direct 
legitimation is limited, however, by the absence of a European demos (Weiler 
1999). In the absence of a demos (at least a demos resembling those found within 
the member states), certain ‘organised’ citizens have become attractive partners for 
political actors, particularly in the Commission. Vivien Schmidt has termed this 
development ‘government with the people’ through consultation of organised 
interests (2004: 977). The extent to which such government with the people is a 
component of either input- or output-legitimacy is unresolved. This thesis 
contributes to debates on whether Union governance can be successfully 
legitimised in terms of inputs by investigating the potential contribution of civil 
society to strengthening input legitimacy alongside output legitimacy, and 
questions the explanatory value of the input-output dichotomy.  
 
For most national societies, input legitimacy rests on a shared identity or belief in 
an essential ‘sameness’ (drawing on Weber’s (1978: 389) concept of 
gemeinsamkeitsglaube) stemming from pre-existing commonalities in history, 
language, culture, ethnicity – a so-called ‘thick’ collective identity. Scharpf argues 
that given the historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic and institutional diversity of the 
EU’s member states, the Union is very far from having achieved such a ‘thick’ 
collective identity. Furthermore, in the absence of this thick collective identity, 
institutional reforms will not greatly increase the input-oriented legitimacy of 
decisions taken by majority rule (1999:9). Institutional reforms cannot (or at least 
not in the short term) provide the sense of ‘we-feeling’ necessary to sustain a 
majoritarian system of representative democracy in the EU. Making a distinction 
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between input- and output-legitimacy underlines the difficulties of strengthening 
the legitimacy of EU governance simply through institutional reform.  
 
The legitimacy deficit from which the EU is said to suffer, occurs because when 
measured against the principles of identity, democracy and performance, the EU 
political system falls short of the ideal. There is, in other words, a ‘gap’ between 
the criteria used to justify the EU’s authority and the extent to which it actually 
measures up to these criteria. There are deficiencies in three criteria which provide 
the normative validity and legitimation for political authority at the EU level 
which are characteristic of liberal democracy: effective performance in respect of 
agreed ends; democratic authorisation, accountability and representation; and 
agreement on the identity and boundaries of the political community. There is a 
certain degree of interconnectedness between these three spheres or components of 
legitimacy such that variation in one will have implications for the other two 
(Beetham & Lord 1998:30).  
 
In this investigation I acknowledge that the extent to which liberal democratic 
principles provide the normative yardstick with which to measure the legitimacy 
of the EU remains an issue for continued discussion. The discussion is further 
complicated by the absence of agreement on what type of polity the EU is, as this 
has serious implications for normative discussions on how it ought to derive its 
legitimacy. The EU is often described as a sui generis (Schmidt 2004: 976), ‘un 
object politique non-identifié’ (Delors, cited in Schmitter 1996:1). What is clear is 
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that it is certainly not a nation-state, yet the nation-state often provides the frame 
of reference in discussions of legitimacy. 
 
Without stating categorically that the EU indeed suffers from a crisis of 
legitimacy, there is undoubtedly a perception of a legitimacy crisis. The 
presumption that the EU needs to be legitimised according to liberal democratic 
principles has underpinned the governance and constitutional reform agendas of 
the institutions in the debate on the future of the EU. The purpose of this study is 
not to assess the magnitude of the legitimacy crisis but to observe that it has led to 
a change in behaviour on the part of the institutions and to look at the ways in 
which the institutions have attempted to respond to it. As Føllesdal points out, 
disagreements over what legitimacy is and different mechanisms for achieving it 
notwithstanding (2006:154-60), governments and EU officials have interpreted 
events following Maastricht to mean that the legitimacy of the EU is at stake 
(p153) – and furthermore have altered their behaviour accordingly. It is therefore 
worthwhile investigating these reactions further. 
 
In light of the perceived legitimacy problems faced by the EU, the debate on the 
future of the EU and other reform agendas have attempted to address the 
legitimacy crisis, or the gap between citizens and EU institutions. Katz (2001) 
suggests that legitimation through traditional structures of representative 
democracy is unrealistic at the EU level. Maurer (2003) sees a way of overcoming 
this paradox and emphasises that parliamentarism is not the only way of bridging 
the gap between EU citizens and the Union. The search for an additional 
Bringing cit izens and the EU closer 20 
 
democratic basis for the EU’s political authority was formalised in the 
constitutional treaty which established the principle of participatory democracy in 
its own right alongside the principle of representative democracy. In the context of 
this search for additional legitimating mechanisms I identify the emergence of two 
processes which provide the subject of this investigation. On the one hand there 
has been an attempt to embrace deliberative decision-making processes, perhaps as 
a means of mitigating the tendency towards bargaining that the absence of 
majoritarian politics encourages. On the other hand there has been a turn towards 
civil society in the search for agents to assist with the attempt to establish direct 
ties between the institutions and the citizens of the member states. Both these 
processes are outlined further in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
 
1.2.3  A normative turn in EU studies 
 
The absence of citizens from the European integration project is mirrored by the 
development of an academic literature on European integration which has also 
tended to focus on the elite level. The empirical literature on European integration 
has tended to pay little attention (or at least little substantive or systematic 
attention) to ordinary people at all (Imig & Tarrow 2001:7, Tarrow 2004). Instead, 
theoretical approaches to studying the emerging European polity have tended to 
focus on whether the emerging polity would be a Europe of states (Hoffman 1966, 
Moravcsik 1998), or an elite-constructed supranational state (Haas 1968); a multi-
level polity (Scharpf 1994, Marks, Hooghe & Blank 1996), a system of ‘network 
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governance’ (Kohler-Koch & Eising 1999), or ‘corporate governance’ (Falkner 
1998).  
 
The increased academic interest in the role of ordinary citizens and legitimacy in 
the European Union can be seen as part of a broader process, described by 
Bellamy & Castiglione as a normative ‘turn’ in European Union studies. It has 
become apparent that the integration process depends on ideals rather than just 
‘facts’ of functional efficiency (Bellamy & Castiglione 2003:7). As Nentwich & 
Weale point out, the constitutional choices confronting the EU in the post-
Maastricht period are ‘irreducibly normative’ (1998:1) since they depend upon 
what Beetham has termed ‘normative justifiability’ – the principles which justify 
the political authority of the EU. For example, the perceived need to rectify the 
democratic deficit is based upon the notion that liberal democracy is the 
appropriate legitimating principle for the EU’s political system – a notion which, 
as we have seen, has not been uncontroversial. 
 
Legitimacy issues had been addressed, albeit in a limited way, prior to Maastricht 
(see for example Scharpf 1988, Weiler 1991). However, in forcing decision-
makers to acknowledge the role played by ordinary citizens in EU political 
processes, Maastricht posed normative questions about the legitimate nature of 
political authority in the EU that had hitherto been avoided. Because these issues 
could no longer be avoided by academics, explaining and understanding the EU 
could no longer be done only in the context of functional efficiency and national 
economic interests. In other words, legitimacy became a dependent variable that 
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academics had to address in order to be able to understand and explain processes 
of integration and decision-making in the EU.  
 
The stalled ratification of the constitutional treaty may become another defining 
moment in the study of the EU’s legitimacy. The referenda in France and The 
Netherlands in 2005 have been described as ‘contentious collective action’ which 
demonstrated an increased politicisation of the European integration process, and 
which exposed significant discrepancies between the constitutional treaty and the 
people’s claims and expectations (Fossum & Trenz 2006), just as the Maastricht 
ratification process had done almost fifteen years previously. However, the 
importance of the French and Dutch rejections should not be overstated, or taken 
as an indication of overwhelming popular dissatisfaction with the constitutional 
treaty or the EU as a whole6. Furthermore, Fossum and Trenz point out that the 
EU is not a state, nor would the constitutional treaty have made it one. 
Nevertheless, in research terms the post-agreement record of the constitutional 
treaty makes it necessary to continue to study the relationship and interactions 
between the emerging EU polity and what they term its ‘social constituency’ i.e. 
organised civil society amongst others. The EU is not held together by a genuine 
public sphere neither can it draw on the solidarity and identity of a unified demos. 
It is nevertheless confronted with expectations of democratic legitimacy and with 
                                          
6
 As Taggart  points out , conclusions on the im plicat ions of the referenda depend upon what  ‘angle’ 
they are v iewed from . From  the perspect ive of the EU studies com m unity the referenda results 
represent  a roadblock on integrat ion. Yet  looked at  from  a dom est ic perspect ive they are an 
exam ple of ‘polit ics as usual’ and, furthermore stem  from  two different  domest ic circum stances 
(2006: 7-8)  
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claims for participation, membership and belonging which need to be researched 
(2006:59-60). 
 
Just as there are varying academic views on the EU’s prognosis regarding its crisis 
of legitimacy, there are also varying views on how to cure it. Political theorists are 
concerned with what makes political authority in the EU right or justifiable. 
Indeed, the EU presents a challenge to political theorists in determining how to 
legitimise a system that is more than an international organisation but less than a 
state. However, as Beetham and Lord point out, these essentially normative 
concerns are increasingly appropriated by political analysts engaged in a rather 
different enterprise: to understand and explain the political system of the EU rather 
than to define or justify ideal criteria for its authority (1998:1-2). This 
investigation is informed by the theoretical literature but contributes to discussions 
of legitimacy in the European Union in a different way. My empirical analysis of 
the role played by civil society identifies barriers to democratic linkage and the 
consequent limitations for a strengthening of EU governance and as such, can in 
turn inform the normative debates. 
 
The components of the normative turn in EU studies have, according to Føllesdal 
(2006: 151, 166) largely focused on how the European institutions are governed. 
Legitimacy, in this view, depends on how decisions are made, as well as what the 
outcome of the decision-making process is. This implies a concern with input 
legitimacy arguments to supplement the output arguments that sustained the 
‘permissive consensus’. Bellamy & Castiglione (2001:2) argue that normative 
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arguments are central to discussions of governance in the EU. They point out that 
governance discourses have tended to adopt a descriptive tone, presenting the 
emergence of polycentric and fragmented governance as characteristic of EU 
decision-making. However, simply saying that something occurs does not provide 
a justification for it, and governance approaches must address the issue of 
legitimation of new structures of governance. 
 
At the outset of this research project the Convention had concluded its business 
and the IGC which subsequently agreed the constitutional treaty was about to 
begin. The constitutional treaty was since rejected by referenda in two member 
states, ratified or nearly ratified by a further 18 states, a period of reflection was 
called for by the European Council in June 2005 and extended in June 2006, and 
agreement to move towards a new reform treaty agreed by the European Council 
in June 2007. If the need to try and understand the relationship between the 
governed and governing in the EU was important in September 2003, it has 
certainly not decreased in importance in the interim and has arguably become even 
more urgent. The institutions show no signs of abandoning the examination of 
their relationship with the citizens (continuing calls for ‘bridging the gap’ between 
citizens and EU institutions abound) and the relationship itself shows no signs of 
becoming less problematic in the near future. 
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1.3 Towards legitimate governance: Civil Society and Democratic 
Linkage in the Debate on the Future of the EU 
 
 
The post-Nice reform discourses outlined a role for civil society – or more 
specifically the organisations that populate civil society – in helping to bring 
citizens and EU institutions closer together. However because this discourse 
operated at the level of rhetoric it was vague and contained very little discussion or 
explanation of how this would work in practice. I argue that in order to fully 
understand the contribution of civil society to legitimate EU governance it is 
necessary to go beyond the rhetoric and look empirically at the organisations 
involved. In doing so this thesis also contributes to normative debates on the role 
of citizens and legitimacy in the EU by providing a more nuanced, empirically-
informed understanding of the capacities and willingness of organisations in 
relation to strengthening legitimate governance and the opportunities for them to 
do so. In the following sections I outline the major components of my empirical 
investigation: civil society, debate and democratic linkage. 
 
 
1.3.1  Civil society and legitimate governance 
 
The notion of civil society has featured heavily in recent EU reform discourses and 
has been an important component of the institutions’ attempts to enhance the 
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legitimacy of EU governance. This interest in civil society on the part of the EU 
institutions should be seen in the context of a broader tendency among politicians 
which is not confined to the EU setting. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the idea 
of civil society was seized upon as a means of strengthening democracy7 (for an 
academic overview see Foley & Edwards 1997; Young 2000; Diamond 1996). 
Civil society is seen as able to provide something, or play a role which formal 
political authorities cannot. In the EU context, the role of civil society is often 
invoked to indicate that the EU institutions acting alone, cannot solve the EU’s 
legitimacy problems, as for example in the European Commission’s 2001 
governance white paper (Commission 2001a). 
 
The nature of this contribution to legitimate governance has been expressed in 
terms of the need to ‘bring citizens and EU institutions closer’. The exact way in 
which civil society brings citizens closer to institutions is not immediately obvious 
but the rhetoric of the reform discourses assumes a high degree of mutual 
inclusivity between citizens and civil society. Nentwich (1998) has argued that 
most of the ‘opportunity structures’ for the participation of citizens in EU politics 
in fact favour highly organised and transnational interests, noting that ‘citizens 
Europe is very much about associations rather than individual citizens’ (Venables 
1990:22). Magnette (2003) reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of the 2001 
governance white paper. He observed that one of the main themes was the need to 
strengthen the relationship between citizens and the EU institutions but in fact the 
                                          
7
 Of course, the not ion of civ il society did not  or iginate in the 1980s. Diam ond (1996:  227)  t races 
the theoret ical or igins of the concept  to Alexis de Tocqueville and argues that  it  is ‘emot ionally and 
spir itually indebted to Jean-Jacques Rousseau for its rom ant icizat ion of “ the people”  as a force for 
collect ive good’. 
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vast majority of the concrete proposals referred to the role of civil society 
organisations in decision-making. Similarly the Laeken declaration appears to 
conflate citizens and civil society, stating that, in order to involve all citizens in the 
debate on the future of the EU, a Forum for civil society organisations would be 
established. And this trend continues in the constitutional treaty, specifically 
Article I-47 which makes a commitment to giving ‘citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in 
all areas of Union action’ (point 1), implying that this can be achieved through 
‘regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’ (point 2). 
 
These examples reveal that the term ‘civil society’ as outlined by the EU 
institutions in the reform discourses actually refers to the organisations that 
populate the space between citizens and the state – what can be described more 
specifically as ‘organised civil society’. This raises questions about the exact ways 
in which the institutionalised participation of these various EU-level organisations 
purporting to represent elements within civil society helps to bring citizens and the 
institutions closer together, or in other words facilitates democratic linkage. In 
particular it poses the question of whether these organisations are any less distant 
from ordinary citizens than the EU institutions themselves.  
 
The EU institutions have a history of working with organisations of civil society 
except they were not in the past called ‘civil society’ actors. Instead they were 
referred to as ‘organised interests’ and the purpose of their involvement in EU 
politics was to provide expertise in the policy-making process. This could 
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strengthen legitimate governance by helping to make and implement effective, 
efficient policies which worked well on the ground, or in other words enhance 
output legitimacy. But in the context of the debate on the future of the EU, the 
rhetoric focuses on the role of civil society in bringing citizens in to the debates, 
thereby emphasising a strengthening of input as well as output legitimacy. 
Understanding the contribution made by these organisations to strengthening input 
legitimacy by bringing citizens closer requires us to ask: what exactly is the nature 
of their relationship with ordinary citizens? 
 
In spite of, or perhaps even because of their assumption of a connection between 
citizens and civil society, the institutions have said little in relation to the concrete 
ways in which the organisations in question can help bring citizens and EU 
institutions closer together. Of course, the reform discourses are declaratory in 
nature, outlining ideas and principles and are therefore rather vague on exact 
details. One of the major problems to be faced when analysing the role of civil 
society is to establish meaning. Certainly, the concept of civil society has been 
used in the various discourses surrounding the debate on the future of the EU 
without sufficient clarity, as a panacea for all the democratic problems the EU 
faces. In the process, however, it has become increasingly difficult to identify what 
exactly civil society is, and the mechanisms by which it can strengthen the 
legitimacy of EU governance. For these reasons my analysis of civil society begins 
with an examination of the concept of civil society and the ways in which it has 
been linked to democratic legitimacy.  
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The methodological focus of this investigation is the activities and perspectives of 
civil society organisations that were involved in the Convention and Futurum. 
Semi-structured interviews with 25 such organisations were conducted in order to 
develop an understanding of how the rhetoric and theory on civil society and 
legitimate governance were reflected on the ground. Though treated collectively as 
‘civil society’, the organisations involved in the Convention and Futurum 
initiatives contained organisations as diverse as trade unions, regional 
organisations, NGOs, and think-tanks. This picture of diversity was reinforced by 
the respondents in the semi-structured interviews, underlining the significant 
variation between the organisations, and bringing in to question the effectiveness 
of any strategy that presumed a single coherent role could be assigned to such a 
heterogeneous group.  
 
 
1.3.2  Debate and legitimate governance 
 
My investigation of these civil society organisations and their contribution to 
legitimate EU governance took place within the context of the ‘debate on the 
future of the EU’. Although the concern with strengthening legitimate governance 
dates back as least as far as Maastricht and continues today, the debate on the 
future of the EU offers a uniquely useful context for the investigation. The treaty 
reform component of the debate was, unlike any previous processes of treaty 
reform, largely motivated by the need to address the challenge of meeting citizens’ 
needs and expectations. Alongside this treaty reform process, and again for the 
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first time, was a commitment to broaden the debate in order to ensure the 
involvement of a much broader range of actors – including civil society – than had 
been involved in the past.  
 
On the 7th March 2001 the Belgian and Swedish presidencies, along with the 
presidents of the Commission and EP launched ‘the debate on the future of the 
EU’ initiative with the opening of the Futurum website. In their joint statement 
they outlined that the Union had committed itself to a debate which should reach 
out further than before to all sections of society:  
 
On the European level it is important to establish a common place 
where all contributions can be collected and easily be accessible to all 
interested parties, the media and above all to the citizens of Europe.  
(Persson et al 2001) 
 
The launch of Futurum and the debate initiative was the symbolic formalisation of 
the call for a ‘deeper and wider debate’ on the future of the EU made by the Heads 
of State and Government at Nice in December 2000, and reiterated in more 
concrete terms at Laeken in December 2001. The Treaty of Nice was finally 
agreed on 11th December 2000 and was signed in February 2001 after months of 
negotiations. The mandate of this IGC, as outlined by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
was to prepare the Union for enlargement by reforming the treaty provisions on a 
series of institutional questions. However many of those involved and those 
observing felt that there was still much that needed to be done to reform the EU 
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and prepare it for future enlargements. Furthermore, there was a sense on the part 
of those involved that the negotiations had been protracted and difficult, and had 
produced an outcome that was inadequate. In an interview, one Union official that 
had been involved in the drafting of both the Nice and the Constitutional treaties 
described how: 
 
Tony Blair stood up at the end of the fourth day of the Nice European 
Council and said ‘we can’t carry on doing business like this’. So there 
was a real sense post-Nice and that rather bruising experience for the 
heads of government that there had to be a different approach in terms 
of treaty modification. 
Union official # 3, 28.03.06, Brussels 
 
As though in acknowledgement of this, a ‘Declaration on the Future of the Union’ 
was annexed to the Treaty after it had been signed in Spring 2001. It was in point 3 
of this declaration that the Heads of State and Government called for ‘a deeper and 
wider debate about the further development of the European Union’ (see Cram 
2001: 595). In December 2001, almost a year after the Nice meeting, the Heads of 
State and Government met again, this time in Laeken in Belgium. The purpose of 
the meeting was to make more concrete and more formal the ‘deeper and wider 
debate’ on the future of the EU. The outcome of this meeting, the so-called 
‘Laeken declaration’ specified the content of the debate, the method it would 
adopt, and convened a new IGC in 2004.  
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The content of the debate was defined in sixty questions which were organised 
into the four ‘themes’ that had been identified at Nice: better division and 
definition of competences; simplification of the instruments; more democracy, 
transparency and efficiency in the European Union (including specifying the role 
of national parliaments) and; paving the way for a Constitution for the people of 
Europe (clarifying the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights). The method 
would be a Convention. The Convention method had been used before in drawing 
up the Charter of Fundamental Rights, but its application in the process of treaty 
reform marked a departure from the closed methods that had traditionally been 
used (Maurer 2003). The Convention was charged with making proposals for 
institutional reform though in the event it went much further than this in drawing 
up a draft constitutional treaty. It would include representatives of national 
governments and parliaments of the member and application states; and 
representatives of the Commission and European Parliament as well as observers, 
representatives of the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the 
Regions, the social partners and the European Ombudsman.  
 
The role of the Convention was to ‘consider the key issues arising for the Union’s 
future development and…identify the various possible responses’ (European 
Council 2001a). The outcomes would prepare the way for a new IGC, and as such, 
the debate initiative was part of the process leading towards treaty reform. 
However it was not confined to preparing for treaty reform. The Commission’s 
governance reform agenda ran in parallel with the debate initiative, and claimed to 
both draw from, and feed back into it (Commission 2001a, see also Wincott 2001). 
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The 2001 White Paper on European Governance, although self-consciously 
separate from the process of treaty reform, began from similar premises and dealt 
with many of the same issues. It shared a concern with ‘bringing citizens closer’ 
and encouraging public involvement in debates on the future direction of the EU. 
The Commission’s involvement in the debate initiative also operated at a practical 
level. Its communication on ‘certain arrangements for the debate on the future of 
the EU’ spelt out how the open debate involving all sectors of civil society would 
be related to the more circumscribed institutional debate leading towards treaty 
reform (Commission 2001b).  
 
The debate initiative, to all intents and purposes, concluded with the signing of the 
constitutional treaty in October 2004. Of course, debates about the EU’s future 
continue. The ratification process, which began in February 2005, encouraged 
national debates on the future of the EU which were ostensibly about, but not 
necessarily limited to, the constitutional treaty. These varied from one member 
state to another. For example in Spain discussion was limited but the electorate 
voted ‘yes’ to the treaty by a large majority, whereas in France and the 
Netherlands debate was widespread, but rarely about the constitutional treaty, and 
in the UK, debate barely got started. Following the referenda in France and the 
Netherlands in May and June of 2005, the European Council called for a period of 
reflection before deciding how to move forward, a key component of which was 
the need for a debate. 
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The debate initiative analysed here should be seen in broad terms. It incorporates a 
formal agenda aimed at reforming the treaties and more informal processes of 
reflection running alongside the treaty reform. It comprised a wide rage of 
institutional and non-institutional actors, from those traditionally involved in treaty 
reform processes – heads of state or government and their representatives – and 
other institutional actors from the European, national, regional and local levels, to 
non-state actors from civil society. It set clear goals, namely to address key 
questions regarding the institutional architecture of the EU (as specified in the 
Laeken declaration) as well as more abstract ideals, specifically the ‘bringing 
closer together’ of citizens and the EU institutions.  
 
Recasting the treaty reform process in terms of a ‘debate’ and accompanying it 
with a broader discussion intended to involve a greater variation of participants 
was, I argue, an important and deliberate decision. It made a conscious effort to 
break with traditions of treaty reform in the EU, in tune with the suggestion that 
the EU had to find ‘another way of doing business’. It can also be seen as an 
important component of both the Commission’s and the European Council’s 
rhetoric on getting closer to the citizens. Debate, by its very nature, involves 
multiple participants and perspectives, all equally valid. It can be seen as a more 
‘deliberative’ approach to decision-making than previous processes of treaty 
reform. There is therefore an interesting theoretical dimension to the debate 
initiative. 
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The debate on the future of the EU initiative provides an interesting context for an 
investigation of the ways in which civil society can help enhance legitimate 
governance. As the previous sub-section indicated, the involvement of 
organisations representing various societal interests has been a feature of EU 
politics for many years. However these activities – and our understandings of them 
– have generally been confined to the policy-making process. The debate on the 
future of the EU provides a different context – one of constitution-making as 
opposed to policy-making, addressing issues of polity as opposed to policy. As 
such it is a new arena for the study of these organisations in the EU, and may 
contribute to an enhanced understanding of their role in EU politics. In addition 
the key statements made by the institutions in reference to the debate (namely the 
Nice and Laeken declarations) said very little about how exactly this debate, and 
civil society involvement in it, would work. Whilst the Commission moved down 
the ladder of abstraction with its governance white paper, this was much less 
specific in its proposals than previous white papers, notably Lord Cockfield’s 1985 
report on completing the single market (Metcalfe 2001) and its Communication on 
arrangements for the debate stopped short of concrete instructions for 
implementation. There are few explicit accounts of how debate, and the 
involvement of civil society in it, can help bring citizens and EU institutions closer 
together and thus strengthen legitimate governance.  
 
My investigation contributes to what has thus far been a rather under-theorised 
issue by taking a closer look at two specific components of the debate initiative: 
the Convention and Futurum. These two case studies provide examples of both the 
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formal and informal nature of the debate initiative. The Convention was part of the 
formal process leading towards treaty reform, whereas Futurum was located within 
the broader informal debates on the EU’s future. Yet in both cases, attempts were 
made to broaden the debates by involving civil society. The involvement of civil 
society in the Convention was formalised in the Laeken declaration which called 
for a Forum for civil society running alongside the discussions of the Convention 
members. For its part, Futurum encouraged civil society organisations to enter into 
partnerships in order to encourage a wider dissemination of the debates. Despite 
these provisions and the opportunities for civil society involvement, my analysis of 
the debates in the Convention and Futurum also reveals limitations placed upon 
organisations and their contribution to the debates. 
 
 
1.3.3  Mechanisms of democratic linkage 
 
This thesis transforms the questions relating to civil society and debate into an 
empirical investigation by drawing upon and developing the notion of democratic 
linkage. Linkages have been defined as ‘the various types of bonds which may 
exist between individual citizens, social organisations, and the political system’ 
(Aarts 1998: 227). Such linkages are regarded as crucial to democratic political 
systems in the absence of either direct democracy or ideal-type representative 
democracy. The notion – and necessity – of linkage is implicit within liberal 
democracy, and in liberal democratic political systems there are formal and 
informal ‘mechanisms’ at work. Easton described how linkages from 
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‘intermediary’ organisations to citizens and the political system could articulate 
social cleavages and thereby contribute to the stability of the system (1965: 250-
7). Lawson has also explored the democratic benefits of linkage in relation to 
political parties (1980) but acknowledges that linkage is not always nice, and can 
sometimes be detrimental to democracy, for example, when it is used for self-
serving purposes (2005:161). 
 
Research on linkages has tended to focus on the actors – the intermediary 
associations – that provide the linkage, with political parties receiving the most 
empirical attention. Lawson’s work on political parties has largely centred on the 
relationship between citizens and political institutions (Farrell, Ignazi & Römmele 
2005: 17). In her classic study of parties and linkage (Lawson 1980: 13-19) she 
identifies several ‘types’ of linkage, including ‘participatory linkage’ whereby 
political parties serve as agencies in which citizens can participate in government; 
and ‘policy-responsive linkage’ whereby parties ensure that government officials 
are responsive to the views of voters. Kitschelt (2000, see also Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson 2007) has also explored the ways in which political parties could 
strengthen the relationship between citizens and the structures of political authority 
to which they were subject, identifying a range of ‘mechanisms’ (such as the 
charisma of party leaders) through which parties could facilitate this democratic 
linkage.  
 
In the EU context, linkages between citizens and the political system have not, in 
general, been a major focus for investigation – though this has changed somewhat 
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since Maastricht, as the role of citizens themselves has changed. Again, those 
linkage studies that exist have tended to address the linkage role of political parties 
as a means of addressing the democratic deficit (Schmitt 2005), alongside a 
growing body of literature on determinants of voting behaviour, some of which 
addresses the role of political parties as intermediaries and agents of linkage 
(Thorlakson 2005; Gallagher, Laver & Mair 2006). However research on civil 
society organisations in the EU has been framed in terms of their contribution to 
policy-making. This is not necessarily separate from or different to their potential 
linkage role, but it does turn analytical attention away from it. My investigation of 
civil society organisations in the Convention and Futurum will begin to address 
this gap in the research by examining whether and how the linkage role is 
performed.   
 
I focus on three broad mechanisms of democratic linkage: participation, 
representation and communication. The purpose of these mechanisms in the 
investigation is two-fold. On the one hand the mechanisms correspond to 
analytical concepts which can help explain the function of civil society vis-à-vis 
the governed and the governing, in this case citizens and EU institutions. As such, 
participation, representation and communication are general ideas, ‘abstract 
notions, composed of various features which deliver [their] distinctive character’ 
(Heywood 1994: 4). They can help to isolate and identify the various ways civil 
society organisations provide democratic linkage. On the other hand, they can be 
used as descriptive terms referring to the various activities employed by the 
organisations. Whilst they may not necessarily describe different kinds of activity, 
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participation, representation and communication provide different ways of looking 
at the same or similar activities. I outline in brief the three mechanisms of linkage 
explored in this investigation below. 
 
Participation 
Participation refers to the taking part of citizens in processes of decision-making. 
Participation can be institutionalised, for example voting for elected 
representatives, or can occur outside formal settings of representative democracy 
(see Nentwich 1998 on the various opportunities for citizen participation in the EU 
– formal and informal, direct and indirect). In this context participation refers to 
the active involvement of citizens in the debate on the future of the EU (and 
resembles Lawson’s (1980:13) notion of ‘participatory linkage’). The principle of 
participatory democracy was established in the constitutional treaty (I-47) as a 
complement to representative democracy; and was identified in the governance 
white paper as one of five principles of ‘good governance’. It is unclear whether, 
and if so how this differs from established processes of consultation of interests, 
and further whether it can make a new contribution to legitimate governance. The 
notion of ‘participation’ was prominent in the rhetoric of the institutions during the 
debate on the future of the EU. This poses the question of whether civil society 
organisations facilitated the active participation of ordinary citizens in discussions 
about the future of the EU, or whether these organisations acted as a ‘surrogate’ or 
‘proxy’ for citizens, participating in discussions on the behalf or, or instead of 
citizens. If the latter were to be the case this poses the question of whether this 
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contributed to linkage in terms of bringing citizens closer to the institutions, as 
well as bringing institutions closer to the preferences of citizens. 
 
Representation 
Civil society organisations (of the type studied here) are often said to ‘represent’ 
civil society. Furthermore, there is an established body of research on the role of 
such organisations in processes of ‘Interest Representation’ in the EU (see Mazey 
& Richardson 1993, Greenwood 2003). But what exactly does representation mean 
in this context, how does it differ from formal channels of representation (i.e. 
structures of representative democracy), and what are the implications of this? For 
civil society organisations to participate in debates on the future of the EU as a 
means of bringing citizens and institutions closer together, the extent to which 
these organisations ‘represent’ citizens is crucial. Although civil society 
organisations may be effective actors in processes of interest representation, the 
debate rhetoric and the focus on participation implies a different or additional form 
of representation whereby civil society organisations are seen to represent citizens 
and/or their interests in descriptive and/or symbolic terms. It becomes apparent 
that there are different theoretical understandings of the concept of representation 
which have implications for democratic linkage. 
 
Communication 
Participation and representation frame conventional understandings of the role of 
civil society in democracies. In addition to these traditional mechanisms of 
democratic linkage, it has become increasingly apparent that communication might 
Bringing cit izens and the EU closer 41 
 
act as a mechanism of linkage at the EU level. The EU institutions, in particular 
the European Commission, have been active in promoting the role civil society 
organisations can play in ‘communicating Europe with the citizens’ based on the 
assumption that the gap between citizens is partly due to inadequate 
communication between the two. It appears that the Commission envisages a 
communicative role for civil society organisations involving the passing of 
messages back and forth from the EU institutions to citizens. The extent to which 
this is feasible is unclear and requires further empirical investigation. It is 
dependent in part on the capacities and the willingness of organisations to engage 
in communication activities. 
 
The concepts of participation, representation and communication provide the 
analytical framework for the investigation of civil society and legitimate EU 
governance. Data on the activities of civil society organisations in the Convention 
and Futurum from the interviews is categorised, demonstrating that the same 
activity can be understood in up to three different ways. This inductive approach 
does not prejudge the nature of linkage and as a consequence leads to a more 
nuanced understanding of the linkage role played by civil society in the debates. 
 
 
1.4 Investigating civil society, debate and democratic linkage: the 
structure of the thesis 
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To summarise, the issues raised so far can be expressed as a series of propositions: 
1. The EU institutions have identified a gap between themselves and the 
citizens of the member states and have attempted various ways of closing 
this gap in order to overcome what is seen as one of the greatest challenges 
facing the Union. 
2. This is an interesting and neglected issue for empirical investigation 
because it helps us to understand the nature of the EU political system and 
develop explanations of it. Legitimacy is hereby an explanatory variable in 
the study of the EU 
3. Taking liberal democratic principles as the basis of EU legitimacy there are 
different components of the legitimacy of EU governance; performance 
and identity for example. The focus here is on democratic legitimacy, and 
attempts to strengthen it outside formal structures of representative 
democracy 
4. The identification of ‘civil society’ as a means of bringing citizens and EU 
institutions closer together (thereby enhancing legitimacy) in this way 
poses a range of questions and avenues of investigation about the prospects 
of such a strategy 
5. The notion of ‘linkage’ and specifically three mechanisms of achieving 
such linkage can help frame the investigation: participation of citizens 
(individual or organised) in decision-making processes; representation of 
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citizens and/or their interests by organised civil society; communication of 
organised civil society with EU institutions and citizens 
6. The ‘Debate on the Future of the EU’ provides the context for this 
investigation since the issues of legitimacy and the role of civil society 
loom large within it 
 
In this context the investigation outlined here addresses the following research 
question: 
 
How can we understand the contribution to democratic linkage made by organised 
civil society in the context of the debate on the future of the EU? 
 
In the following discussion I outline how the observations made above regarding 
citizens, civil society and legitimate EU governance are translated into a 
‘programme of research’  around which my thesis is developed8.  
 
The discussion in the previous sections identifies the emergence of an institutional 
discourse on the role played by civil society in ‘bringing citizens and EU 
institutions closer together’. The emergence of this discourse is interesting in 
itself, and arguably provides scope for a ‘critical discourse analysis’ of the 
language used and the meanings therein (Fairclough 2001). Critical discourse 
analysis focuses on how social relations and power are constructed through the 
                                          
8
 I  am  inform ed here by Hakim ’s discussion of research design as the point  at  which the 
theoret ical quest ions raised above are converted into feasible research projects that  can provide 
answers to the quest ions (Hakim  2000: xi)  
 
Bringing cit izens and the EU closer 44 
 
judicious use of language and rhetoric. Fairclough, as one of the primary 
proponents of critical discourse analysis, analysed the rhetoric of the New Labour 
government in the UK in his book ‘New Labour New Language? (Fairclough 
2000)’. In this study, Fairclough found that Tony Blair, and his spin doctors, used 
language and rhetorical devices to convey a message about a break with ‘old’ 
Labour’s past, and the emergence of a new political option, the ‘Third Way’. The 
rhetoric used by the Commission in documents such as the White Paper on 
Governance suggests that there is scope for a similar type of investigation, 
focusing on the construction of a discourse on legitimate EU governance through 
debate – and the role of the EU institutions as facilitators therein. 
 
But my concern was how the debate on the future of the EU as a legitimacy-
enhancing exercise, a ‘creation in language’ in Fairclough’s terminology, 
corresponded to the experiences of the actors concerned; and whether the inherent 
assumptions about the potential linkage role of civil society organisations are 
grounded in an understanding of their characteristics, capacity and willingness to 
play this role. Simply observing or even analysing the discourses that are being 
constructed could not provide this insight.  
 
In order to go beyond the rhetoric and try to understand the experiences of the 
actors involved in the debate initiative I turned the methodological focus towards 
the individual actors behind the discourses, and gathered qualitative data on these 
events and phenomena through semi-structured interviews. I conducted six 
interviews with Union officials from the European Commission, the Council and 
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the Economic and Social Committee (during March & April 2006). The informal 
and loosely structured nature of these discussions encouraged the respondents to 
depart from the official rhetoric on the debate but I was concerned that speaking 
only to the institutional actors involved was likely to provide only one part of the 
story. I therefore conducted an additional 25 interviews with officials from 
organisations that were involved in either the Futurum or Convention initiatives 
(between January and April 2005), or both; from which the bulk of my empirical 
data is drawn.  
 
I developed two different ‘interview guides’ (Bryman, 2004: 321)9: one for use in 
the interviews with Union officials and one for the interviews with civil society 
organisations. The guides contained a list a topics that I made my way through 
during the interview. Although I included in the guides some examples of how to 
phrase questions, they were not a list of questions that I delivered in the same 
order to each respondent. Rather the guides were a tool that helped me to prompt 
or probe the respondent, allowing for flexibility as some respondents were chattier 
than others, but which ensured that I covered all the issues that I wanted the 
respondents to comment on.  
 
A characteristic of semi-structured (and unstructured) interviews is that the role 
played by the interviewer can be more pronounced than is the case in highly 
structured interviews. In managing the prospect of ‘interviewer effects’ I tried to 
                                          
9
 Brym an defines an interview guide for use in sem i-st ructured interv iews as a ‘st ructured list  of 
issues to be addressed or quest ions to be answered’ (2004: 540) . 
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refer to Kvale’s criteria of a good interviewer (1996). I aimed to keep my 
contributions to a minimum but to prompt and probe where necessary. Because I 
was primarily concerned with gathering rich data on the perspectives of the 
respondents I recorded the interviews, and took minimal notes at the time. I asked 
each of the respondents in advance whether they would mind me doing so and 
offered them the opportunity to object but none of them did (the subject was not 
sensitive). Once recorded, the interviews had to be transcribed – however, unlike 
some of the literature on generating qualitative data using this method, I am not 
inclined to view this as a drawback of the method or approach. Rather, 
transcribing the interviews gave me the opportunity to get closer to the data and 
develop a deeper familiarity with it. 
 
One of my main reasons for choosing semi-structured interviews as the primary 
method of data collection was that they allow for respondents to describe in their 
own words their activities, perspectives and opinions. In the case of the interviews 
with individuals from the various civil society organisations this generated a more 
personal account of the organisations’ involvement in the debate on the future of 
the EU – rather than the organisation’s ‘official line’ on the subject. For the Union 
officials, it enabled me to get beyond the rhetoric that pervaded the official 
communications surrounding the debate. 
 
However, semi-structured interviewing as a method of generating qualitative data 
relies on accepting that the accounts provided by respondents are an accurate and 
honest reflection of their beliefs, activities and opinions. However, it is not always 
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the case that interviewees will speak truthfully about these things. Although the 
discussion with interviewees tended not to cover issues of a sensitive nature, there 
might nevertheless be incentives for respondents to provide answers that were 
misleading, and which would therefore undermine the validity of the data. One 
possible pitfall is the tendency for civil society (and institutional) actors to inflate 
the importance of their own role or contribution in discussions about the EU’s 
future. 
 
Another was the issue of ‘social desirability’. Although as mentioned the subject 
of the discussions was not sensitive or incriminating, such is the power of the 
discourses on the role of citizens in democratic decision-making, that to depart 
from this line might be conspicuous. Whilst Monnet may have been able to get 
away with suggesting that consulting the people was not necessary, and that 
Europe should develop in an elitist manner, it would be difficult for Union 
officials to get away with saying this on the record today, despite the sense one 
gained that their jobs might be much easier, were it not for the need to be 
accountable and democratic. 
 
Nevertheless, the problems associated with semi-structured interviews are, in my 
view, vastly outweighed by their primary benefit in relation to this investigation: 
they produced entirely new data: data that would not otherwise have been 
available. The generation of rich new data helps to make sense of the extent to 
which civil society organisations in the EU have the capacity and the willingness 
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to facilitate democratic linkage, or ‘bring citizens and EU institutions closer 
together. In the following five chapters I pursue and develop this line of enquiry. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the context of the investigation, namely the ‘debate on the 
future of the EU’ initiative, asking the questions, ‘what is debate and how can it 
help strengthen legitimate governance?’ I address these questions theoretically by 
drawing upon ideas about the role of debate found with democratic theory, and in 
particular the deliberative democracy literature. I then prepare for an investigation 
of how these ideas are manifested in the debate on the future of the EU by 
outlining the two case studies – the Convention and Futurum. I analyse the stories 
of the Convention and Futurum, identifying the attempts to broaden the debates as 
a means of making them more legitimate. I argue that presenting the treaty reform 
process as part of a debate on the EU’s future was a self-conscious attempt by the 
EU institutions to confer legitimacy on the process. However the legitimating 
effects of debate were limited because of the ways in which the ideas and rhetoric 
were implemented insufficiently on the ground. 
  
In Chapter 3 I turn attention towards civil society as the agents of democratic 
linkage, and crucial actors in both the case studies. Before analysing the 
contribution of civil society to democratic linkage, and democratic linkage I reflect 
on the questions ‘what is civil society and how does it contribute to legitimate 
governance?’ A theoretical analysis of some of the recent trends in civil society 
literature reveals two broad (and not always complementary) views, elements of 
which can be found in the reform discourses of the EU institutions. The 
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prominence of the notion of civil society in recent institutional discourses 
disguises a much longer relationship between EU institutions and associations, 
previously under the auspices of ‘interest representation’. The continuity of 
associational activity poses the question of whether there has been a break with the 
past, and if the adoption of the language of ‘civil society’ is accompanied by a 
contribution to input as well as output legitimacy. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are framed by the concepts of participation, representation and 
communication respectively. They each begin with a theoretical analysis of the 
concept in question and the way in which it strengthens legitimacy through 
linkage. In brief, participation is understood as the taking part of citizens (whether 
individual or group citizens, elite or ordinary citizens) in processes of decision-
making; representation is about the making present in decision-making processes 
of someone or something that is not actually present; and communication refers to 
the transmission of information relating to the decision-making process. Then each 
chapter presents and analyses the empirical data from the interviews by identifying 
the activities which can be understood as participation, representation or 
communication activities; and the perspectives of the civil society organisations 
and Union officials on these activities. 
 
Finally in Chapter 7 I summarise the key findings of the preceding five chapters 
before returning to the questions of legitimate governance and the role of citizens 
that have been outlined here. 
  
 
Chapter 2  
 
 
The debate on the future of the EU: democratic linkage through 
debate? 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The notion of debate dominated the EU’s post-Nice reform agenda. The 
Declaration on the Future of the Union (made by the European Council at their 
December 2000 meeting and subsequently annexed to Treaty of Nice as 
Declaration No. 23) was among the first to establish debate as a feature of treaty 
reform, highlighting the need for a ‘deeper and wider debate’ on the future of the 
EU (European Union 2001). By linking this debate to a perceived ‘need to 
improve and monitor the democratic legitimacy’ of the Union’s institutions in 
order to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States, it made a 
connection between debate and legitimate governance for the EU. The sentiments 
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of the European Council were echoed soon afterwards by the Commission in its 
2001 White Paper on European Governance. This stated that ‘democracy depends 
on people being able to take part in public debate’, and argued that such 
participation should be a key principle of EU governance (Commission 2001a). 
Debate therefore, has been identified by the institutions as both a means towards 
and an end of legitimate EU governance: a procedural mechanism for 
democratising EU governance and an aspirational characteristic of a democratic 
EU.  
 
Debate was a key feature of the process that led towards the signing of the 
constitutional treaty and even after the failure of France and the Netherlands to 
ratify this document, the idea of debate remained powerful. The Commission’s 
response to the period of reflection called by the heads of state and government 
following the referenda was to launch ‘Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate’ which intended to ‘stimulate a wider debate between the European 
Union’s democratic institutions and citizens’ (Commission 2005b). In other words, 
both the post-Nice process of treaty reform which produced the constitutional 
treaty; and the period of uncertainty following the rejection of the constitutional 
treaty by referenda in two member states (which the post-Nice treaty reform 
process had produced) were met with calls for debate. Clearly, in the view of the 
institutions, debate has potential problem-solving capacities vis-à-vis legitimate 
governance. But what exactly are these capacities? 
 
The tendency of political actors to turn to debate as a means of addressing 
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complex problems extends beyond the EU context. In the UK it was noted that in 
the first half of 2006 the UK Parliament heard more than 100 calls for national 
debates on issues as diverse as ‘the future of policing; road charging; pensions, 
hoodies; Britishness, the comprehensive spending review; council tax; a bill of 
rights; the health service; the cost of medicines; drug laws; nuclear weapons; 
nuclear waste; and smoking’ (Glover 2006). Reflecting on the question, ‘what is a 
national debate?’ this article made the observation that the point at which a debate 
ends is unclear, as is who decides the outcome, and that ultimately, more begin 
than are concluded. Although this is a light-hearted critique of the propensity of 
politicians to speak in clichés and rely on language which lends them a cloak of 
moral respectability there is a serious point about the way in which debate is used 
to both infer and confer legitimacy. The more frequent the calls for a debate 
become across a range of issue areas, the more elusive it appears. The term 
‘debate’ is used in so many contexts yet so rarely defined with any precision that it 
is in danger of becoming meaningless, contributing further to a gap between 
rhetoric and reality. It is in this context that the chapter seeks to understand the 
relationship between debate and legitimacy; and to investigate empirically whether 
the EU’s debate initiative has the potential to strengthen democratically legitimate 
governance. 
 
In the first part of the chapter I elaborate a theoretical explanation of how debate 
strengthens democratic legitimacy. I place the ubiquity of calls made by political 
actors for public debates on various problematic or contentious issues in the 
context of a ‘deliberative turn’ within democratic theory over the past 20 years. 
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The deliberative democracy literature, in particular the work of Cohen (1989), 
Dryzek (1990, 2000), Elster (1998), and Gutmann & Thompson (2004) assists my 
operationalisation of debate through an account of discursive processes in 
democracy; and my explanation of why debate is seen as a desirable component of 
EU governance in the contention that the essence of democratic legitimacy is 
located in deliberative processes. In the second part of the chapter I address the 
legitimising potential of debate empirically. I identify the ‘debate on the future of 
the EU’ (the debate initiative) as an attempt to implement of the notion of debate 
in the process of treaty reform. Two components of the debate initiative – the 
Convention on the future of the EU and Futurum – provide case studies within 
which I analyse whether there were opportunities for civil society organisations to 
provide democratic linkage through processes of participation, representation and 
communication. 
 
 
2.2 Debate and legitimacy in democratic theory 
 
 
Part of the reason why calls for debate have been so widespread is that it helps to 
make decision-making (seem) more legitimate, but how exactly does ‘debate’ 
contribute to legitimate EU governance? The term ‘debate’ appeared widely in the 
post-Nice reform rhetoric of the EU institutions as a means of addressing differing 
and complex problems yet it was rarely defined with precision. The assumption of 
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the institutions was that debate strengthened democratic linkage and thereby 
enhanced legitimate governance but it is unclear whether and how this actually 
happened. Furthermore there have been relatively few attempts made to define and 
therefore explain the concept of debate in the context of the post-Nice 
constitutional reform agenda (though Føllesdal (2000) and Fossum (2000) looked 
at earlier reform processes from a deliberative perspective). Nevertheless, 
explanations of the legitimising potential of debate can be found within democratic 
theory. 
 
The idea of debate is well established in democratic theory, even if it is a relatively 
new way of thinking about the democratisation and the legitimation of governance 
in the EU. According to Elster, the role of debate in democratic theory is expressed 
in the idea that democratic decision-making involves discussion between free and 
equal citizens (1998:1). This idea that democracy involves discussion is of course, 
nothing new. Indeed, Elster claims it can be traced back as far as fifth-century 
Athens10. More recently (though still far from contemporary) ideas about the 
importance of discussion in political decision-making can be found in the work of 
Burke, Rousseau, and JS Mill11.  
 
                                          
10
 Elster (1998)  ident ifies the role of debate ideas in Per icles’ observat ion that  polit ical leaders 
during this t im e viewed discussion as an ‘indispensable prelim inary to any wise act ion at  all’ 
(Thucydides I I .40 1972) . I n the Penguin t ranslat ion the passage reads ‘we Athenians take our 
decisions on policy or subm it  them to proper discussions;  for we do not  think that  there is an 
incompat ibility  between words and deeds;  the worst  thing is to rush into act ion before the 
consequences have been properly debated’. Gutmann & Thompson (2004: 8)  cite Ar istot le (1981)  
whose ‘Polit ics’ advocates a process of law-m aking whereby cit izens would discuss their laws in 
public. 
11
 According to Elster, Mill was a proponent  of ‘governm ent  by discussion’ (Considerat ions on 
Representat ive Governm ent  1993)  and Burke’s famous statement  to the Bristol electorate also 
emphasized the importance of discussion (Elster 1998: 3) . I n The Social Cont ract , Rousseau felt  
that  individuals should engage in som e form  of internal reflect ion or deliberat ion on the nature of 
the com m on good’. 
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It is possible to discern a renewed enthusiasm in contemporary political theory for 
classical ideas of discussion as a feature of democracy. Mainstream liberal 
democratic theories have addressed the importance of debate. Dahl (1971) for 
example notes that polyarchy depends upon plurality and the free exchange of 
ideas. The need for debate has been linked to perceived weaknesses or 
inadequacies of representative democracy, in reference to both the EU (Neyer 
2006) and other political systems. The aggregation of preferences within structures 
of representative democracy is seen as unable to generate sufficient legitimacy. 
Instead, as Habermas has argued, decision-making requires discussion which can 
lead to the transformation, rather than the simple aggregation of preferences 
(Habermas 1984, 1987). This transformative capacity of discussion is a key 
distinguishing factor between explanations of legitimacy offered by representative 
models of democracy on the one hand, and deliberative democracy models on the 
other.  
 
Debate and ‘deliberative democracy’ 
The (re)emergence of the ideas that citizens should actively participate in 
discussions and decision-making, that politics involves more than self-interested 
competition and bargaining between actors, and that through discussion 
preferences can be transformed have found expression within theories of 
‘deliberative democracy’12. Young described the increasing prevalence of 
deliberative ideas and concepts over the previous 20 years as an ‘explosion of 
                                          
12
 Bohman & Rehg (1997)  at t r ibute the first  use of the term  ‘deliberat ive democracy’ to Joseph 
Besset te (1980)  in his argum ent  against  elit ist  interpretat ions of the Am erican Const itut ion. 
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theorising about democracy as a discussion based form of practical reason’ (1996: 
486). But Benhabib (1996: 84) understands deliberative democratic theory to be 
elucidating the already implicit principles and logic of already existing democratic 
practices such as the significance of deliberative bodies in democracies, the 
rationale of parliamentary opposition, the need for a free and independent media 
and sphere of public opinion. Whilst the subject matter of the deliberative theory 
of democracy is not entirely new she argues, as a theory it illuminates some 
aspects of the logic of existing democratic practices better than others. This is 
particularly apparent in its treatment of legitimacy.  
 
The deliberative turn is not a unified or homogenous school of thought. As 
Hendricks observes, ‘deliberative democracy comes in many shapes and sizes’ 
(2006: 491), and according to Dryzek, many democratic varieties ‘sail under the 
deliberative banner’ (2000: 2). By way of definition however, Gutmann and 
Thompson (2004: 7) offer the following, describing deliberative democracy as: 
 
A form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their 
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one 
another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, 
with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on 
all citizens but open to challenge in the future. 
 
This implies a rejection of decision-making procedures based solely on the 
aggregation of votes (voting) or the competition of interests (bargaining) which 
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can result in arbitrary or irrational outcomes, and instead the adoption of a system 
which includes room for debate, deliberation or ‘arguing’ (Elster 1998: 5-6). It 
also underlines why decision-making based upon debate seems so attractive at the 
EU level where structures of representative democracy have weaknesses, and there 
is a desire to move beyond intergovernmental bargaining in negotiating treaty 
reform. 
 
It is possible to distinguish between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ streams of deliberative 
thought based on the formality of deliberation described. The former focuses on 
defining the ideal conditions of a deliberative procedure, the latter emphasises 
informal discursive forms of deliberation which take place in the public sphere 
(Hendricks 2006: 486-487). This investigation of debate as a characteristic of EU 
treaty reform is addressed by the former. By defining an ‘ideal deliberative 
procedure’ (Cohen 1989) micro conceptions of deliberative democracy can help 
explain how incorporating debate into decision-making opens up opportunities for 
democratic linkage, and can thereby enhance democratic legitimacy. 
 
According to Cohen, a deliberative process, or ‘a debate’ has four key 
characteristics. First, it is free in that the participants regard themselves as bound 
only by the results of their deliberation and suppose that they can act from the 
results. Second, deliberation is reasoned, with no force other than that of ‘the 
better argument’ (Habermas: 1975: 108) exercised. Third, participants are formally 
and substantively equal. And fourth, the ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a 
rational, motivated consensus. In other words, and summing up these 
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characteristics, the objective of the deliberative process is ‘to find reasons that are 
persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned 
assessment of alternatives by equals’ (Elster 1998:74). This underlines a strong 
link between process and legitimacy within deliberative decision-making (Maurer 
2003:172). 
 
The account presented here is by no means an exhaustive treatment of deliberative 
democracy theory, but it gives an indication of the ways in which deliberative 
ideas can explain how debate might help to enhance legitimacy in the EU. Though 
the debate on the future of the EU is hardly an ‘ideal deliberative procedure’, it can 
be seen to adopt features of deliberative decision-making. If debate is 
conceptualised as an approximation of deliberation, it can be seen to encourage a 
particular way of making decisions, i.e. through reasoned argument between equal 
citizens. This deliberative method of making decisions can in turn create more 
opportunities for linkage through participation, representation and communication. 
It is not the intention of this thesis to investigate whether then EU has or is in the 
process of adopting a deliberative character. Nor is it the aim to say whether this 
would be desirable or not. Rather, by developing a clearer picture of what debate 
is, and how it can contribute to legitimate governance, the aim is to make an 
empirical investigation of whether the procedures of the debate on the future of the 
EU provide opportunities for democratic linkage between citizens and EU 
institutions.  
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2.3 Investigating debate in the EU 
 
 
The ‘debate on the future of the EU’ or ‘debate initiative’ which provides the 
context for this investigation, was an attempt to implement the notion of debate or 
deliberation. In December 2000 the European Council had called for a debate on 
the EU’s future, leading towards (but not confined to) treaty reform and the debate 
initiative was officially launched in March 2001. The two specific components of 
the debate initiative addressed here – the Convention and Futurum – are case 
studies within which the linkage role of civil society organisations is investigated. 
Case study research is a research strategy so to speak, as opposed to a research 
method (see Yin 1994 for a detailed account of case study research). It is suited to 
research such as this which calls for a detailed understanding of the political 
processes at work because it facilitates the collection of rich and detailed data in 
context (Hartley 2003: 323), indeed the context itself is part of the investigation.  
 
The Convention and Futurum were selected as case studies within the broader 
debate initiative because they are clearly identifiable initiatives in their own right 
with definite beginnings and ends. Furthermore, what both have in common is that 
they included an important role for civil society organisations. However, whereas 
the Convention was part of the formal treaty reform process leading towards the 
2004 IGC, Futurum was separate from this process in the sense that it did not feed 
directly in to the discussions of the Convention or the European Council meeting 
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that followed. In focusing on the Convention and Futurum I acknowledged that 
these initiatives would have an impact on the linkage role of civil society within 
them by creating opportunities for or constraints upon the activities of the 
organisations. 
 
The 25 civil society organisations that I interviewed were involved in either or 
both of these initiatives. During the interviews I asked the individuals from each 
organisations to describe their involvement in the Convention and Futurum. 
Interviewees were also asked to reflect on whether the Convention and Futurum 
presented opportunities for and/or constraints upon their involvement. The aim of 
the interviews was to build a picture of the nature civil society involvement in the 
Convention and Futurum debates from the point of view of these key actors, 
giving an insight into how the rhetoric on ‘bringing closer’ actually played out on 
the ground. To supplement the perspectives of the organisations I also interviewed 
six Union officials (from the Commission, Council and Economic and Social 
Committee) who had also been involved in varying capacities in the Convention 
and Futurum debates. Conducting interviews within the case studies allowed for an 
understanding of how the context, in other words the Convention and Futurum 
debates, interacted with the activities of the organisations to affect their capacities 
and willingness to perform a linkage role. 
 
The analytical framework of this research that is provided by the concepts of 
participation, representation and communication is informed by an inductive logic. 
This means that I explore how these concepts describe the activities of 
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organisations – remembering that any particular activity could be described in 
terms of participation and communication for example. And I explore how the 
concepts explain the nature of the linkage, for example does linkage occur through 
the ‘making present’ of citizens or their interests (representation), or through the 
exchange of information (communication) or both? Again, one of the strengths of 
the case study approach is that it lends itself this kind of inductive approach 
because it allows for open-ended inquiry without the need to test a particular 
hypothesis. 
 
Detailed examination of these two cases provides rich data but it poses questions 
of generalisability. The two cases are by their very nature unusual, occurring 
outside the normal, everyday politics of the policy-making process. It could be 
argued, therefore that the data generated by the interviews and the conclusions that 
I draw from them are limited in understanding the activities of all civil society 
organisations and understanding organisations outside the context of the 
Convention and Futurum. However, the focus of generalisation for this kind of 
research is not the case itself but the underlying processes (Hartley 2003: 331), for 
example the presence or absence of detailed and fixed rules governing 
contributions to the debate, or whether or not civil society contributions are fed 
back in to the formal treaty reform debates. 
 
In the following sub-sections I introduce the case studies and identify the various 
ways in which the debate was broadened by incorporating civil society into the 
discussions.  
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2.3.1 Case study I: The Convention on the Future of Europe 
 
At the close of the December 2001 meeting of the European Council, hosted by 
the Belgian Presidency in Laeken at the edge of Brussels, the heads of state and 
government adopted the ‘Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe’. This 
document detailed the decision to establish the Convention on the future of Europe 
(the ‘European Convention’ in official shorthand, or simply ‘The Convention’). It 
outlined the Convention’s composition, its working methods and the key questions 
and challenges pertaining to the future of the EU that it would address. In this 
analysis of the Convention I draw upon interviews with six Union officials who 
were involved in the Convention process to develop a picture of who was involved 
in the Convention, how it was structured and what it sought to achieve. I focus in 
particular on the attempts that were made by the architects of the Convention to 
broaden the debates by involving civil society. Additional material is drawn from 
accounts of the Convention by academics, journalists and Union officials that were 
either directly involved in the Convention or observed its work closely (see in 
particular Norman 2003; Milton & Keller-Noëllet 2005). 
 
The Convention brought together 105 representatives from the member (and 
applicant) states and the European Union institutions. Included in this were fifteen 
representatives of the member state governments, plus representatives of the (then) 
thirteen applicant states’ governments. There were two representatives of each 
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member states’ national parliament in addition to two from the applicant states’ 
parliaments, which meant that the opposition within each member state could be 
included alongside the government. There were also sixteen members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) and two Commissioners. Each member could 
nominate an alternate if they were unavailable. In addition to these members, the 
Convention included thirteen ‘observers’ drawn from the Economic and Social 
Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the European Ombudsman and the 
social partners. The Convention was assisted by a secretariat which prepared 
working documents drafted discussion papers and summarised the proceedings. A 
thirteen-member praesidium led the Convention and was chaired by the former 
French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing and vice-chairs the former prime 
ministers of Italy and Belgium – Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene (these 
three individuals having been appointed by the Laeken declaration). Alongside the 
chair and vice-chairs, the praesidium comprised the two Commissioners, two 
representatives of both the European and national parliaments, and the government 
representatives of the three member states that held the presidency during the 
period in which the Convention met. The praesidium’s role was to draw up the 
draft agendas and generally supervise the Convention’s activities13.  
 
The Laeken declaration defined the task of the Convention as the need to consider 
the key issues arising for the future development of the EU and identify possible 
responses to these, in order to prepare for the 2004 IGC in as broad and open a 
                                          
13
 A detailed descript ion of the st ructure of the Convent ion, can be found at :  
ht tp: / / europa.eu.int / scadplus/ european_convent ion/ int roduct ion_en.htm  
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manner as possible. It stated that the debate should address the four key questions 
highlighted by the Declaration on the future of the Union14, which the text of the 
Laeken declaration had expanded into around sixty detailed questions about 
reforming the Union’s institutions, democratic life and working methods (Norman 
2003: 20).  
 
Between February 2002 and July 2003 the Convention met in plenary sessions 
twice a month in the European Parliament building in Brussels. These plenaries 
tended to focus on one or two specific issues in detail. Discussions were prompted 
in response to contributions from working groups, from Convention members 
(members of the Convention were able to make written contributions which were 
circulated to all fellow members) and from the civil society Forum. The work 
programme of the Convention was split into three successive phases: a listening 
phase, a studying phase and a drafting phase. The first phase opened the 
proceedings with a period of ‘listening’, the idea behind which was to try and gain 
an appreciation of what the citizens wanted from the European Union. The second 
phase of the Convention was described as one of ‘analysis’ for weighing up the 
proposals for reform. The third and final stage of the Convention was 
characterised by the drafting of articles, discussion of amendments and the seeking 
of compromise. 
 
                                          
14
 The four quest ions were:  ‘How to establish and m onitor a m ore precise delim itat ion of 
competences between the EU and the m em ber states, reflect ing on the pr inciple of subsidiar ity;  
the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU proclaim ed in Nice, in accordance with 
the conclusions of the European Council in Cologne;  A sim plif icat ion of the t reat ies with a view to 
m aking them  clearer and bet ter understood without  changing their  m eaning;  The role of nat ional 
parliam ents in the European Architecture’ see ht tp: / / europa.eu.int / futurum  
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The Laeken declaration did not predetermine the outcome of the Convention’s 
deliberations, whether this would be a single document or a list of options. 
However very early in the proceedings Giscard d’Estaing made it clear that he, and 
the Convention he chaired, would be ambitious (Milton & Keller-Noëllet 2005: 
31). Indeed, in his opening speech he urged the Convention to ‘achieve a broad 
consensus on a single proposal’ which, he argued, would have more persuasive 
power than a list of suggestions; and coined the phrase ‘constitutional treaty’ in 
order to avoid disagreements over semantics (Giscard d’Estaing 2002). In the end 
a Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was presented to the 
European Council on 18th July 200315.  
 
The decision to convene a Convention with the intention of preparing for a new 
IGC had emerged gradually in the months following the Nice European Council 
meeting (Norman 2003: 24). The Convention method itself was not entirely new in 
the EU context, having been chosen by the Cologne European Council to draft the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, establishing a Convention to prepare for 
treaty reform was a break with the past. The reasons for the innovation can be 
attributed on the one hand, to a feeling that the IGC method would be an 
inappropriate mechanism for drafting a constitutional document (de Witte 2001). 
On the other hand it can be seen as driven by practical concerns such as those of 
the British government after the Nice meeting that a new way of doing business 
was needed (Milton & Keller- Noëllet 2005). In either case, a range of innovations 
                                          
15
 The full text  of the draft  Const itut ional Treaty as drawn up by the Convent ion can st ill be viewed 
online at :  ht tp: / / eur-
lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?ur i= CELEX: 52003XX0718(01) : EN: HTML ( last  accessed 
03.08.07)  
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were made with the aim of making the debate as broad as possible: publishing 
Convention documents; widening participation through the civil society plenary, 
the Youth Convention and the civil society Forum; including formal observers; 
establishing working groups; assigning personal roles to the praesidium members; 
and encouraging national members to take the debate home16; each of which is 
addressed in turn here. 
 
Firstly, the Convention was characterised by a degree of openness that had rarely 
been seen before in processes of treaty reform. Indeed, the commitment to 
ensuring that the discussions of the Convention would be in the public domain, 
was in marked contrast with the processes leading up to the Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice treaties (Norman 2003: 23) and can be seen as a deliberate 
attempt to move away from ‘closed-door practices of intergovernmental 
conferences’ (Milton & Keller-Noëllet 2005: 43). The secretariat of the 
Convention made significant efforts to publish official documents on a dedicated 
Convention website, and the plenary sessions were open to the public, and 
transmitted, via a webcam, on the Convention website (See Appendix I for screen 
shots of the Convention website). There were some limitations to the openness, 
most notably within the praesidium which met behind closed doors, ostensibly to 
allow the members to express themselves freely (Milton & Keller-Noëllet 2005: 
43) and thereby facilitate the effective operation of the Convention. 
 
                                          
16
 During an interview, one of the Union off icials that  had been heavily involved in the Convent ion 
out lined these six at tempts that  were made to t ry and broaden the Convent ion debates (Union 
official # 2, 20.03.06, London 
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These measures contributed to a policy of openness through transparency, and 
were accompanied by a second measure to broaden the debate which encouraged a 
policy of openness through wider participation. Giscard d’Estaing, in his opening 
speech to the Convention (Giscard d’Estaing 2002), made a deliberate effort to 
emphasise the importance of consulting widely: 
 
We must embark on our task without preconceived ideas, and form our 
vision of the new Europe by listening constantly and closely to all our 
partners, governors and governees, economic and social partners, 
representatives of regional authorities – already present here – 
members of associations and civil society represented in the forum, but 
also those who have no other identity than that they form part of 
Europe… everyone must have the opportunity to be heard. 
 
He recognised that this would involve effective and decentralised organisation and 
management in order to translate these ideals into practice and a number of novel 
initiatives followed. One of which was the plenary session of 24th-25th June 2002 
which was intended to give representatives of certain sectors of civil society the 
opportunity to speak to the Convention members17 about how their sector viewed 
the future of the Union. Also apparent during the listening phase of the Convention 
was a great deal of enthusiasm for involvement of young people (in particular in 
his opening speech Giscard had made reference to the need to pay special attention 
                                          
17
 The m em bers of the Convent ion have been descr ibed var iously as ‘Convent ionnels’ and 
Convent ioneers’ but  I  use the term  ‘Convent ion m em bers’ for clar ity. 
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to young people). To this end, a ‘Youth Convention’ was established in July 2002, 
the aim of which was to enable young people to formulate their own vision of the 
future of Europe. The Youth Convention brought together 210 young people (i.e. 
people aged between 18-25), all of whom were selected by the members of the 
Convention. 
 
Perhaps the most visible and wide-reaching attempt to broaden participation was 
through the ‘Forum’ for civil society which the Laeken declaration had called for 
alongside the Convention on the basis that the debate ought to ‘involve all 
citizens’ and be ‘broadly based’. Like the Convention more broadly, the Forum 
was charged with the task of considering the key questions concerning the future 
development of the European Union and identifying possible answers. It would 
feed into the Convention debates the perspectives of civil society on these key 
questions, and therefore was an important tool in broadening the debate. 
Unsurprisingly in the immediate aftermath of the Laeken meeting there was a great 
deal of enthusiasm for the Forum on the part of civil society organisations. 
However this was slightly curtailed when, as one of the organisations interviewed 
(Civil society organisation #21, 17.02.05, Brussels) explained, it became apparent 
that in practice the Forum actually amounted to little more than a website, the 
inference being that a website was a rather passive and did not really match the 
spirit of the Laeken declaration on the importance of involving civil society in the 
Convention debates. 
 
On the website the Forum described itself as ‘a structured network of organisations 
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representing civil society’ which had two roles: to allow civil society organisations 
to follow the proceedings of the Convention, and to facilitate their contribution to 
the Convention’s debates (see Appendix I for a screen shot of the Forum website). 
The first role was facilitated in large part by linking the Forum website to the main 
Convention website. Here was gathered details of the timetables of meetings; 
agendas of the President and Vice-Presidents; details of the forthcoming plenary 
sessions and summaries of what they covered; reports of the Working Groups and 
the Discussion Circles. These were accompanied by various documents relating to 
the proceedings: contributions, speeches, summary reports, and drafts of the treaty. 
In addition the site contained background information on the organisation and 
composition of the Convention, and on its praesidium and secretariat. The result 
was a kind of ‘one-stop shop’ for all information relating to the Convention 
process which civil society organisations could draw upon to follow and monitor 
the proceedings. However, because access to the Convention website was open to 
all, the Forum website didn’t give organisations access to anything they would not 
have otherwise have been able to see.  
 
The second role of the Forum was to facilitate the active participation of 
organisations in the process, by encouraging them to submit contributions to the 
debate. A series of rather complicated rules governed which organisations were 
permitted to make contributions to the debate, and the steps they had to take in 
order to do so. Firstly, only organisations – as opposed to individual citizens – 
were permitted to be participants. Organisations wishing to make a contribution 
had to belong to a pre-defined list of participants. In order to get onto this list they 
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had to submit to the secretariat of the Convention, a fact-sheet detailing the nature 
of their organisation, specifying which out of a list of ‘categories’ of organisation 
they wished to be entered in (political interests, socio-economic interests, 
academic interests and think tanks, or other civil society organisations. This fact 
sheet had to accompany their contribution, and, if the contribution was more than 
3000 characters long, a 3000-character summary of the contribution. There were 
also rules governing what a ‘substantive contribution’ to the Convention had to 
entail. Contributions had to have been drawn up especially for the Convention; to 
be explicitly related to issues of the future of the European Union and the reform 
of the treaties; and had to address the questions raised by the Laeken declaration.  
 
Information on the number and types of organisations that were involved in the 
Forum were detailed on the website. In total 265 organisations were listed under 
four headings: Political or Public Authority (31); Socio-Economic (23); Academic 
and Think Tank (26); and Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought (186). 
However, some organisations were listed more than once either under alternative 
language versions of their name, under different headings, or as individual 
organisations as well as part of umbrella organisations to which they belonged. It 
is unclear, therefore, exactly how many organisations were actually involved. The 
contributions made were also displayed on the website under the different 
headings. A total of 55 documents were posted by 22 Political and Public 
Authority organisations; eighteen documents by fifteen Socio-economic 
organisations; sixteen documents by thirteen Academic and Think Tank 
organisations; and 390 documents by 140 ‘Other’ organisations.  
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The extent to which these innovations were successful in terms of either bringing 
in perspectives from civil society or shaping outcomes is debatable. The civil 
society plenary session was criticised as being an exercise in ‘Brussels talking to 
Brussels’ on the grounds that the organisations involved were close allies with a 
history of working with the Commission (Milton & Keller- Noëllet 2005). The 
independence of the organisations involved and the extent to which the session 
heard the genuine voice of European society was called into question by one of the 
interviewees. Referring to statements made by the representative of the UK 
parliament (see Stuart 2004) after the conclusion of the Convention’s work 
claimed: 
 
[They] argued that the whole thing was a stitch-up, it was like the 
Soviet Union…they [claimed to] have the representative for European 
Youth to speak and you got somebody from a Brussels-funded 
organisation like the Union of European Federalists, saying that “we 
demand that Europe moves forward blah, blah, blah”  
Civil society organisation # 25, 22.04.05, London 
 
Similarly, the Youth Convention, about which Giscard d’Estaing had been so 
enthusiastic, was later dismissed by him as being populated by ‘Eurocrats in short 
trousers’ after it produced a range of largely bureaucratic and unimaginative 
proposals (Milton & Keller-Noëllet 2005:43). 
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A third attempt to broaden the Convention debates was through the involvement of 
a number (thirteen in total) of so-called ‘formal observers’. Six of the thirteen 
represented the Economic and Social Committee and the ‘social partners’ (trades 
unions and employers associations); a further six represented the regions of the 
EU; and the final observer was the European Ombudsman. The observers were 
permitted to attend all the discussions of the Convention, and to make suggestions 
but the Convention members were not obliged to take their suggestions into 
consideration. The role of the observers had been laid out by the Laeken 
declaration but their precise role was left rather vague. The secretariat of the 
Convention reportedly found the observers of limited use in breaking with the past 
since they represented a rather traditional piece of the Brussels machinery, and 
attempted to use the Convention as another avenue down which to pursue their 
goals of enhancing their formal powers under the treaties (Union official #2, 
20.03.06, London). 
 
Fourthly, there was the introduction working groups in June 2002 during the 
second (analysis) phase of the Convention. These groups comprised members of 
the Convention which would discuss in detail certain issues that did not lend 
themselves to plenary discussion; and draw up proposals that would be 
incorporated into the draft treaty. Originally ten groups were convened, focussing 
on issues such as subsidiarity, economic governance, and legal personality. The 
focus on particular issues in smaller groups opened up an opportunity for 
organised interests to target the discussions they were most concerned about. After 
pressure from Convention members and representatives from within civil society, 
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an eleventh group on ‘Social Europe’ was created.  
 
The establishment of working groups saw the discussions in the Convention move 
on from the rather abstract ‘visions of Europe’ that had characterised the listening 
phase towards dealing with more concrete issues and proposals. As this occurred, 
so too was there a change in the way some civil society organisations approached 
the Convention. The Director of one large umbrella organisation explained that the 
focus of his organisation’s activities adapted to the particular phase of the 
Convention’s work programme: 
 
As the Convention process became more elaborate and went on, the 
debates started to get more specific, it was no longer giving just 
general position papers, although some organisations did that 
throughout, most of the organisations who were more successful 
responded to what was happening in the Convention, and picked up a 
dialogue based upon the latest drafts that came out, and specific 
working groups that were set up. 
Civil society organisation #21, 17.02.05, Brussels 
 
However there was also a feeling amongst other organisations that the move to the 
analysis phase of the Convention and the formation of working groups served to 
marginalise them from the more open plenary discussions. For the Union officials, 
there was a degree of surprise, verbalised by one in particular in an interview, that 
the anticipated mobilisation of civil society around the individual working groups 
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never really materialised (Union official #3 28.03.06, Brussels). 
 
A fifth attempt to broaden the debate - related to the issue of the working groups - 
can be seen in the personal role of each of the praesidium members. A member of 
the praesidium was assigned to each of the working groups and as a means of 
linking the discussions back to the task of drafting a single document. In addition, 
the members of the praesidium – including the triumvirate of Giscard d’Estaing, 
Dehaene and Amato – represented a range of political backgrounds and 
approaches and drew upon these in getting support for the Convention across the 
political spectrum and within the member states. All thirteen members of the 
praesidium were, or had once been, national politicians, and as such were (in 
theory) aware of the importance of linking the Convention with what was 
happening inside the member states. 
 
This leads on to a sixth and crucial attempt to broaden the Convention debates by 
exporting them to the national level. The national government and parliamentary 
representatives in the Convention were encouraged to stimulate debates on the 
issues covered by the Convention within their member states. National debates 
were however, extremely asymmetrically implemented. One of the Union officials 
that was interviewed observed that the national debates were:  
 
Highly successful in Slovenia, and highly successful in Ireland because 
of the coincidence with the Nice referenda; quite successful in 
Belgium because people are serious about the European Union and 
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were nervous about some of the directions Giscard wanted to go…they 
were serious in the second half of the Convention in Poland and Spain 
when they saw the way the debate was going on voting weights…how 
much public debate did we encourage in the UK or Germany or 
France? Zero. 
Union official #2, 20.03.06, London 
 
In summary, these six attempts to broaden the Convention debates have been 
interpreted as having varying levels of success.  In the aftermath of the French and 
Dutch referenda the perceived failure to implement debates on the Convention at 
the national level was reignited. The referenda results should not undermine the 
Convention method or the process itself but they demonstrated that the Convention 
method could not single-handedly solve the legitimacy problems of the EU in the 
absence of a transnational, genuinely public discourse on EU politics and policies 
(Risse & Kleine 2007:70). 
 
 
2.3.2 Case study II: The Futurum initiative 
 
As we have seen, in their Declaration on the Future of the Union (annexed to the 
Treaty of Nice) the heads of state and government had called for ‘a deeper and 
wider debate about the further development of the European Union’. A debate was 
formally opened in March 2001 by the Belgian and Swedish Heads of 
Government, alongside the Presidents of the Commission and the European 
Civil society 76 
 
Parliament, with the launch of the Futurum website. During a ceremony which 
marked the official opening of the debate initiative, a joint statement outlined how 
‘The Declaration on the future of the Union should spark a wide-ranging public 
debate on matters of an institutional nature, which are meaningful only if viewed 
in the context of a coherent and sustainable model for an enlarged Union. What is 
therefore needed is a far-reaching public debate on our expectations of, and wishes 
for, Europe’ (Persson et al 2001). The Futurum website was presented as such a 
space. The Futurum initiative is outlined here, drawing in part upon data from 
interviews with institutional and civil society actors, most notably the Head of 
Unit for Public Debate in the Secretariat-General of the Commission who was in 
charge of the day-to-day running of the website. 
 
The Futurum initiative was, to all intents and purposes, a website (see Appendix I 
for a screen shot of the Futurum website). The idea behind Futurum was that it 
would accompany the debate on the future of the EU initiative by providing a 
place where any material relating to the debate called for in the Nice declaration – 
official documents, speeches, opinions and so on – could be found. As such it was 
intimately linked with the Convention process, and in fact the Convention Forum 
website was run by the Futurum team. Yet at the same time it was more than this. 
The Futurum website predated the Convention by several months, and remained 
open and active for several months after the Convention had concluded its 
business. Futurum was also broader than the Convention in both scope: it was not 
confined to the treaty reform process; and in terms of who could get involved: it 
was not confined to contributions from Convention members. In these respects it 
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made a concrete attempt to implement the commitments made at Nice to establish 
a ‘deeper and wide debate’ involving ‘all the relevant stakeholders’.  
 
Futurum described itself as an ‘interinstitutional’ initiative but the website was 
managed by the Public Debate Unit within the Secretariat-General of the 
Commission, and there is little evidence of involvement from the other institutions 
in the day-to-day operation of the site. By taking responsibility for Futurum the 
Commission developed a broader role than has tended to be the case in previous 
processes of treaty reform. Indeed, it was able to maximise its own role in the 
debate initiative through a skilful degree of entrepreneurship. The Declaration on 
the Future of the Union had indicated a commitment to moving away from a 
closed system of reforming the treaties and engaging the public only at the end of 
the process to one which was preceded by a debate involving all section of 
European society. The Commission it appears, saw a window of opportunity in the 
commitment to involve a greater number of actors in the debate but an absence of 
concrete suggestions for implementing such a strategy. Following the Nice 
meeting the Commission made a proposal to the Council presidency for activities 
that would enlarge the scope of the debate based on their experiences with the 
earlier ‘Dialogue on Europe’ initiative. This was subsequently taken up and 
became the Futurum website (Union official #1, 11.01.05, Brussels). 
 
The characteristics of Futurum derive in large part from this earlier ‘Dialogue on 
Europe’ website. This initiative was a web-based resource which displayed 
information about the process of treaty reform and the 2000 IGC leading towards 
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the Treaty of Nice. Adopted on 15th February 2000, and was an attempt by the 
Prodi Commission to counter-balance the closed nature of the IGC. On the one 
hand, the aim of the initiative was to ‘explain why the Union must adapt its 
institutions to make a success of enlargement’ (Prodi et al 2000). The focus here 
was on raising awareness among the public on what the reform involved and what 
was at stake. On the other hand the initiative claimed to ‘promote public debate 
with Europe’s citizens’. However the purpose of this public participation in the 
debate was left unclear and no explanation was made of how this would be linked 
to the process of treaty reform.  
 
The Dialogue on Europe, and the Futurum initiatives should be seen in the context 
of the long-standing commitment on the part of the institutions since Maastricht, to 
get closer citizens, but also demonstrate an emerging tendency to use web 
technologies as a means of addressing democracy and legitimacy issues (see 
Cammaerts 2006). The European Union has proved to be a fertile ground for so-
called ‘e-democracy’ initiatives due to a combination of a perceived democratic 
deficit and a large geographically diverse population (Wright 2005). The 
Commission’s 1997 report ‘Building the European information society for us all’ 
made a link between web technologies and addressing the democratic deficit 
(Commission 1997). Using the web, it argued, could help increase transparency 
and openness by providing opportunities for public participation in political 
decision-making and by informing people about EU decision-making. The 
conclusion was that web technologies could ‘bring government closer to all 
people’ (1997: 67). 
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The possibility of using the web to raise awareness and give the public 
opportunities to participate in discussions about EU issues continues to inform 
initiatives for bringing citizens and institutions closer together and also 
characterised Futurum. The objectives of Futurum vis-à-vis implementing the 
‘deeper and wider debate’ called for at Nice, were three-fold: ‘to renew and 
publish as many documents and links as possible about the process of drafting the 
Constitution; provide the information tools needed to understand it; and give civil 
society the means to make its voice heard in a real European public forum’. 
 
The first of these, to publish documents and links relating to the process of 
drafting the Constitution was intended to ensure that all information generated by 
the debate, not only that produced by the Convention but also speeches, documents 
and websites that touched upon the general issues regarding the debate on the 
future of the EU could be readily accessed by ordinary citizens alongside those 
emerging from the Convention. In this sense the scope of the debate within the 
Futurum initiative was broader than that of the Convention. One of the intended 
implications of the collation of information relating to the broader debate was to 
encourage a transnational element to the debate by displaying information about 
initiatives that were occurring in each member state so that citizens from other 
member states could have access to these. In addition, making access to all the 
information surrounding the debate available to the public was seen as important 
in contributing to making the whole process of treaty reform more open and 
transparent than it had been in the past (Union official #1, 11.01.05, Brussels). 
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Alongside simply making information available to citizens, the objectives of 
Futurum spelt out the need to provide the information tools necessary for people to 
understand the various elements of the debate and the process of treaty reform. 
Futurum was not intended to be solely a source of information on the Convention 
or the process of treaty reform, but there was an acknowledgement that citizens 
would need to be informed in order to take part in the debate on the future of the 
EU (Union official #1, 11.01.05, Brussels). Furthermore there was a recognition 
on the part of the Commission that an element of education was a prerequisite of a 
successful debate. This relates back to one of the concerns raised in the 2001 
governance white paper, that ‘when things go wrong “Brussels” is too easily 
blamed by member states for difficult decisions that they themselves have agreed 
to or even requested’ (Commission 2001a: 7). Nevertheless, there is a tension 
between whether this involves taking a more proactive approach to explaining the 
added value of the Union, or whether it amounts to ‘selling’ the benefits of the 
Union.  
 
The third objective, to give civil society the means to make its voice heard in a real 
European public forum, was implemented through a variety of mechanisms: an 
online discussion forum for individual citizens; a section displaying contributions 
from organised civil society; and a series of ‘partnerships’ with a range of 
organisations and their own online debates on the future of the EU. 
 
The online forum open to all citizens was called ‘discussion corner’ and claimed to 
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give European citizens complete freedom to express their views on, and discuss, 
the future of Europe. The editorial policy of the discussion outlined how 
contributions were not censured in any way but were subject to a list of basic rules 
of politeness and respect which if contravened would prevent a message from 
being displayed. In practice, the Futurum team claimed that very few messages 
were blocked in this way and when this did occur it tended to be because they 
were deemed irrelevant rather than inflammatory (Union official #1, 11.01.05, 
Brussels). From time to time, the citizens’ discussions were supplemented with an 
input from political actors, most notably Romano Prodi, then the President of the 
Commission, either introducing a discussion or responding to certain issues. This 
gave the impression that citizens’ discussions were being heard but ultimately, 
ongoing interaction between citizens and politicians was largely illusory. The 
discussion corner was, as the Official responsible for running Futurum explained 
‘a place where citizens talked between themselves, it was not meant to be a place 
where we ourselves would provide systematic reaction, answers to questions and 
so forth’ (Union official #1, 11.01.05, Brussels). The democratic benefits of the 
discussion corner were to accrue to the individuals taking part in the discussions, 
rather than to enhance the debate itself as the content of these debates was not fed 
back into the Convention debates but instead were deliberately kept separate. 
 
In contrast, the discussion involving civil society organisations was summarised 
for political authorities and fed back into the Convention discussions. Also 
contrasting with the discussion corner, the contributions from civil society 
organisations were organised ‘offline’ in the sense that contributions were 
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submitted by email to the moderator and then posted under particular headings 
relating to different themes of the debate. The idea behind this strategy was to 
make available to citizens the opinions of different sectors of organised civil 
society on the future of the EU, alongside the official Convention discussions. The 
civil society discussion subsequently provided the model for the Convention 
Forum which, as described above, was also managed by the Futurum team. 
 
A third mechanism for giving civil society a mechanism for making its voice heard 
was through the opportunity for organisations to form a ‘partnership’ with 
Futurum. This involved having a page on the organisations’ own website dedicated 
to the debate on the future of the EU, linked to the Futurum website, and having 
their own logo and URL displayed on the Futurum site. The idea behind these 
partnerships was to facilitate the exchange of information and links on the internet 
to allow wider access to the debate on the future of the EU. In order to qualify as a 
partner of Futurum, the partner organisations had to be non-commercial 
organisations or networks belonging to academic, socio-economic or political 
spheres, or from civil society more generally, and had activities in more than two 
member or candidate countries. There were in total 27 Futurum partners, for the 
most part organisations based in Brussels, but from a variety of functional 
backgrounds. trades unions confederations had partnership status alongside 
regional development agencies, think tanks and charitable foundations. 
 
In sum, Futurum was intended to bring all the elements of the debate together and 
provide a common reference point for them. As one of the Union officials 
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involved explained: 
 
Futurum was to be the place where all initiatives related to the debate 
on the future of Europe could be traced. It was not meant to be the 
place where the debate takes place because there’s no such place. The 
debate was to take place all over Europe, involving as the statement 
from the Heads of State and Government indicated, educational 
circles, academic circles, socio-economic organisations, political 
circles, citizens organisations, a very wide and very developed series 
of spontaneous initiatives throughout Europe 
Union official #1, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
 
2.4 Discussion: the Convention and Futurum, deliberation and 
debate 
 
 
The EU political system has proved to be a particularly fertile ground for the ideas 
of deliberative democracy. In part this is because theories of deliberative 
democracy identify possibilities for strengthening democratic legitimacy outside 
formal structures of representative democracy. As a consequence, in recent years it 
has been possible to discern a ‘deliberative turn’ in EU studies – whereby theories 
of deliberative democracy have been applied to the study of the EU. In reference 
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to the notion of debate found within the reform discourses of the EU institutions, 
the deliberative democracy literature helps us to develop an understanding of what 
is meant by the notion of ‘debate’, as this is not always clear in the accounts given 
by the institutions. The debate on the future of the EU was a pre-decisional process 
which aimed to produce a consensus on the future direction and characteristics of 
EU politics, and enshrine this in a constitutional document.  
 
In the context of the post-Nice process, framing reform as a ‘debate’ offered 
greater opportunities for democratic linkage (than previous structures of 
intergovernmental bargaining which had restricted and closed membership) largely 
because of the need for multiple contributors to the debate (debate needs multiple 
participants and multiple contributions otherwise it is not a debate). By broadening 
out the debate to involve more than the ‘usual suspects’, civil society organisations 
were introduced into the debates, along with their potential to act as agents of 
linkage. Incorporating civil society as key contributors to the debate meant that a 
large number of perspectives included in EU civil society were brought in and, it 
was hoped, brought the debate closer to citizens because of the supposed links 
between civil society organisations and ordinary citizens. 
 
The deliberative democracy literature also helps to explain the prominence of the 
notion of ‘debate’ in the reform discourses due to its account of legitimacy. Most 
deliberative theorists agree that the legitimacy of political decisions derive from 
their having been the subject of deliberation among free and equal participants. 
The idea that the EU, through discussion, might be able to identify a consensus on 
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its future direction is attractive given the national differences and large numbers 
involved and, to return to the initial issue, in the context of decision-making 
structures which have produced decisions widely seen as lacking legitimacy. 
 
Framing the post-Nice process of treaty reform as a ‘debate’ on the EU’s future 
was a self-conscious attempt on the part of the institutions to break with the past in 
the process of reforming the EU. It can be seen as an intentional move away from 
previous processes of treaty reform, most notably the December 2000 Nice 
European Council meeting which had been arduous and had produced a treaty 
which was widely seen as inadequate. Yet although the notion of debate was 
intended to convey the message that this would be an open and free debate, in 
practice there were several limitations. There were difficulties associated with 
implementing the ideas of debate into a process which would be free and open yet 
which would result in achievable treaty reforms. Notably there was a trade-off 
between increasing participation and maintaining effectiveness which mean that 
the debate was subject to restrictions in order for it to produce a workable 
outcome. 
 
It was not always easy to identify what was part of the debate and what was not. 
According to the press releases of the institutions, the debate was formally 
launched in March 2001 with the inauguration of the Futurum website but this can 
be seen as a largely symbolic event. Similarly, and perhaps because of the 
outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda on the constitutional treaty it is 
difficult to identify when the debate ended, and indeed if it has ended, or was 
Civil society 86 
 
intended to end. Risse & Kleine (2007) have expressed concerns that the outcomes 
of the referenda may mean that treaty reform returns to the earlier closed system 
and that the unfortunate and innocent victim here is the Convention method which 
had a large role in producing the Constitution. Although the Convention was a 
long way from being a truly public forum for debate on the EU’s future it would 
be difficult to hold it accountable for the fate of the constitutional treaty. With 
‘Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’ and the communication strategy it 
seems likely that the notion of debate will continue to define reform discourses, 
but that actual treaty reform might return to being the domain of intergovernmental 
actors. 
 
The debate on the future of the EU provides an interesting context for the study of 
democratic linkage because of the way in which the importance of having citizen 
participation in the debates was part of the discourse. Alongside the formal treaty 
reform process was a broader debate to which it was hoped ordinary citizens 
would contribute. The exact nature of the links between the broader debate and 
constitutional outcomes are at times unclear, raising issue of whether the process 
of debating is legitimate or legitimating itself, or whether for debate to have 
legitimating effects it needs to be reflected in outcomes. In other words, is it the 
process of debate or the outcome of debate (or both) which confers legitimacy? 
 
The Convention on the Future of the EU incorporated a range of measures which 
were intended to broaden the debates taking place inside the Convention, and 
thereby make the process of drafting treaty reform closer to citizens and, as a 
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consequence, more legitimate. Although it could not really be described as an ideal 
deliberative forum it arguably went further in broadening the discussions about the 
EU’s future than any previous treaty reform process had done. Nevertheless, both 
institutional and civil society actors identified limitations with the Convention 
method. 
 
The news that a ‘Forum’ for civil society would be part of the Convention (as 
outlined in the Laeken declaration) caused excitement among civil society 
organisations, expressed by several of those interviewed for this research. Yet 
there was palpable disappointment that the Forum turned out to be nothing much 
more than a website. That civil society expectations had been raised so high 
suggest further evidence for a gap between the rhetoric of the debate and the 
reality of the situation as it was implemented on the ground. The implementation 
of the Forum as a rather underwhelming online resource was in part due to the fact 
that Belgian civil servants had drafted the Laeken declaration (during the 2001 
Belgian Presidency of the Council) but they didn’t actually have to implement it. 
The secretariat of the Convention had the responsibility of implementing this, 
without any further concrete indication of what the Forum actually ought to be. In 
the end, the Commission presented a solution to the secretariat, along the lines of 
the Futurum/Dialogue on Europe model, which the secretariat-general made a 
rational decision to take up in order to avoid spending time and effort on this 
difficult task. 
 
Tellingly, two of the Union officials that were interviewed admitted that some of 
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the several measures that were taken to broaden the Convention debates were done 
so for the primary reason of ‘keeping people happy’. The secretariat of the 
Convention was charged with the task of implementing both the spirit of the 
Laeken declaration (which made much of the need to broaden the debate) and the 
need for an efficient debate: in the end this resulted in a trade-off between 
participation and effectiveness. The implications of this depend on whether the 
process or the outcome is viewed as most important. It seems that the institutions, 
particularly the Commission tried to make the case that having a debate – in other 
words the process – was important, but the nevertheless, most of the civil society 
actors were more concerned with influencing the Convention members (and 
thereby the constitutional treaty) than taking part in a debate. 
 
Futurum also sought to implement the spirit of the debate through a website. Yet at 
times Futurum appeared to be a solution without a problem: it lacked focus; it had 
multiple, and sometimes not complementary roles; and even the participants were 
unsure what the point of it was. Furthermore, the extent to which democratic and 
legitimacy deficits could be overcome through web technologies was, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, limited. As one organisation explained: 
 
Whilst everybody has access to the internet I would still say this was a 
forum for experts and not for the ordinary citizens. Therefore I think 
that other means are very important as well like media campaigns or 
public events in the cities and the countryside – I think the 
Commission has realised that it needs to apply other measures than a 
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website  
Civil society organization #6, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
The objective of the ‘discussion corner’ was to give citizens the opportunity to 
engage in debates with other citizens possibly from other member states. Of 
course, there may be democratic benefits accruing to the individuals involved but 
the discussion can not be said to have made the debate more democratic because 
the outcomes of these discussions were not fed back in to the Convention debates. 
The Commission’s ‘communication on certain arrangements for the debate on the 
future of the EU’ (2001b) stated that it was separate from the Convention’s 
discussions, for ‘obvious reasons of democratic legitimacy’, presumably to avoid a 
potential distortion of the debate by unelected, self-selected participants. But the 
distinction may also be misleading given the rhetoric on giving the public the 
opportunity to ‘have its voice heard’ – again this emphasises the different concerns 
of process and outcome. According to Wright (2005) the discussion corner in 
particular and by implication Futurum as a whole, was an exercise in post-hoc 
legitimation rather than democratisation: an attempt to give credibility to an 
unrelated process but which in fact served to undermine the legitimacy of the 
process because it amounted to nothing more than ‘tokensim’.  
 
One of the defining features of the Convention and Futurum was the attempts 
made in each to carve out a role for civil society organisations. The following 
chapter takes a closer look at the notion of civil society and its relationship with 
democratic legitimacy. 
  
 
 
Chapter 3  
 
 
Civil society, democratic linkage and legitimate governance in the 
European Union 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
In recent years, the notion that civil society can help enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of EU governance has become widespread in both political and 
academic discourses. In the debate on the future of the EU initiative and more 
recently, in the Commission’s communication strategy, the role of civil society has 
been discussed in relation to ‘bringing the citizens and institutions closer together’. 
These discourses draw upon well established ideas in democratic theory of civil 
society as an ‘intermediary’ between the state and the citizens18. Civil society, it is 
                                          
18
 Kumar (1993: 376-377)  documents the t ransit ion in the history of the concept  of civ il society 
throughout  the eighteenth century from  being pract ically synonymous with ‘polit ical society’ to a 
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claimed, facilitates linkage between the governed and the governing, thus 
strengthening the democratic relationship. This ‘closer proximity’ (metaphorically 
speaking) can in turn help mitigate the legitimacy crisis from which the EU is said 
to suffer, and in particular strengthen the input legitimacy of the EU.  
 
The assumption that civil society can offer a solution to various problems of 
democracy and legitimacy is not confined to analyses of the EU political system. 
A turn towards civil society can be seen in a global context across a range of 
international, national and local contexts. Indeed, civil society has been described 
as ‘the “chicken soup” of social sciences’ (Post & Rosenblum 2002: 23), a cure-all 
for a range of democratic ills. As a consequence however, identifying meaningful 
and concise definitions of what civil society is and what it does can be 
problematic. ‘Civil society’ is a contested concept and as such no consensus 
operates over its meaning. The notion of civil society continues to spark discussion 
and disagreement amongst political theorists (see for example the contributions in 
Chambers & Kymlicka 2002) as it has done since at least the late seventeenth 
century (Hendricks 2006). These definitional issues are more than problems of 
semantics because the way civil society is conceptualised has implications for the 
way in which, and the extent to which it can play a legitimising role vis-à-vis EU 
governance.  
 
                                                                                                                  
sphere of society dist inct  from the state, ident ifying Locke, Paine, Ferguson and Sm ith as the key 
cont r ibutors to this dist inct ion. 
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In the EU context, it is possible to infer the meaning and role of civil society as 
perceived in the rhetoric of the institutions by looking at the ways in which the 
term has been used. Definitions of the term ‘civil society’, when given, tend to be 
framed in terms of the organisations involved. For example the Commission’s 
2001 governance white paper specifies that ‘civil society includes the following: 
trade unions and employers’ organisations (“social partners”); non-governmental 
organisations; professional organisations; charities; grass-roots organisations; 
organisations which involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular 
contribution from churches and religious communities’ (European Commission 
2001a: 14). In other words the institutions conceptualise civil society descriptively, 
in terms of the organisations that comprise it. This highlights a continuity between 
these so-called ‘civil society organisations’ and what had previously been referred 
to as ‘interest groups’. 
 
There is a tradition of associational activity in the EU in the form of interest 
representation. Indeed, it has been argued that one of the defining features of the 
EU political system has been the empowerment of societal groups and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Wallace & Young 1997, Wallace 2001b) 
from within civil society. However, the findings of some of this research challenge 
the assumption that the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes 
contributes to legitimate governance. In particular whilst there seems to be 
evidence of the contribution made by these organisations to what Scharpf (1999) 
terms ‘output’ legitimacy, it appears that ‘input’ legitimacy may not similarly 
benefit and may even be harmed by the involvement of these organisations in EU 
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decision-making processes, primarily because the organisations themselves have 
been wholly or largely concerned with outputs (Greenwood 2007a). Furthermore, 
since the descriptive definition of civil society (i.e. what civil society is) offered by 
the institutions is rarely accompanied by a functional definition (i.e. what it does), 
it is unclear what the role of civil society, as perceived by the institutions, ought to 
be. 
 
Evidently, there are many questions concerning the contribution of civil society to 
legitimate EU governance, and a need for greater conceptual clarity on the issue. 
Accordingly this chapter asks the questions:  what is civil society (in the context of 
the reform rhetoric of the EU institutions) and how can it help enhance legitimate 
governance in the European Union? I start by reflecting on the concept of civil 
society in democratic theory, addressing the questions of what civil society is and 
what role it plays in democratic societies. This helps me to develop of an 
understanding of the concept and why it has been linked to strengthening 
legitimate governance in the EU.  
 
In the second part of the chapter I turn the attention towards civil society in the 
EU. The study of civil society in the EU has expanded greatly in recent years, 
alongside a discourse on legitimate governance (Armstrong 2002, de Schutter, 
2002, Smismans 2003, 2004, 2006; Curtin 2003; see also Greenwood 2007a) but I 
argue that it should be seen as the continuation of an older literature on 
associational activity in the EU. I then introduce the organisations that were 
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interviewed, the data from which provides the basis for my analysis in chapter 4-6 
before discussing the issues that arise from this.   
 
 
3.2 Civil society in democratic theory 
  
 
Several authors have observed a ‘renaissance’ of the concept of civil society 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Keane 1988: 1, Cohen & Arato 1992:29, 
Diamond 1996, Young 2000:154). However, there are multiple understandings and 
even misunderstandings of the concept of civil society making it important to ask 
the questions ‘what is civil society?’, and furthermore, ‘how does it contribute to 
legitimate governance?’. It quickly becomes clear that this is not a straightforward 
task. Political theorists have been discussing the concept of civil society for 
hundreds of years; thousands according to Cohen & Arato who claim Aristotle was 
the first to identify the concept, using the term politike koinonia – political society 
or community (1992: 84). However, other theorists trace the origin of the modern 
concept of civil society to the eighteenth century (Keane 1988:1), with empirical 
origins in de Tocqueville’s study of ‘associational life’ in democracy and spiritual 
origins in Rousseau’s ‘romanticisation of “the people” as a force for collective 
good’ (Diamond 1996). Pinning down a definition of the concept that would apply 
to its various usages across time and issue areas therefore is difficult, let alone 
operationalising it in order to investigate it empirically. However, it is possible to 
Civil society 95 
 
achieve some clarity by considering separately what civil society is, and what is 
does or in other words its role in democratic societies and contribution to 
legitimate governance. 
 
Walzer characterises civil society as the ‘source of uncoerced human association 
and also the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, 
interest, and ideology – that fill their space’ (1995: 7). However, as noted by Iris 
Marion Young, this definition is extremely broad and includes a great deal of what 
could be described more generally as ‘social’ (2000: 157). Consequently, though it 
may be all-embracing, it is rather vague. Rather than attempting to construct a 
sentence definition, Young argued that the idea of civil society required 
distinguishing and articulating terms describing social life. She combined a spatial 
definition of civil society with a process-oriented element so that civil society is 
conceptualised as a space or an arena in which activities of self-organisation occur 
across a range of associations and networks (2000: 160). These three elements: 
arena; activities; and associations can all be examined further in developing a 
picture of what civil society is. 
 
Most civil society theorists would agree that as an arena, civil society lies outside 
of the state. As such, it is an arena of voluntary association meaning that it is 
neither mandated nor controlled by the state (Young 2000: 158). Some theorists 
have gone further, and emphasised the importance of distinguishing civil society 
not only from the state but also the economy (Cohen & Arato 1992, Habermas 
1996, Walzer 1995), making civil society a ‘Third Sector’ (Young 2000: 158). In a 
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similar vein, Gramsci’s definition differentiated civil society from the economy 
and the state, distinguishing between the ‘civil’ and ‘political’ societies. However, 
excluding the economy from civil society poses questions about the status of 
organisations such as trade unions, professional associations and so on. Identifying 
the ‘location’ or arena of civil society is important because it has implications for 
the role it plays vis-à-vis the state and citizens, and therefore the contribution it 
makes to legitimate governance. 
 
Within the arena of civil society the activities that take place are characterised by 
self-organisation, and therefore fundamentally bottom-up. Cohen and Arato (1992) 
draw upon the distinction between state, economy and civil society in their 
elaboration of the activities in question. Drawing upon Habermas’ concept of the 
‘lifeworld’ outlined in ‘The Theory of Communicative Action Volume I’ as 
distinct from systems of the state and of the economy, Cohen and Arato argue that 
a defining feature of civil society is that the networks or associations that comprise 
it require communicative interaction for their reproduction (1992: 429). This is in 
contrast to the state and the economy which function primarily through systems of 
authorised power and finance respectively. As Young explains, ‘in the associations 
of civil society people co-ordinate their actions by discussing and working things 
out, rather than by checking process or looking up the rules’ (2000:159).  
 
The issue of agency – or the associations involved – is bound up with the arena 
and activities of civil society. Many civil society theorists refer to the various 
associations and networks that comprise civil society. These associations, as we 
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have seen from an elaboration of arena and activities, are voluntary, arising not 
from state coercion but from ‘the everyday lives and activities of communities of 
interest’ (Young 2000: 158). A range of descriptive terms are employed to refer to 
the kinds of associations and networks involved from those which are highly 
organised such as interest groups, to looser formations such as social movements 
or issue networks. Civil society theorists have tended to avoid defining civil 
society in terms of these pre-existing concepts (Hendricks 2006: 488) but there is a 
degree of conceptual overlap.  
 
Moving on from characterising civil society – in other words describing what it is 
– authors have addressed the role of civil society in a democracy – in other words 
what it does. Foley & Edwards (1996) describe the various roles civil society has 
been allocated in democratic societies. There are, they argue, two broad usages of 
the term ‘civil society’ in these contemporary debates which refer to two ‘roles’ 
that civil society plays vis-à-vis the state and society. On the one hand civil society 
is presented as spheres of communal and associational life, which are essential for 
a healthy functioning democracy, and in opposition to liberal individualism (what 
they term ‘Civil Society I’). On the other hand civil society is viewed as a source 
of state opposition, a contention arising out of the literature referring directly to the 
anti-communist movements in Eastern and Central Europe, referring to the work 
of Seligman (2002), (and termed ‘Civil Society II’).  
 
The first argument on the role of civil society in a democracy sees civil society as 
a sphere of voluntary action within which associations perform important 
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functions, most notably the socialisation of individuals to develop the skills and 
attitudes of democratic citizenship. Robert Putnam’s empirical analyses of Italy 
(1993) and the United States (2000) are important contributions to this argument. 
This strand of thought owes a heavy debt to the ideas of de Tocqueville, namely 
his study of ‘Democracy in America’ (1865) in which he asserts that a strong and 
sustainable democracy is dependent on a robust associational life (de Tocqueville 
didn’t actually use the term ‘civil society’ - instead he referred to ‘associations’). 
According to Putnam ‘de Tocqueville was right: democracy is strengthened, not 
weakened when it faces a vigorous civil society’ (Putnam 1993: 182). 
 
A second and related perspective argues that the role of civil society is to act as a 
counterweight to state power. This argument gained popularity in the 1990s owing 
to the emergence of anti-communist movements in central and eastern European 
states and these states’ subsequent democratic transitions. Reflecting on these 
events, Diamond quotes Huntington in arguing that ‘the first and most basic 
democratic function of civil society is to provide “the basis for the limitation of 
state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic 
political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control”’ 
(Diamond 1996: 230). Acknowledgment is made of the spiritual debt owed to 
Rousseau’s ideas of the people as a force for collective good, rising up to assert the 
democratic will against an evil autocracy (1996: 227).  
 
By distinguishing between these two broad arguments on the relationship between 
civil society and democratic governance Foley & Edwards (1996) identify a 
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paradox. The first argument invests with significance the notion that association 
has positive effects for democratic governance, whilst the second argument 
emphasises the importance of civil association as a counterweight to the state. The 
two different arguments, as a consequence have differing implications for 
legitimate EU governance. Foley & Edwards argue that a way around this paradox 
and towards a more nuanced understanding of civil society and its potentially 
legitimising effects might derive from empirical inquiry. One suggested avenue for 
further explanation is to attempt to go beyond sweeping terms (as discussed above, 
even the term ‘civil society’ can be too broad to be useful) which are unlikely to 
capture the diversity of associational life and the democratic benefits they might 
bring. Bearing this in mind the next part of the chapter turns the empirical 
attention towards understandings of civil society in the European Union. 
 
 
3.3 Civil society in the European Union 
 
 
Some of these ideas on the nature and role of civil society vis-à-vis democratic and 
legitimate governance can be detected in the institutional rhetoric surrounding the 
debate on the future of the EU. The identification of civil society as a component 
of legitimate governance has been a relatively recent phenomenon in the EU. 
According to Smismans (2006: 4), the term ‘civil society’ first appeared in the 
rhetoric of the EU institutions in the mid-1990s. The Economic and Social 
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Committee first developed a discourse on the legitimising potential of civil society 
in processes of governance in its paper on ‘The role and contribution of civil 
society organisations in the building of Europe’ (see Economic and Social 
Committee 1999). As the component of the Union’s institutional architecture 
representing interest groups, Smismans (2003: 481-484) argues that the Committee 
saw an opportunity to enhance its own role, presented by the widespread 
perception that the Union needed to enhance its democratic credentials. The 
definition of civil society developed by the Committee and the discourse linking 
civil society to legitimate governance was subsequently adopted by the 
Commission and went on to inform the 2001 governance white paper. 
 
We can observe a transition from discussing associational activity in the EU in 
terms of ‘interest groups’ to a discussion of ‘civil society organisations’ alongside 
an increasing fixation with making the EU more democratic and its institutions 
more legitimate (Armstrong 2002). But this switch from interest representation to 
civil society is not as smooth in practice as implied by the rhetoric of the 
institutions. The interest representation literature contains several examples of 
associational activity weakening, rather than enhancing legitimate governance 
which poses a challenge to the discourses of the institutions that link civil society 
and legitimate governance, and the ideas from democratic theory outlined above.  
 
The Commission’s 2001 governance white paper is supportive of civil society 
involvement in EU decision-making on the grounds that it facilitates wider 
participation, defined as a key principle of good governance. Yet this obscures 
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inequalities of access that characterise processes of interest representation. Grant’s 
(1978) work on ‘insider groups’ and ‘outsider groups’ helps to explain inequalities 
of access between different organisations operating in the EU. Insider groups, 
according to Grant, are regarded as legitimate by government and consulted on a 
regular basis whereas outsider groups are either unable to gain recognition or else 
do not wish to become involved in a consultative relationship with officials or 
state representatives (Grant 1989: 14-15). In the EU decision-making process, 
organisations must command certain resources to stand a chance of gaining insider 
status vis-à-vis the EU institutions, including information and expertise, economic 
muscle, status, control over implementation, the ability to influence members, and 
the ability to help the overloaded Commission (Greenwood 1997: 18-20). It has 
been argued that Brussels is very much ‘an insider’s town’ and those organisations 
without a presence there are likely to find themselves at a disadvantage in relation 
to those that do (Greenwood 2003b:55). This is reminiscent of Olson’s (1965) 
famous critique of pluralist accounts on the grounds that they could not explain 
why not all interests organised into groups, not all groups gained access to the 
political process, and not all preferences were reflected in policy outcomes. 
 
Closely related to the suggestion that the activity of civil society organisations in 
the policy-making process entails wider participation, is the idea that it can help 
bring grass-roots organisations into the political process. As Truman (1962) 
argued, organisations within civil society can perform the vital role of informing 
policy-makers of the preferences of individuals in society because they are close to 
these grass-roots interests. Indeed, one of the fundamental assumptions of the idea 
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that civil society organisations can help bring citizens and EU institutions closer 
together is that the organisations are close to both sides. However in the EU, the 
Commission has tended to favour dialogue with European-level groups rather than 
national groups which over time has led to the development of Europe-wide 
organisations, the best known including UNICE (Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe), ETUC (European Trade Union 
Confederation), EEB (European Environmental Bureau). These organisations can 
be highly effective but the leaders rarely engage directly with members or 
supporters (Warleigh 2001:635, Sudbery 2003: 89) let alone ordinary citizens. 
Furthermore, as Greenwood (2003b: 53) points out, it is extremely rare for these 
organisations to admit individuals as members. For these various reasons, civil 
society organisations operating at the EU level tend to be rather remote from the 
grass roots members whose interests they are supposed to represent. Rather than 
an arena for grass-roots involvement therefore, interest representation in the EU is 
largely dominated by distant supranational-level federations. 
 
A further means by which civil society organisations are seen to strengthen the 
Union’s democratic credentials is by increasing transparency and openness within 
the policy-making process. Enhancing the transparency of the EU political system 
has been an important component of the attempts to bring institutions and citizens 
closer together. This ‘transparency programme’ it is argued, aims to increase 
public support for European integration, institutions and policies by opening them 
up and providing information about them for citizens (Heritier 1999). Civil society 
organisations could contribute to the transparency of the policy-making process, 
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and in doing so undermine the picture of EU policy as developed ‘behind closed 
doors’, by representing interests that are inherent in society and bringing these into 
the policy-making process. However, a rather different interpretation of this 
activity has emerged in which it ‘is characterised by the multitude of 
heterogeneous actors, who have divergent policy styles and lobbying practices, are 
linked only loosely in overlapping networks, engage in shifting coalitions, and 
move within and across the different levels of the EC system’ (Kohler-Koch 
1997:51). Rather than enhance transparency it is suggested that these features 
contribute to the overall complexity of the EU system. 
 
Pluralist accounts of associational activities in democratic systems are based upon 
the assumption of a separation between the state and civil society. The literature on 
the role of civil society in a democracy which arose out of the democratic 
transitions in central and eastern Europe for example views civil society as a free 
associative space independent from the state and protecting against the undue 
concentration of political power, providing a counterweight to power and assisting 
in the dispersal of this power. The extent to which civil society organisations 
operating within the EU system can be said to be entirely independent of the state, 
however, is debatable. Many of the organisations operating at the EU level, 
particularly NGOs, rely in part on funding from the Commission, often for large 
proportions of their overall budgets (The Economist 2004). There is a high degree 
of institutionalisation between the organisations that are regularly consulted, and 
the EU institutions that consult them. In the past these relationships have been 
largely informal, though the constitutional treaty made an attempt to formally 
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incorporate these structures into the constitutional order of the EU in Article 47 on 
participatory democracy. Some commentators have argued that certain 
organisations are enmeshed in complex relationships of dependency with the 
Commission, making it difficult to see where the institution stops and civil society 
starts (see Greenwood 2003b: 54). Furthermore, the intensity of the 
institutionalisation and dependence has led to the suggestion that the system of 
interest representation can be characterised as ‘an imperfect oligopolistic 
competition, one which creates a kind of new political class and merges EU and 
national actors in a political process that is increasingly distant from the ordinary 
citizen’ (Wessels 1997: 38). Rather than help bring citizens closer to the 
institutions, in this view the involvement of civil society organisations serves to 
exacerbate the distance between them. 
 
Evidently, the notion that civil society involvement enhances legitimate 
governance is challenged by the findings of research on associations in the EU. It 
appears that civil society can actually undermine rather than strengthen legitimate 
governance. This might suggest a pessimistic conclusion with regards the extent to 
which organisations involved in the debate on the future of the EU can engender 
democratic linkage between citizens and EU institutions. However, a degree of 
caution may be necessary prior to drawing this conclusion. Much of the research 
on the activities of civil society organisations in the EU has been conducted 
through the framework of interest representation. As such, the research agenda is 
based upon certain epistemological assumptions which may not necessarily be 
suited to an analysis of civil society organisations as agents of democratic linkage. 
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Specifically, the focus of the research is on elite-level relationships between 
organisations and officials within the EU’s institutional framework; the EC policy-
making process; and policy outcomes, or ‘system outputs’.  
 
According to Greenwood, ‘one of the most striking features of the system of 
interest representation is its elite nature’ (2003b: 53). His research found that 
organisations operating at the EU level often claimed to represent interests or 
groups found more widely in civil society but the dialogue between civil society 
and EU political institutions was narrow, involving a small number of actors. The 
suggestion that Brussels is an ‘insider’s town’, and the observation that policy is 
made in closed communities comprising institutional actors and certain 
stakeholders or ‘usual suspects’ contributes to a picture of a process that is elite-
dominated. But the epistemological focus of studies of interest representation is on 
the interaction between policy-making elites and (usually Brussels-based) 
organisations, which makes the conclusion that the activity is elitist less surprising. 
It also poses questions about whether these findings are relevant to the analysis of 
their contribution to the Union’s democratic life or specifically linkage between 
citizens and EU institutions. The notion of democratic linkage suggests that 
interactions occur in two different directions – ‘up’ to the elite institutional actors, 
and ‘down’ to the citizens. But research on processes of interest representation has 
tended to focus only on the interactions between organisations and elite decision-
makers rather than the links or interactions between organisations and citizens in 
member states. 
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In addition to a focus on elite-level interactions, research on interest representation 
in the EU is located within the policy-making process, the objective being to 
understand how organisations attempt to exert influence and the degree to which 
they are successful in doing so. Analysis of policy-making in the EU has relied on 
‘stages’ models of the policy process, heuristic devices that conceptualise the 
process as comprising a series of self-contained, successive stages (see John 
1998). This has encouraged the development of a research agenda concerned with 
taking policy outcomes as evidence of successful activity at an earlier stage of the 
process. The objective of this research has tended to be the ways in which interest 
groups contribute to the development of more effective policy which will be 
implementable and acceptable to those on which it will be imposed rather than the 
‘inputs’ they bring to the process in their representation of interests that occur in 
broader civil society. Furthermore, the policy-making process is not constitutive of 
the EU system as a whole. In developing an analytical model from which to view 
the entire EU system, Wallace has identified ‘territorial’ and ‘affective’ 
dimensions which co-exist alongside the ‘functional’ or policy-making dimension 
of the EU (Wallace 2001a: 1-22). In addition, since the process of policy-making 
is technical, complex, sector specific, and appears generally ‘distant’ from 
ordinary citizens, processes of interest representation in which civil society 
organisations are engaged are probably not the most appropriate aspect of their 
activities when investigating the extent to which they connect with citizens and 
improve the democratic life of the Union.  
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This focus on the policy-making process points to and indeed contributes to the 
prioritisation of outputs, as opposed to inputs, as observable evidence upon which 
to base conclusions. Measuring the relative influence these organisations may have 
in the policy-making process, which is the primary objective of the interest 
representation literature, has led to a focus on policy outcomes. Although it is 
extremely important to know which actors are influential and which interests are 
reflected in policy outcomes, it is arguably equally important to understand the 
basis upon which such outcomes stand, i.e. the inputs. Although the interest 
representation literature can enlighten with regards to the former, it says less about 
the latter and is therefore less able to demonstrate the contribution of organisations 
to democratic linkage.  
 
To date, much of the research on interest groups and civil society organisations in 
the EU has focused on elite-level interactions between organisations and officials, 
the EU’s functional dimension and the policy outcomes produced rather than 
inputs. Their outlook on how these organisations strengthen the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union is rather pessimistic and suggests that civil society may 
undermine as opposed to strengthen democratic legitimacy. However, these 
findings should be seen in the context of their epistemology which directs 
empirical attention towards outputs, elite-level interactions and the policy-making 
process – not inputs, ‘downward-facing’ interactions or arenas outside the policy-
making process. They pose an interesting and important challenge to the notion 
(found within democratic theory and the rhetoric of the institutions) that civil 
society strengthens legitimate governance. But they do not engage fully with the 
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question of whether and to what extent organised civil society facilitates 
democratic linkage. Rather, the gaps in the interest representation literature 
strengthens the need for an empirical investigation of organised civil society in 
which the contribution to legitimate governance is the motivating question. 
 
 
3.4 Organised civil society and the debate on the future of the EU 
 
 
The aim of my empirical investigation is to understand and explain the extent to 
which organised civil society can promote democratic linkage in the context of the 
debate on the future of the EU. This involves turning the attention towards the 
organisations themselves, and investigating their respective capacities and 
willingness to perform the roles suggested by the institutional rhetoric on the 
debate and outlined by democratic theory.  
 
The notion of democratic linkage implies that organisations maintain interactions 
in two directions: ‘upwards’ towards elite decision-makers, in this case the EU 
institutions; and ‘downwards’ towards citizens, in this case in the member states. 
Empirical research into the activities of what are now referred to as civil society 
organisations has tended to address only the former – the upward-facing 
interactions. However, to effectively understand their role in facilitating linkage it 
is also essential to consider their downward-facing interactions. This is a departure 
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from the previous research on interest representation which has tended to focus on 
the elite-level, or upward-facing interactions.  
 
Addressing the ‘downwards’ facing interactions of civil society organisations 
could also provide an insight into the role of citizens in EU politics more 
generally. As was outlined in Chapter 1, EU institutional actors increasingly find it 
in their interest to appeal to and influence citizens. So far, research on the 
interactions between civil society organisations and citizens in the EU has been 
limited but there is an emerging literature based on empirical research conducted 
outside the EU context (primarily from the US) on the so-called ‘outside lobbying’ 
activities of groups. Outside lobbying is defined as ‘attempts by interest group 
leaders to mobilise citizens outside the policy-making community’ (Kollman 
1998:1), for example by publicising policy positions or organising letter-writing 
campaigns or online petitions. The focus of investigation in this literature is the 
interactions between groups and publics as opposed to groups and political actors. 
In his study of outside lobbying activities undertaken by groups based in 
Washington DC, Kollman (1998) questions why groups use outside lobbying (as 
opposed to traditional ‘inside’ lobbying of political actors), when it works, and 
who benefits from it. In the context of a reform agenda where appealing to the 
public is a priority, this line of empirical inquiry displays significant potential in 
the study of groups in the EU.  
 
Kollman’s study is based on the observation that ‘lobbying…is not just a game 
played by well-paid lawyers, ideological activists and legislators’ (1998:1). Rather, 
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as in other aspects of political life, the outside public is increasingly involved. 
Kollman suggests that outside lobbying, achieves two tasks simultaneously. 
Firstly, it can communicate public opinion preference to policy-makers by 
mobilising citizens, demonstrating that the people the group represents really do 
care about a particular issue. This role is referred to as ‘signalling’ (1998:8) as the 
group signals its popular support to the policy-makers. In addition to this largely 
elite-level role, outside lobbying performs a second role of influencing public 
opinion by changing how citizens consider and respond to policy issues. Kollman 
refers to this role as ‘conflict expansion’ (1998:8) as it involves groups attempting 
to get citizens involved on their side. In terms of both of these roles, outside 
lobbying is related to the political salience (or the relative importance people 
attach to political issues) of issues in a way that public opinion polls are unable to 
do. Individuals are mobilised by issues they find the most salient, and interest 
groups have the potential to increase the salience of these issues to citizens. 
 
The dual purposes of outside lobbying make it a particularly relevant topic for 
investigation in the context of the EU political system. As the previous section 
argued, group activity in the EU has often been presented and analysed as an elite- 
level activity. However, the concept of outside lobbying emphasises a public 
dimension of group activity. Although signalling to policy-makers that the groups’ 
preferences are also salient for individuals in society is central, groups use outside 
lobbying to influence individuals as much as to demonstrate popular support to 
policy-makers. Kollman’s research found that many group leaders believed that 
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their outside lobbying activities would have lasting effects on the way members of 
the public perceive and evaluate policy issues.  
 
Kollman’s research objective – to explore why and when interest group leaders 
turn towards the public – could be applied to the study of civil society 
organisations in the EU, and would go some way towards addressing the 
imbalance within the literature on EU level group activity. However, my research 
objectives are slightly broader than Kollman’s, as ultimately, his research 
investigates mobilising the public as a strategy used by interest groups in order to 
influence policy decisions in the US Congress, and therefore is focused on outputs. 
In contrast, I acknowledge that influencing decisions is an objective of EU civil 
society organisations, but I do not make the assumption that it is the only objective 
of their involvement in the Convention and Futurum. 
 
The Convention and the Futurum initiative lend themselves well to an 
investigation of the role of civil society within the debate on the future of the EU. 
In both cases there were several measures were taken to ensure the involvement of 
civil society organisations. The Laeken declaration called for a ‘Forum’ for civil 
society to be established alongside the Convention in order to broaden the debate 
beyond the official members of the Convention. This Forum took the form of a 
website where organisations could find information on the debates taking place, 
and where they could post contributions outlining their opinions on the discussions 
for Convention members to see. In addition, in one of the plenary sessions during 
the ‘listening’ phase of the Convention’s work speakers from a range of 
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organisations had the opportunity to address the Convention members directly 
with the concerns of their sector. Futurum was another web-based initiative but 
unlike the Convention Forum it sought to broaden the debate beyond civil society 
organisations and beyond the discussions of the Convention. Like the Forum it 
invited civil society organisations to post documents outlining their thoughts on 
the draft Constitution, and the future of the EU more generally. However it also 
hosted an online discussion board (the ‘discussion corner’) to which individuals 
could post their comments and opinions on issues relating to the EU’s future 
defined broadly. Finally, it encouraged civil society organisations to develop a 
‘partnership’ by linking their own websites and online debate pages with Futurum. 
 
To investigate the role of civil society organisations within the framework of the 
three mechanisms of linkage – participation, representation and communication – I 
draw upon data from interviews with 25 organisations that were involved in the 
Convention and/or Futurum. Using the information on the Convention Forum and 
Futurum websites I investigated the range of organisations that were involved. I 
was particularly interested to note that, on their websites, many of the 
organisations adopted similar rhetoric to that of the institutions, declaring their 
commitment to debating the EU’s future. I sent letters and follow-up emails to 46 
organisations explaining my research and the reasons for my interest in their 
organisation. 
 
Of the 46 organisations approached, 31 responded and I was finally able to arrange 
interviews with 25 between January and April 2005. Eighteen of the organisations 
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were based in Brussels. Four were based in Paris and a further one based in France 
outside Paris. The remaining two organisations were based in London. Interviews 
were conducted with individuals occupying a range of positions within their 
respective organisation, Director, Secretary-General, Research Director, and 
Campaign Manager for example, and in five of the interviews there was more than 
one interviewee. 
 
All of the organisations that took part in the interviews were happy to be 
associated with the research but some did not want their comments attributed to 
them personally. To avoid different systems of attributing comments, in the text, 
all of the comments are anonymised, but with indications given, where relevant, of 
the type of organisation the individual worked for. A list of all of the 
organisations, along with a brief description, can be found in Appendix II. 
 
The EU institutions adopted a broad definition of civil society (in terms of the 
organisations involved) and both the Convention Forum and the Futurum websites 
employed categories to distinguish between the different types of organisations 
involved. These were: Political or public authority; Socio-economic; Academic 
and think-tank; and ‘Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought’. This 
categorisation, particularly the inclusion of ‘political or public authority’ and 
‘socio-economic’ organisations, was the source of controversy among some of the 
organisations interviewed. In particular the regional organisations (which came 
under the heading of ‘Political or public authority’) that were interviewed did not 
Civil society 114 
 
always view themselves as ‘civil society’ organisations, and the trade unions 
viewed themselves as a special part of civil society. 
 
The emphasis in the interviews was on encouraging the interviewees to discuss in 
their own words the involvement of their organisation in the two initiatives, 
aiming to ‘gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to 
interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena’ (Kvale 1983: 174). The 
benefit of this was that it allowed me to develop an understanding of the 
experiences of the organisations as the primary agents of linkage, in their own 
words, rather than reported by the institutions. As such, I treat the interview data 
as a ‘resource’ (Seale 1998). The implication of this was that I had to make 
‘realist’ (King 2003: 14) assumptions that their accounts would provide an insight 
into their actual experience of involvement in the Convention and Futurum, a 
strategy that has been criticised by social constructionist traditions (Rapley 2004) 
which claim that the interview data should not be seen as an insight into the 
interviewee’s experience but instead as a construction of a perspective. 
 
As is the custom for qualitative research interviews (King 2003: 15) I had no fixed 
list of questions to be asked word-for-word in the same order. Instead, the 
interview schedule was organised around four topics which I guided the 
interviewees around, and which I had informed them of in advance of the 
interview. These topics were the Convention and/or Futurum; the role of organised 
civil society in ‘bringing citizens and institutions closer together’; debate as a 
feature of decision-making in the EU; and the role of citizens in the EU.  
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I did not directly ask interviewees whether they engaged in participation, 
representation or communication activities because of the potential for there being 
multiple possible interpretations of the concepts, with the prospect of one 
organisation describing their activities in terms of participation and another 
describing similar or the same activities as communication. Instead, I use the 
concepts of participation, representation and communication to describe the kind 
of activities that were reported. Sometimes the same activity can be described by 
more than one concept but this intentional because it provides us with more 
explanations of linkage. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion: civil society in the EU – theory and practice 
 
 
In recent years the idea of civil society has become increasingly prominent in the 
reform discourses of the European Union, and in particular has been linked closely 
with the need to enhance the democratic credentials of EU governance and bring 
citizens and EU institutions closer together. This can be seen as part of a broader 
global trend to turn towards civil society in searching for solutions to a range of 
problems experienced by contemporary democratic political systems. The 
beneficial effects of civil society are well-established in democratic theory which 
tends to either identify civil society as a counterweight to the state and protection 
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against the concentration of power or else focus on the role of civil society in 
socialising democratic behaviour through association. The EU’s reform discourses 
have tended to focus upon the latter role to a greater degree than the former. 
 
Yet identifying the exact contribution of civil society to democratically legitimate 
governance in the EU depends on defining what is meant by the term ‘civil 
society’. The notion of civil society can be defined along several different 
dimensions which results in multiple interpretations of what civil society is and 
what it does, leading to some confusion. Iris Young’s approach to understanding 
civil society was to avoid the ‘one-sentence’ definition approach and instead to 
consider the arena, activities and associations in question (2000: 157). She 
conceptualised civil society as a space or an arena lying outside of the state and 
neither controlled nor mandated by the state; in which fundamentally bottom-up 
activities of self-organisation occur; across a range of associations and networks 
arising from the everyday lives and interests of individuals.  
 
However, a preliminary review of the nature of civil society in the EU reveals that 
there are incongruities between this and the ideal of civil society as outlined by 
democratic theory. Armstrong (2002) argues that there are significant limitations 
in the idea of European civil society as conceptualised by the discourses of EU 
institutions, which can be particularly identified in the governance white paper. He 
claims that the notion of civil society elaborated by the white paper and 
surrounding discussions is ‘unduly narrow’ thereby confounding the expectation 
that civil society will contribute to open, participatory democracy; and moreover, 
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that the transnational, institutionalised civil society is likely to succumb to the 
same legitimacy problems as the institutions themselves. Many civil society 
organisations operating at the EU level (including several interviewed for this 
research) are federations of national and/or regional civil society organisations 
which were formed in response to the Commission’s preference for working with a 
single EU-wide organisation rather than multiple national organisations. An EU-
level umbrella NGO told the story of their origins: 
 
I had a meeting with a senior official of the Commission six or seven 
years ago and I asked him ‘why is it so difficult for us as the social 
sector to express our views and be listened to by the Commission?’ 
And the answer was very brief, and rude, and clear: get organised. And 
that’s what we do. We learnt that the vast majority of new legislation, 
new regulations, is influenced by the thinking and the overall 
framework that Brussels gives to national and regional authorities. And 
therefore it is important that we have strong organisations here in 
Brussels  
Civil society organisation #16, 14.01.05, Brussels 
 
Not only does this quotation illustrate the preference of the institutions for dealing 
with EU-level as opposed to national level organisations, it also demonstrates the 
way in which the institutions have been influential in the development of EU level 
organisations. This suggests a blurring of the extent to which EU civil society can 
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be seen as comprising self-organising associations and means in the case of some 
organisations the extent to which they are entirely ‘voluntary’ is questionable.  
 
The extent to which EU level civil society can be viewed as genuinely separate 
from the state is blurred further by the financial dependence of many EU civil 
society organisations (including most of those interviewed for this research) upon 
the Union budget. That the organisations the Commission in particular is so keen 
to incorporate into discussions about the EU’s future are financed (often heavily) 
by the Commission, is odd. Although many democratic governments and 
international organisations – notably the World Bank – finance NGOs and other 
civil society organisations, the situation in the EU becomes a little more sinister 
when the organisations funded by the Commission promote messages congenial to 
the Commission (The Economist 2004). Furthermore, the fact that many EU civil 
society organisations receive, and indeed are reliant upon funding which comes 
from the EU institutions seriously challenges Young’s characterisation of civil 
society as an arena independent from and neither controlled nor mandated by the 
state – or in this case the EU institutions. 
 
In addition to the dependence of civil society on EU funding, the literature on 
interest representation in the EU has documented the dependence of the 
Commission upon expertise from sources external to it such as civil society 
organisations (see Mazey & Richardson 1993, 2001; Greenwood 2003a). This has 
led to the ‘institutionalisation’ of civil society in some policy-making areas. There 
is a high degree of ‘embeddedness’ of civil society organisations in the decision-
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making process of the EU, specifically in the Economic and Social Committee, 
and which can also be seen in terms of the Commission’s reliance on outside 
technical expertise. Consequently, this is further evidence that the extent to which 
EU-level civil society organisations act as a counterweight, as opposed to a 
component of state power, is questionable. 
 
One of the striking features of the nature civil society in the EU is that this is a 
relatively new way of referring to a series of organisations and a type of activity 
that has been around for much longer. There is an established literature on the role 
of associations in EU governance – indeed it has been seen as one of the defining 
features of EU governance. In the past the associations in question were referred to 
as ‘interest groups’, yet they are now called ‘civil society organisations’. The shift 
in terminology can be seen as a part of a discourse created by the EU institutions 
and motivated by the need to become, or at least appear more open, democratic, 
legitimate and so on. 
 
The findings of research on interest groups in the EU highlight challenges to the 
assumption that civil society strengthens democracy on several grounds. It has 
been argued that interest groups operating within Brussels behave in a 
fundamentally different way to interest groups in other – usually national - 
systems. Greenwood (2003b) argues that public appeal campaigning tactics, which 
can be an important element of group activities in many democratic systems, are 
minimised by organised interests in Brussels. He cites the example of Greenpeace, 
a traditionally activist organisation, which like similar organisations has a policy 
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office rather than campaigning office in Brussels and whose activities are more on 
the side of ‘building alliances and making private compromises with other policy 
players than their public marketing profiles might otherwise suggest’ (Greenwood 
2003b: 53).  
 
Elsewhere in the literature on group activities in the EU is scepticism about the 
capacity and willingness of EU level groups to engage in outside lobbying-type 
strategies, which calls into question the validity of applying this framework to the 
EU example. Sudbery (2003) suggests that the activities of European level groups 
were unlikely to be focussed on the communication of information to supporters 
and the general public. As an officer from the European Environmental Bureau 
explained: ‘while ideally it would be good to get people involved, time pressures 
mean that the most effective use of my time is to get on with advocacy. In the end 
my role is not to encourage participatory governance but to ensure the best results 
for the environment’ (2003: 90).  
 
In addition, Warleigh’s (2001) research on citizen interest groups organised at the 
EU level finds these groups neither willing nor able to act as agents for political 
socialisation of their supporters, arguing that ‘their internal governance is far too 
elitist to allow supporters a role in shaping policies, campaigns and 
strategies…moreover most NGO supporters do not actually want to undertake 
such a role’ (2001: 635). 
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The discrepancies between the nature and role of civil society outlined in 
democratic theory, and the picture of civil society that is emerging poses questions 
about the implications for legitimacy. Armstrong argues that ‘instead of embracing 
a multi-form, multi-dimensional and multi-level conception of civil society what is 
offered is a strictly transnational relationship between transnational structures of 
governance and a transnationalised organised civil society which may suffer from 
the same sorts of legitimacy problems as transnational governance itself (2002: 
103). My empirical investigation addresses these by considering the capacity and 
willingness of organisations to facilitate democratic linkage. Qualitative interviews 
with 25 organisations that were involved in the Convention and Futurum processes 
help to understand the perspective of the organisations in their own words, and in 
turn explain the nature of civil society in the EU and the contribution it can make 
to legitimate governance.  
 
The debate initiative attracted a great deal of interest from civil society 
organisations – quite understandably. For the first time these originations had the 
opportunity to get involved in debates that would lead towards treaty reform and 
therefore potentially influence the constitution. The organisations that were 
interviewed for the research fell into the four categories outlined by the 
Commission (and used in the Forum and the Futurum websites). It is impossible to 
say that these organisations were numerically representative of all the 
organisations operating at the EU or even the national level, partly because of the 
difficulties of establishing the size of this population. But they give an indication 
of the diversity of the organisations that were involved, some of which might not 
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even fit into conventional definitions of civil society – trade unions and even 
regional organisations were included for example. 
 
The interviews with these organisations provide much of the empirical data upon 
which the investigation is based. The following three chapters outline and analyse 
the contribution of these civil society organisations to strengthening democratic 
linkage through the mechanisms of participation, representation and 
communication. 
  
 
Chapter 4  
 
 
Mechanisms of democratic linkage I: Participation 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
There are several reasons for looking at the concept of participation when 
trying to understand and explain the linkage role played by organised civil 
society in the context of the debate on the future of the EU. The debate 
discourse is imbued with rhetoric on participation and the explicit suggestion 
that through participation citizens and institutions can be brought closer 
together. The concept of participation also forms part of the theoretical 
explanations for how and why debate or deliberation on the one hand and civil 
society on the other hand strengthen democratic legitimacy. By looking at the 
activities of the organisations in the debate on the future of the EU and the 
ways in which they characterise and justify their activities I compare the theory 
and the rhetoric with the situation on the ground. In this context, the purpose of 
this chapter is to outline the nature of the empirical investigation into the nature 
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of participation within the debate on the future of the EU and the role of 
organised civil society therein; and to detail the findings of this investigation. 
 
The notion that participation is a desirable component of decision-making in 
the EU can be traced from the Nice declaration to the Laeken declaration; it 
dominated the Commission’s 2001 governance white paper; and it was 
enshrined in Article I-47 of the constitutional treaty. In each case the rhetoric is 
informed by the notion that participation can help bring citizens and 
institutions closer together, or in other words, facilitate democratic linkage. But 
to what extent does this rhetoric on participation correspond to the actual 
activities of civil society organisations in the Convention and Futurum? In 
what ways do the participation activities of the organisations involved 
strengthen (or at least make attempts to strengthen) linkage, or in the language 
of the rhetoric, bring citizens and institutions closer?  
 
Some guidance can be found within democratic theories which incorporate the 
concept of participation into explanations of ideal democratic institutions. The 
literatures on both deliberative democracy and civil society identify 
participation as a component of a ‘fuller’ expression of democracy in which the 
role of citizens in the political process is not limited to periodic voting in 
elections (see for example Mansbridge 1980 and Barber 1984 on ‘strong’ 
democracy; Cohen 1989; Fishkin 1991; and Bohman 1996 on participation and 
deliberative democracy; and Putnam 2000 and Dahl 1989). In their 
elaborations on the role of participation in contemporary democracies, 
democratic theories can demonstrate why participation has become such an 
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attractive notion to decision-makers in the EU and beyond. They can also 
contribute to an explanation of exactly how participation can contribute to 
legitimate governance in the EU, specifically within the case studies introduced 
in Chapter 2.  
 
In investigating the nature of participation and the extent to which it facilitates 
democratic linkage in the debate on the future of the EU, the empirical 
investigation turns towards the civil society actors involved. An analysis of the 
organisations’ understandings of participation, their objectives in pursuing 
activities which facilitate participation, and their perspectives on participation 
contributes to an explanation of their capacity and willingness to facilitate 
linkage through participation. Much of the data are drawn from interviews with 
25 organisations that were involved in either the Convention, or the Futurum 
initiative or both. Before outlining the empirical findings however, this chapter 
outlines the notion of participation as it appears in the institutional rhetoric 
before engaging in a little conceptual ground-clearing in order to define the 
notion of participation. 
 
 
4.2 Participation in the institutional rhetoric 
 
 
A discourse on participation as a component of legitimate governance has 
emerged within the institutional rhetoric surrounding the debate on the future 
of the EU. Participation here refers to non-formal modes of participation in 
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decision-making, as opposed to participation through voting in European 
Parliament elections. Elements of this discourse can be found in the Nice and 
Laeken declarations, the Commission’s 2001 governance white paper and the 
constitutional treaty and are outlined below. However, the discourse makes 
several problematic assumptions about the nature of participation, which have 
implications for the extent to which it facilitates linkage, and therefore its 
contribution to legitimate governance. Most notably, participation appears to 
be conceptualised as an elite activity, involving organised civil society actors, 
rather than individual citizens. Beyond this, very little indication is given of the 
intended nature of participation in the debate on the future of the EU. 
 
The Declaration on the Future of the Union, annexed to the Treaty of Nice 
made the formal call for a debate proposing: ‘wide-ranging discussions with all 
interested parties’, including ‘representatives of civil society’ (European Union 
2001: Declaration 23, point 3). From the earliest stage of the debate on the 
future of the EU, there was the idea that the debates should involve the 
participation of a range of actors, beyond the governmental actors traditionally 
involved in treaty reform. The Laeken declaration, issued almost one year later, 
built on and expanded these ideas. Its main contribution was to outline the 
institutional requirements for the debate on the future of the EU that had been 
called for by the Nice declaration. To this end it convened the Convention on 
the Future of Europe and specified that its members would be drawn from 
member and applicant state governments and parliaments; and EU institutions. 
In addition the decision was taken to establish a ‘Forum’ for civil society 
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which, it claimed, would ‘guarantee the participation of all citizens’ (European 
Council 2001, emphasis added).  
 
In the intervening period the Commission had issued its White Paper on 
European Governance in which the notion of participation was again singled 
out. The white paper gives one of the most prominent expositions of 
participation in the rhetoric surrounding the debate on the future of the EU. 
This document, which represented the Commission’s key contribution to the 
debate on how to bring the citizens of the member states and the EU 
institutions closer together, outlined five principles of ‘good governance’, one 
of which was participation19. According to the Commission’s notion of good 
governance ‘the quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on 
ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain’ (2001a:10 emphasis 
added).  
 
In the reform discourses, participation has been identified as part of the process 
of debating the EU’s future, and as a characteristic of a more legitimate system 
of governance that was the intended outcome of the debate. Article I-47 
enshrined the principle of participatory democracy in the constitutional treaty 
alongside the principle of representative democracy. In particular, it stipulated 
that via a petition of at least one million signatures, the citizens of the member 
states could invite the Commission to take a legislative initiative – the so-called 
‘citizens initiative’.  
 
                                          
19
 Alongside part icipat ion, the governance white paper defined openness, accountability , 
effect iveness and coherence as principles of good governance, the applicat ion of which would 
reinforce the exist ing com m itment  to the principles of proport ionality and subsidiar ity 
(European Comm ission 2001a:  10) . 
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Even after the referenda on the constitutional treaty in France and the 
Netherlands in May and June 2005 the belief that participation was a means of 
addressing the problems that the Union was facing persisted. ‘Plan D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’ (the Commission’s contribution to the 
period of reflection following the referenda) aimed to ‘stimulate a wider 
debate’ which required the active participation of citizens alongside the 
Union’s institutions (2005b: 2). The publication of Plan D was followed shortly 
afterwards by the Commission’s White Paper on a European Communication 
Policy. In a style reminiscent of the earlier governance white paper, this 
document pointed out that ‘democracy can only flourish if citizens know what 
is going on, and are able to participate fully’ (European Commission 2006a:2). 
 
Naturally, the discourse on participation, operating largely at the level of 
rhetoric, leaves important questions unanswered. The governance white paper 
aroused significant interest concerning its use of the notion of participation (see 
Armstrong 2001), in spite of, or even because it offered little explanation of its 
understanding of participation. Paul Magnette (2001, 2003) analysed the notion 
of participation found within the white paper and pointed out that although it 
invoked the role of the citizen in EU governance, the concrete proposals for 
enhancing participation addressed only groups that were already organised and 
active in lobbying and trying to influence EU policy-making – in other words 
organised civil society. Magnette concluded on this basis that rather than 
creating opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in EU governance 
processes, the white paper would only enhance the role of ‘elite citizens’ and 
create opportunities for more ‘elite participation’.  
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The notion of ‘elite participation’ is also implicit in the Laeken declaration. 
Like the governance white paper, the Laeken declaration made reference to the 
citizens of the member states before calling for a Forum which would be open 
only to civil society organisations. In doing so it goes even further in making 
an assumption that citizens and organised civil society are interchangeable. The 
Forum for civil society organisations, the Laeken declaration stated, was 
created in order to facilitate the participation of all citizens. 
 
In contrast, and perhaps in recognition that it was a mistake to conflate 
individual and ordinary citizens with civil society organisations, Article I-47 of 
the constitutional treaty addressed individual citizens directly (albeit a 
significant number of individual citizens acting together), in addition to highly 
organised groups of interests or citizens. Yet the requirements of the citizens’ 
initiative were vague and referred only to the need for the one million citizens 
to be drawn from a ‘significant number of the member states’, and conceded 
that additional legal instruments would have to be developed in order to 
implement the article.  
 
Furthermore, in the absence of detailed guidance, the citizens’ initiative looked 
likely to become another tool used by organisations to lobby the institutions, 
and therefore an arena for elite participation. Shortly after the ratification 
process began, the Social Platform of NGOs20 were discussing the ways in 
which the initiative could be exploited by member organisations or the 
                                          
20
 The ‘Social Plat form ’ is an um brella organisat ion br inging together NGOs from  the social, 
environm ental,  development  sectors and the t rade unions, and was one of the organisat ions 
that  were interviewed for this research. A descript ion of the organisat ion can be found in 
Appendix I I .  
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Platform as a whole21. This resonates with Kollman’s (1998) observation that it 
is extraordinarily rare for individual citizens to join together an engage in 
genuinely spontaneous political action: what is far more likely it that organised 
groups are behind the scenes facilitating this activism and as such, although the 
initiative ostensibly addresses (one million) individual citizens, in practice it 
empowers organised citizens. 
 
These examples demonstrate that the rhetoric emerging from the institutions 
does not give a comprehensive and nuanced picture of how the mechanism of 
participation actually works in practice. It is at times confusing because it 
conflates the participation of citizens with that of organised civil society 
without taking into consideration the relationship between organised or ‘elite’ 
citizens and individual or ‘ordinary’ citizens. Furthermore, it clearly outlines a 
commitment to the notion of participation as a desirable component of 
governance at the EU level, but it is often sketchy on details. The end result is 
that the rhetoric tells us relatively little about how participation might help 
facilitate democratic linkage and thereby enhance legitimate governance. In 
response to these issues the following section takes a closer look at the concept 
of participation, drawing upon explanations from democratic theory on the 
relationship between participation and democracy, and using these to establish 
the basis of the empirical investigation. 
 
 
                                          
21
 I n February 2005 the Social Plat form  held a conference for its members ent it led:  
‘Rat ificat ion of the Const itut ional Treaty and Developing Part icipatory Dem ocracy’. One of the 
sessions discussed m ethods of ‘Developing Art icle I -47’, the consensus being that  this 
presented a new opportunity for NGOs. 
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4.3 Conceptualising participation 
 
 
Though the notion of participation looms large in the rhetoric surrounding the 
debate on the future of the EU, the nature of participation in the debate and its 
contribution to legitimate governance is not always made clear. Taking a closer 
look at the concept of participation as outlined in democratic theory provides 
some enlightenment on the nature of participation and the ways in which it can 
provide democratic linkage. Just as the notion of participation has become 
popular amongst political actors in the EU only relatively recently, the same 
can be said for the theoretical treatment of participation and its relationship 
with democracy. For much of the twentieth century mass participation in 
political decision-making was regarded as unattainable and even dangerous.  
 
Schumpeter’s influential book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943) 
argued that the so-called ‘classical doctrine’ of democracy which took as 
central the participation of people in decision-making was empirically 
unrealistic, and rather that the essence of democracy was to be found in ‘that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote’ (1943: 269), or in other words, the competition for leadership. This 
suspicion of participation was reinforced by the work of American 
behaviouralists in the 1950s, for example the finding of Berelson et al (1954) 
that democracy depending in part upon a degree of indifference on the part of a 
large proportion of the electorate. By the 1970s, however, this dominant 
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suspicion of participation was being challenged. Carole Pateman’s book on 
Participation and Democratic Theory (1970) was motivated by the observation 
that the notion of participation was becoming increasingly popular during the 
late 1960s. Her analysis of contemporary democratic theorists (including 
Schumpeter) and empirical case studies led her to the conclusion that ‘a viable 
theory of democracy…retains the notion of participation at its heart’ (p111). 
 
At its most basic, participation can be defined as the taking part of groups or 
individuals in political decision-making or, in the context of this thesis, in the 
debates about the future of the European Union. Pateman articulated an ideal of 
democracy as characterised by the active discussion and decision-making of 
citizens. As such, the participation of citizens in decision-making would allow 
for decisions to be based upon the genuine preferences of citizens. Input 
legitimacy, in this view, rests on this direct involvement of citizens.  
 
Robert Dahl has disputed whether the ideal of the active participation of 
citizens in democratic decision-making is feasible in contemporary 
democracies, and particularly in post-national systems. In ‘A Preface to 
Democratic Theory’ (1956) Dahl argues that participation in contemporary 
democratic societies is confined to a number of elite groupings rather than 
widespread throughout society. The exception to this is voting in elections 
which involves much larger numbers. His limited conception of participation is 
elaborated in ‘Polyarchy’ (1971). In this work he argues that ‘democracy’ is an 
unattainable ideal, and the nearest thing we get to it in contemporary societies 
is polyarchy, or the rule of the many. ‘The many’ in this case refers not to the 
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citizens but to multiple elite groupings representing different communities or 
parts of society. Dahl maintains that the participation of organised groups 
rather than individual citizens does not necessarily make a system 
undemocratic. But it does have implications for the nature of participation. 
Consequently, my empirical investigation seeks to establish exactly which 
actors are participating in the two debate case studies.  
 
Another way in which participation may create democratic linkage, and why it 
is important to study it in this context, is because as a mechanism it allows 
policy makers to find out about the sort of policy responses that people want. 
Many participatory approaches to democracy argue for a broader 
conceptualisation of democracy than simply the ability of citizens to vote on 
representatives every four or five years. Instead, a ‘fuller’ democracy is one 
that allows citizens to involve themselves more continuously (Young 1996: 
485). Inglehart’s (1997) comparative research on cultural, economic and 
political change in 43 societies demonstrated that in addition to choosing their 
leaders in elections every five years, citizens wanted to be able to influence 
them on a more continuous basis in between elections. Furthermore, the greater 
the number of opportunities for citizens to participate, the greater the number 
of opportunities for their ‘genuine preferences’ to be discovered by decision-
makers and reflected in political decisions.  
 
In addition to bringing the genuine preferences of citizens in to the decision-
making process, and thereby enhancing the input legitimacy, participation can 
also improve what arises out of the decision-making process, or contribute to 
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more output legitimacy. Participation brings the potential for policy-makers to 
develop more effective policy: effective in terms of whether it can be 
implemented successfully and whether it will do the job it aims to. 
Participation in EU decision-making has been seen to contribute to what 
Scharpf (1999) conceptualised as ‘output legitimacy’ – that political outcomes 
will be effective because they have been influenced by the actors who have 
expertise in the technical policy areas, and often partial control over their 
implementation. Investigating the activities and objectives of the organisations 
gives an indication of whether the conditions for the development of effective 
policy are met. 
 
Participation can play a symbolic role in legitimising democratic political 
systems. It enhances the democratic credentials of a political system by 
demonstrating that the decision-making process is open to the input of the 
people, or in other words, that the governed have the potential to influence the 
governing agenda. In turn this demonstrates that the governing are accountable 
to the governed. Schumpeter (1947) felt that participation in modern 
democratic societies served a largely protective function against the worst 
tyrannies of government, ensuring that - through elections - governments could 
be thrown out. His, however, was a largely sceptical view of participation as a 
component of democracy, which was limited to this sole, and largely 
hypothetical function. Inglehart’s (1997) research, by contrast, demonstrated 
that citizens are often concerned with holding governments accountable (as 
well as influencing them) on a continuous basis in between elections. 
Investigating the activities performed by the organisations and the actors 
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involved in these activities demonstrates whether this task is being performed 
effectively. 
 
Finally, participation plays an important role for the individual, allowing them 
to see the significance of their role in the democratic system and thus 
enhancing democracy on a micro level. Pateman (1970) recognised that the 
notion of participation had several dimensions – that it could play a role in 
improving the effectiveness of policy-making, but also that quite apart from its 
functions vis-à-vis the political system, participation played an important 
democratic role in the mind of the individual citizen. Having the opportunity to 
participate in political decision-making, and taking up such opportunities, she 
argued, would allow the individual to more easily see the significance of their 
role in a democratic political system. This is a different approach to the study 
of participation as a means of democratic linkage to that of Dahl because it 
views the outputs on the side of the individual rather than the political system.  
 
The paragraphs above survey some of the normative claims that have been 
made about participation as a mechanism of democratic linkage. The following 
section investigates empirically the nature of participation in the Convention 
and Futurum debates and the role of civil society organisations therein. 
 
 
4.4 Participation in the Convention and the Futurum initiative 
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As we have seen, the discourse on participation as a component of legitimate or 
‘good’ governance indicates that there is a normative commitment to 
participation on the part of the EU institutions. At the same time important 
questions remain which require empirical attention: What are the opportunities 
for and constraints upon participation in the Convention process and the 
Futurum initiative? Does organised civil society have the capacity and the 
desire to facilitate democratic linkage through participation? Can the concept 
of participation explain the linkage role of organised civil society within the 
context of the debate initiative? 
 
I explored these questions in the interviews that I conducted with 25 civil 
society organisations and six Union officials. The data presented below are 
drawn primarily from these qualitative interviews (the interviews are outlined 
in greater detail in Chapter 3). I did not ask organisations about their 
participation activities directly, because of the potential for differing 
interpretation of what it means to participate. Instead I identified within their 
responses examples of behaviour and attitudes on the subject of ‘taking part’ in 
the debate processes. 
 
In addition to the interview data, official documents of the organisations such 
as annual reports, and the organisations’ websites were consulted. To recap, all 
but two of the 25 organisations were EU-wide in their scope. Seventeen 
organisations were based in Brussels, five in Paris and two in London. The 
organisations belonged to all four of the categories used in the Convention 
Forum and Futurum initiative: Political or Public Authority (3); Socio-
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economic (2); Academic and think-tank (5); and Other, civil society, NGOs 
and schools of thought (15). Whilst not representative of the entire population 
of organisations that were involved in the Convention and the Futurum 
initiative in a numerical sense, the organisations are illustrative of the wide 
range of perspectives from within civil society that were involved in the 
various debate initiatives. The Union officials that I interviewed were from the 
Commission (3), the Council Secretariat (2) and the Economic and Social 
Committee (1). 
 
The aim of the interviews was to outline the nature of participation in the 
Convention process and Futurum initiative from the perspectives of the civil 
society actors involved, and the data are presented here according to a number 
of broad themes: participation in the Convention; participation in the Futurum 
initiative; reasons for engaging in participation activities; whether the activities 
constitute a break with the past; the question of which actors are involved; and 
perspectives on the Convention and Futurum initiative. In each case the 
findings are illustrated by direct quotations, primarily from the organisations 
but also from the institutional actors where relevant. In the discussion that 
follows I relate the empirical findings back to the three key questions of this 
chapter: the opportunities or constraints for participation; the capacity and 
willingness of the organisations to participate; and the explanatory value of the 
concept of participation. 
 
Participation in the Convention 
Part icipat ion 138 
 
The organisations that were interviewed described their participation in terms 
of a range of activities in the different components of the debate initiative. 
These varied slightly depending on the debate in question. The Convention 
offered several opportunities for the participation of civil society organisations. 
The Forum was the apparatus put in place to manage civil society participation 
in the Convention debates and was intended to be the major focus of civil 
society participation in the Convention. It mediated civil society participation 
by requiring organisations to submit their contributions electronically to the 
website administrators and then these contributions were displayed on line. All 
the contributions were collated into a digest by the secretariat which was then 
passed to the Convention members. Eight of the organisations interviewed had 
registered with the Convention Forum and sent their contributions to the debate 
in this way. One organisation was a member of an umbrella organisation which 
was registered and had made contributions. In addition another organisation 
had individual members that were registered for the Forum. Three of these 
organisations described the way in which they participated in the Forum: 
 
I think we were quite active, it was one of the priorities of the year. 
We did two written contributions to the Convention. It was a 
process we followed very closely. 
Civil society organisation #22, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
We sent many contributions to the members of the Convention. We 
sent documents, we were very close to the Convention. Every two 
weeks we had a meeting in Brussels on the last session of the 
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Convention, and a discussion and wrote a paper saying ‘we would 
like you to consider this idea or this conception in this article’. So 
we were really very close to the Convention, supporting some 
amendments, opposing others. 
Civil society organisation #17, 14.01.05, Brussels 
 
During the works of the Convention we published a lot of 
contributions about judicial issues, economic issues, democratic 
issues. It’s difficult to say if these contributions had an influence on 
the works but I think these words have been read by politicians, by 
members of the Convention. 
Civil society organisation #23, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
These responses seemed to suggest very active participation on the part of the 
organisations, and were fairly typical of those that were involved in the 
Convention. However, the exact extent of the organisations’ participation 
activities, as illustrated by the number of contributions that were sent to the 
Forum website, varied from one organisation to another. Some of the 
organisations sent only one document to the Forum but actively followed the 
progress of the Convention, whilst others sent several documents, each 
referring to different aspects of the Convention’s discussions. 
 
As one of these quotes indicates, the organisations recognised that submitting 
contributions to the Forum website did not necessarily mean that their voice 
was heard by Convention members. Alongside the Forum however were 
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additional measures which gave organisations more direct access to 
Convention members. Early in the Convention’s work, during the ‘listening 
phase’ one of the plenary sessions was devoted to civil society, and allowed 
certain organisations to speak in brief directly to the Convention members. For 
practical reasons the number of organisations that were allowed to address the 
Convention during this plenary session was limited, and the organisations that 
did speak were meant to represent the various strands of civil society. Seven of 
the organisations that I interviewed had contributed to this plenary session, one 
of which summed up their activity: 
 
The Convention [plenary for civil society] was open to civil society 
but our foundation only had a few minutes to express ideas about 
the future of Europe so its difficult to say that there was a real 
influence at this point. We said certain things about the future of 
Europe in this [plenary] but not a lot. 
Civil society organisation #23, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
This quotation indicates that organisations felt constrained by the amount of 
time available to them within the civil society plenary session which prevented 
them from participating effectively. By contrast, one of the Union officials had 
a different opinion on why civil society participation in the plenary session was 
not particularly effective: 
 
Many of them were interested in the earlier articles about the 
objectives of the Union, what I would say is declaratory stuff. 
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Some of them it was quite clear they had their own phrase they 
wanted in, to leave their mark on the text of the Constitution on 
issues about objectives, which actually fundamentally wasn’t going 
to change the way the Union functioned in the future. 
Union official #3, 28.03.06, Brussels 
 
There was, it appeared, an element of disappointment among Union officials 
that the participation of certain civil society organisations did not take the 
debate far beyond the level of rhetoric. A similar sentiment was expressed 
following the Youth Convention in which individuals from two of the 
organisations interviewed participated22. Participation in the Youth Convention 
meant indirect participation in the ‘adult’ Convention (so-called in the 
literature of the Youth Convention!) since the conclusions of the Youth 
Convention were fed back to the ‘adult’ Convention. One of the organisations 
that contributed to the Youth Convention explained what their participation 
meant and what they felt it achieved: 
 
[We] had been working very hard trying to lobby the Convention. 
We had the Youth Convention which presented its results to the 
praesidium of the convention, and in the end we managed to have a 
youth article and part three of the Constitution on social rights. 
Civil society organisation #5, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
                                          
22
 Mem bers of the Youth Convent ion were nom inated by the European Com m ission, European 
parliam ent  or the governm ents of the m em ber states. I n these two cases both indiv iduals 
were nom inated by the European Par liam ent . 
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One of the ideas behind the Youth Convention, espoused by Giscard d’Estaing 
was that it was important for the Convention to listen to young people and that 
special attention should be paid to their views. Such special attention was also 
reserved for the social partners who were invited to attend the Convention as 
observers. As a result one of the trade union organisations interviewed was 
able to participate in all of the plenary sessions in addition to submitting 
contributions via the Forum website: 
 
[We were] part of the Convention, we got a place as an observer. 
So our secretary-general attended all the sessions of the Convention 
and we took part in some of the working groups. We participated in 
the discussions and we submitted a lot of contributions. 
Civil society organisation #12, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
As official observers, this organisation had direct access to the Convention 
members. In spite of the dedicated structures that were put in place to manage 
the participation of civil society, some organisations found that making their 
own direct contact with Convention members outside of the Forum was 
preferable, as these organisations explained: 
 
We did a huge campaign around the [Convention] but for us it was 
not about posting documents in the Forum website, it was about 
persuading Convention members through personal meetings and 
through exchanges with them that they should be pushing certain 
ideas…we were in a position of trying to meet Convention 
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members, trying to send them directly documents and we set up our 
own mailing list very quickly to reach Convention members rather 
than what we were told to do which was ‘post your documents on 
the Forum and we’ll make sure the Convention members get it’ but 
we just didn’t believe this. 
Civil society organisation #21, 17.02.05, Brussels 
 
We wrote to the Convention members, because we knew a lot of 
them during the process of the Convention, as well to the Prime 
Ministers, heads of State and Government. 
Civil society organisation #20, 04.02.05, Paris 
 
During the Convention we had two members of the board that were 
at the time assistants of MEPs so they were quite active in 
everything the Convention was doing, and lobbying directly 
Convention members. 
Civil society organisation #9, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
Participation in the Futurum initiative 
Participation in the Convention comprised a range of strategies – both formally 
sanctioned by the Convention secretariat, and informal organisation-specific 
tactics. The Futurum also offered several opportunities for organisations – and 
individual citizens – to participate. One novel approach was the prospect of 
‘partnership’, outlined in Chapter 2. Eighteen of the organisations that I 
interviewed were Futurum ‘partners’. This, according to the official 
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explanation on the Futurum website, involved an exchange of information and 
links on the websites of the Futurum and the individual organisation. One of 
the organisations explained what this entailed: 
 
The European Commission put our opinion on the constitutional 
treaty on the website and in return we put their banner on our 
website with a little comment, and so we also tried via our website 
to promote the idea and make some public relations or promotion 
of the Futurum website with our member organisations and 
everybody who visits our website. 
Civil society organisation #6, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
However, several of the organisations that had developed such a partnership 
confessed to know very little about Futurum, the exact nature of their 
participation in the Futurum initiative or the reasons for pursuing this activity. 
One of the Futurum partners that was interviewed explained that the idea of 
having an online debate about the future of the EU was something they had 
been pursuing prior to the launch of the Futurum website: 
 
I don’t think we explicitly said at some point we wanted to be 
partners in this. We were already dealing with the whole debate on 
the Convention then at that time even before the Convention was in 
place we had a section on future EU which started from the first 
speech Joschka Fischer did. We decided we wanted to do a special 
section for that discussion. So in a way we were way ahead of the 
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Commission and the Futurum website because we already looked 
at the different voices in the debate. 
Civil society organisation #2, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
Others explained that, rather than the organisation itself pursuing this 
opportunity, they had been approached by the Public Debate Unit within the 
Secretariat-General of the Commission who proposed had the partnership: 
 
The participation in the Futurum was not necessarily our own idea 
but rather the collaborator of the Commission asked us if we could 
publish our opinion and our press releases on the Futurum website. 
Back then they [the Commission Secretariat-General] were right 
opposite from our building and I said ‘OK maybe we can see each 
other and discuss how we can collaborate’, so we had two meetings 
with the administrator of the European Commission where she 
explained the aim and the concept of the Futurum website. 
Civil society organisation #6, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
The Commission asked us to have an internet link with Futurum, 
the online debate. We have not had ongoing contact on Futurum, 
we have contact with the Directorates-General which are the most 
important for us and with the presidency, Mr Barroso and the 
cabinet. 
Civil society organisation #19, 04.02.05, Paris 
 
Part icipat ion 146 
 
The overwhelming picture that emerged from the Futurum partner 
organisations was that this did not involve a great deal of active participation: 
 
We had a document we put on the Futurum website because we had 
our own work and debates about the future of Europe which were 
not connected to this, but it was nothing like an organised 
partnership between us and them. We are not a partner of the 
Futurum, we’re debating on our own site on the future of Europe 
for more years than the Commission. 
Civil society organisation #20, 04.02.05, Paris 
 
Back in 2001 we sent the draft constitution we had written to the 
Futurum website and that was our only contribution to Futurum. 
[One of the organisation’s officers] sent some documents, some 
analysis, what we did. To my knowledge these are the only things 
that have been sent to the Futurum. 
Civil society organisation #8, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
As far as I’m aware there’s never been any communication from 
the Commission or the people that ran the Futurum ever since then. 
There’s not a body or group of people that they actually work with, 
its just organisations that when they set it up said they were 
interested. It’s more of a signpost thing, at that time it would 
populate their site and also people would be redirected to our site to 
see what we were doing. 
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Civil society organisation #4, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
We are in contact with the Commission and we co-operate on 
projects. Regarding Futurum I have to say that we haven’t 
interacted with the debate, and although we organise debates within 
the topic on the debate on the future of Europe, we haven’t done 
this, not yet. 
Civil society organisation #10, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
Several of the organisations23 were unable to comment in any great detail on 
their Futurum partnership because the individual interviewed had not been 
involved in the work on the Futurum. The problem, which is symptomatic of 
the sector more broadly where the nature of funding often means fixed-term 
contracts for staff, is that the personnel involved in the Futurum initiative had 
moved on from the organisation and taken with them the knowledge about the 
process.  
 
Reasons for engaging in participation activities 
The lack of knowledge about or enthusiasm for the Futurum initiative poses the 
question of why the organisations were motivated to develop a partnership with 
the Commission on the website in the first place. In several cases this was 
explained by the desire to co-operate with the Commission wherever possible. 
EU level civil society organisations spend a great deal of time and energy 
hoping to influence the Commission because, due to its right of legislative 
initiative in the Community pillar, influencing the Commission can lead to 
                                          
23
 I ncluding organisat ions number 9, 15 and 22 
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influencing the policy agenda and ultimately, the decision taken by the 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Commission manages 
Community spending in the medium term and EU level organisations often 
rely on the Union budget for a large proportion of their funding so this may 
also explain the organisations’ desire to oblige the Commission. Furthermore, 
it became apparent that for many of the partnership organisations, Futurum was 
just one among several means of achieving the overarching goal of influencing 
the outcomes of the debate on the future of the EU as these comments from 
two partner organisations suggest: 
 
It wasn’t a decision to focus only on the Futurum initiative, it was 
much broader than that. But the governance debate and the 
Futurum initiative were very much seen as means to influence the 
process towards increased and improved dialogue and a means to 
bring forward our views. 
Civil society organisation #7, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
At some point Futurum was put up by the Commission and we said 
‘well it’s probably good for the Commission and it links to what 
we’ve already done’. 
Civil society organisation #1, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
In addition to participating in the Convention and Futurum initiatives, several 
organisations mentioned other activities relating to the debate on the future of 
the EU that were pursued as a means of ‘exploring all the avenues available’: 
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We had a journalist working for us following the Convention and 
who published a book afterwards on what happened in the 
Convention. 
Civil society organisation #22, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
We tried hard to get cities to sign up to the 1000 Debates 
initiative24 knowing that we can’t have a more proactive role than 
asking our members to organise debates. However the interest and 
the willingness to organise debates on the constitutional treaty was 
not as huge as we had hoped because it is still considered as 
difficult and as something which citizens will not necessarily care 
about. 
Civil society organisation #7, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
We did lots of activities related to the Convention and the 
Constitution. Specifically what we did was organise a gathering of 
young people in Brussels, demonstrations or activities for the 
Parliament for example. 
Civil society organisation #9, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
We had people there basically watching the whole thing [the 
Convention]. We had a very solid network of people involved in 
the Convention itself, but we were all the time setting arguments 
                                          
24
 The ‘1000 debates’ init iat ive was launched after the const itut ional t reaty was signed and 
aim ed to encourage local and regional elected representat ives to organise debates on the 
future of the EU and the Const itut ion in their  town. 
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and analysis, so that was the kind of involvement we had, then we 
publicised the lot. 
Civil society organisation #1, 06.01.05, Brussels 
 
We have participated through the youth portal of the EU. This 
portal has a link to the Futurum website and we thought it was 
interesting because [we are] in the steering group of the Youth 
Portal, and we thought it would be interesting to have a discussion 
for young people on issues relevant to the Constitution or to 
Europe. 
Civil society organisation #5, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
Pursuing as many avenues as possible was related to the ultimate goal of most 
organisations which was to influence the discussions of the Convention 
members and ultimately the outcomes in the constitutional treaty: 
 
[We] decided that the process of the Convention was an absolute 
priority because we particularly wanted to influence the whole 
debate and discussion around gender equality. So we set out using 
every possible avenue of communication. 
Civil society organisation #3, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
Our main activities were inside the Convention. The main objective 
was not to contribute to the debate but to submit and to defend our 
changes to the treaty. 
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Civil society organisation #12, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
The desire to influence the outcomes in a particular direction was highly 
apparent among the NGOs. By contrast, the think-tanks tended to have a 
slightly different approach, as summed up by one of the Brussels-based think-
tanks: 
 
If something like this comes along which is related to the core of 
changing European decision-making and if you’re a think tank 
committed to European affairs you don’t have a lot of discussion 
about whether this is something for us so I mean it was a natural 
thing for us and the few think tanks that you have here in town, it 
was expected that they would participate in the debate, to present 
an independent view and to present policy analysis. 
Civil society organisation #1, 06.01.05, Brussels 
 
A break with the past? 
The debate on the future of the EU was presented as a new way of working, a 
break with the past in particular in terms of how treaty reform was prepared. 
Interviewees were asked whether their activities in the Convention and the 
Futurum initiative were a new way of working for their organisation. There 
was an acknowledgement on the part of the organisations that these initiatives 
presented new opportunities for civil society. One organisation summed this 
up: 
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There was a sort of excess of attention [in the Convention] from the 
part of civil society, which is due of course to the fact that before 
then, this was the first time that civil society had the opportunity to 
say something directly, get to sit around the same table with the 
people who were taking the decisions. 
Civil society organisation #13, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
However only a minority of the organisations interviewed felt that their 
participation activities in the Futurum and Convention involved a new way of 
working. One such group, a trade union organisation that was a registered 
Futurum partner explained: 
 
The website Futurum: that was a new aspect of our work to have 
our opinion published on a different website, on an official website 
of the European institutions. And the public to which we addressed 
this opinion was different. We had not a single addressee like for a 
proposal for a directive which we address to the rapporteur at the 
Parliament or the European Commission. Here we addressed it to a 
large number of anonymous people. 
Civil society organisation #6, 11.01.05, Brussels 
  
However for other organisations it was more often the case that participating in 
the debates on the future of the EU was not a major departure from what they 
would otherwise be doing. Again, several organisations referred to the 
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Convention, and particularly the Futurum initiative as additional avenues down 
which they could pursue their pre-defined objectives. 
 
Basically it’s in line with what we already do, it’s a narrow part of 
what we do because [we] are in a lot of different areas, but it 
certainly was one of the important things – the Youth Convention 
and the Constitution were very important. 
Civil society organisation #5, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
We were very much involved in the Convention and this [Futurum] 
is just another vehicle but I suppose a lot of the material had been 
basically the same that we were producing for the convention 
process. So there was an invitation there and it was the natural 
thing for us to participate and we were doing it anyway so it was 
just another channel if you like to get our contribution out 
Civil society organisation #1, 06.01.05, Brussels 
 
Who participates? 
The notion of participation poses the question of who is doing the participation. 
The term, ‘the usual suspects’ was used on several occasions by different 
organisations to describe the participants that were most visible during the 
Convention debates. One of the organisations described how they encountered 
many of the same individuals and the same organisations during their 
participation in the Convention: 
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There tended to be these circles of people following the 
Convention. They would meet each other and get to know each 
other, we found a lot of friends by following the work of the 
Convention, and most of the time there was a sort of conventional 
wisdom about certain topics. Most of the people had similar views 
about the big issues and most were criticising to a certain extent the 
lack of ambition at the beginning at least. 
Civil society organisation #13, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
In relation to the civil society plenary of June 2002, one of the interviewees 
recalled the phrase of one of the Convention members ‘Brussels talking to 
Brussels’ to illustrate how the representatives of civil society who spoke to the 
Convention were already active and well-known in policy-making circles. 
Similarly, as outlined in Chapter 2, the members of the Youth Convention had 
been described as ‘Eurocrats in short trousers’, a sentiment echoed by one of 
the organisations:  
 
There was this Youth Convention, it did not have the average 
European young person there. You had a stagiaire who would use 
the language that is already used by the older ones too, people who 
were very close to the [European institutions].  
Civil society organisation #13, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
In addition to establishing civil society partnerships and displaying the 
contributions of civil society organisations, Futurum hosted an online 
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discussion board to which individual citizens could post their views on the 
future of the EU. Several organisations were sceptical about the extent to 
which this actually resulted in the participation of ordinary citizens however as 
these comments indicate:  
 
I think the whole Futurum thing and in general the whole civil 
society drive at the Commission level has brought in groups not 
individuals, but I think that was the idea. The Commission can’t 
cope with having thousands of individuals saying what their views 
are. 
Civil society organisation #4, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
When you look at the contributions they mostly come from experts 
from organisations where there is a certain distance between us 
here in Brussels and our member organisations and their individual 
members. And whilst everybody has access to the internet I would 
still say this was a forum for experts and not for ordinary citizens. 
Civil society organisation #6, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
One organisation even doubted whether facilitating the participation of 
ordinary citizens was either possible or had been intended by the Commission: 
 
I don’t think the Commission even had the expectation that they 
were going to be engaging with citizens individually throughout the 
EU through something like Futurum. What they did is hope that 
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they would engage the groups that would encompass diverse 
groupings of individuals who wouldn’t have any contact otherwise. 
Civil society organisation #4, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
Perspectives on the success of the Convention and Futurum 
In the interviews I asked organisations whether, in their view, the Convention 
and the Futurum initiative had been successful (‘success’ being defined 
broadly). The vast majority of the organisations that I interviewed had 
welcomed the opportunity to take part in the debate on the future in a formal 
sense, but took this opportunity to criticise the structures that had been put in 
place to facilitate civil society participation. As might be expected from some 
of the responses relating to the Futurum, evaluations of this initiative were 
generally negative: 
 
The Futurum basically wasn’t much, but the Convention is where 
we participated more. 
Civil society organisation #5, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
Yes, we’re on the [Futurum] website but it doesn’t work very well. 
We did not write on this website and I don’t think that our role is 
important in this frame. 
Civil society organisation #23, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
It’s not very interactive, we did not get very much feedback from 
our opinion. The Futurum website was the only place where we 
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published it and people had the chance to look it up but we did not 
get feedback that referred to Futurum and we did not get into a 
discussion or exchange with the other organisations that published 
their opinions or individuals who participated or contributed so its 
more of a virtual forum but not really interactive. 
Civil society organisation #6, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
Some similar sentiments were expressed about the attempts made in the 
Convention to facilitate the involvement of civil society: 
 
When the Laeken conclusions came out and they said there was 
going to be a forum for civil society we got quite excited about that 
and then we got pretty dispirited when we found out it would 
amount to a website…It was a useful idea but it wasn’t very well 
executed. 
Civil society organisation #21, 17.02.05, Brussels 
 
Groups like ours, we don’t have the resources to devote to that elite 
style of politics, we wouldn’t have had the resources to send people 
over to Brussels to try and influence a process that we didn’t 
fundamentally trust and there was no possibility that this 
Constitution would take the EU in a different, decentralising 
direction. 
Civil society organisation #25, 22.04.05, London 
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Furthermore, rather than facilitate the participation of civil society in the 
Convention, one organisation suspected that the real purpose of the Forum was 
to contain civil society: 
 
If you want a positive spin on things the Forum was quite a useful 
way of getting position papers out there and engaging but actually a 
more negative interpretation which sometimes you could feel was 
that it could be a way of blocking us from having direct contact 
with Convention members. 
Civil society organisation #21, 17.02.05, Brussels 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
 
Having considered the empirical findings on the role of civil society 
organisations in the Convention and Futurum initiative within the framework 
of participation I now return to the questions outlined at the outset of section 
4.4: What are the opportunities for and constraints upon participation in the 
Convention process and Futurum? Does organised civil society have the 
capacity and the desire to facilitate democratic linkage through participation? 
Can the concept of participation explain the linkage role of organised civil 
society within the context of the debate initiative? These questions are 
discussed below with reference to the prospect of democratic linkage and its 
contribution to the EU’s input legitimacy arguments. 
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The institutional discourse on the debate on the future of the EU made much of 
the suggestion that the process would involve the participation of a wide range 
of actors in discussions about the EU’s future. Without a doubt, the process of 
the debate on the future of the EU offered more opportunities for the 
participation of civil society actors than any previous process of EU Treaty 
reform had done. Both the Convention and Futurum demonstrate that by 
framing the reform as a ‘debate’, opportunities for participation were opened 
up. The organisations that I interviewed acknowledged these opportunities and 
were supportive of the idea that such opportunities for participation should be 
available in any future processes of treaty reform.  
 
The participation of civil society organisations in the Convention and the 
Futurum debates is characterised by a degree of continuity. Few of the 
organisations thought that their activities in relation to the Convention were 
‘new’ or broke significantly with their existing work programme. Instead, 
participating in the Convention was viewed as an additional way of lobbying 
politicians in a similar way to lobbying the Commission or the Parliament in 
the policy-making process. In this respect the structures of debate do not 
appear on the whole to have changed the behaviour of the organisations 
interviewed by making new kinds of activity more feasible or attractive.  
 
Similarly, continuity can be observed in terms of the actors participating. 
Several interviewees made the observation that it seemed to be the same kind 
of organisations, or the ‘usual suspects’ involved in the various debate 
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activities. Because of the way in which the organisations that were interviewed 
were selected (i.e. on the basis of their involvement in one or more element of 
the debates) it is not possible to comment on whether the structure of the 
initiatives constrained certain types of organisation from participating. 
However, it does seem to be the case that the initiatives were structured in a 
way which encouraged the participation of transnational, as opposed to 
nationally-based organisations, and furthermore organisations (‘elite citizens’) 
in general as opposed to individual citizens. Several organisations recognised 
that the debate initiatives were geared towards certain kinds of organisations 
rather than individual citizens, but doubted whether the participation of 
ordinary citizens was ever the intention of the institutions, despite references in 
the Laeken declaration and the governance white paper to the involvement of 
‘citizens’ in the debates.  
 
Despite acknowledging the opportunities for participation in the Convention 
and Futurum debates these nevertheless fell below the expectations of many of 
the organisations. Expectations had been raised by the institutional rhetoric 
surrounding the debates, particularly in the Laeken declaration which promised 
a central role for voices from civil society in the discussions. The subsequent 
implementation of the Convention Forum as a ‘virtual’ as opposed to a ‘real’ 
forum disappointed organisations who thought that it bore little resemblance to 
what the Laeken declaration had proposed. Furthermore, some organisations 
observed clear constraints to their participation in the debates, arguing that the 
Forum served to marginalise civil society from the Convention’s discussions 
rather than incorporate them into the discussions. By attempting to restrict the 
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activities of civil society to the Forum, it was suggested that the Convention 
secretariat were preventing organisations from what they saw as their right to 
talk directly to Convention members if the Convention members wanted to 
listen. The setting up of working groups to discuss key questions and prepare 
detailed reports was also viewed as a way of ‘shutting out’ civil society from 
the discussions that took place since there were no formal structures allowing 
for the participation of civil society in these groups. 
 
The perspectives of organisations on the opportunities for participation differ 
between the Convention and the Futurum initiative. In part these differences 
can be understood by referring to Dahl’s (1994) description of the trade-off 
between participation and effectiveness in the EU. Dahl argues that the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty created a system of governance that is 
effective at dealing with a range of economic, environmental, and security 
issues that transcend national boundaries, but at the same time it has reduced 
the capacity of individual citizens to exercise control over these matters. There 
were several attempts made to open the Convention to participation from a 
wide range of civil society actors. But ultimately, the pressures of drafting a 
document within a deadline meant that the opportunities for civil society to 
participate in discussions were curtailed. In contrast, in the case of the Futurum 
initiative, the Commission actively pursued organisations with the aim of 
establishing ‘partnerships’ with them. However, many of the organisations that 
established such a partnership were less than enthusiastic about this and the 
other participation opportunities involved in Futurum, and tended to view it as 
lacking focus and as an ineffective means of achieving their objectives. In the 
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Futurum initiative increased participation was accompanied by limited 
effectiveness, and in the Convention increased effectiveness resulted in less 
participation. 
 
Although the ways in which the Convention and Futurum debates were 
structured has an impact on participation, so too does the agency of the civil 
society organisations. In particular, the extent to which organisations 
participated or facilitated participation depends firstly upon their capacity do so 
and secondly upon their willingness to do so. Both of these varied between 
different organisations though it is possible to identify several themes that 
emerge from the data. 
 
All of the Brussels-based organisations that were interviewed appeared to have 
the capacity to participate in the Convention and Futurum debates as 
demonstrated by their various activities, most notably submitting contributions 
to online fora and making direct contact with Convention members. The 
capacity to engage in such activities is dependent in large part on the 
organisations’ informational resources, amassed over years spent observing 
and trying to influence the EU policy process. These organisations also 
benefited from financial resources sufficient to allow them to maintain an 
active staff and permanent office in the heart of the district containing offices 
of the EU’s institutions in Brussels, which further enhanced their capacity to 
participate effectively. 
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The organisations tended to evaluate their own participation favourably. Since 
the objective of such participation tended to be to influence the discussions, 
and thereby the outcome of the Convention some looked to the constitutional 
treaty for evidence of their success (though others were more aware of the 
difficulties of claiming to be the originators of ideas). The institutional actors 
however were not always convinced about the capacity of the civil society 
organisations to participate effectively. There was concern over the 
‘declaratory language’ used by organisations in their contributions to the 
Convention plenary on civil society, and the Youth Convention’s conclusions. 
There was a sense that some organisations were more concerned with making 
grand yet vague statements referring to how momentous the occasion was or to 
the importance of civil society in discussions on the EU’s future, and relatively 
little of substance on what they and their members wanted from a constitutional 
treaty.  
 
The willingness to participate in the Convention debates on the part of most of 
the organisations interviewed can be contrasted with a lack of enthusiasm on 
the part of organisations for participating in the Futurum debates. The 
responses of the organisations that had a partnership with the Commission on 
the Futurum website indicate an unwillingness to participate extensively in this 
initiative. This unwillingness appears to be partly a function of the confusion 
on the part of several organisations regarding the partnership’s purpose and 
objectives, and is thereby linked to the structures of debate. In the absence of 
clear statements about what Futurum was supposed to achieve, and suspicion 
about the extent to which it helped organisations achieve their objectives, the 
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willingness to participate to any degree seemed to be largely motivated by the 
desire to maintain good relations with the Commission. 
 
It appears, therefore, that most of the organisations have the willingness, and to 
a certain degree, the capability to participate in the debates on the future of the 
EU. However, the kind of participation observed in the Convention and in 
Futurum refers to a rather limited interpretation of the concept of participation. 
In this view, participation is the preserve of organised groups as opposed to 
ordinary citizens. Furthermore these organisations did little to facilitate the 
participation of ordinary citizens. Several organisations acknowledged that 
they had neither the capacity nor the willingness to facilitate the participation 
of the members or supporters in debates. Only a minority of organisations 
interviewed mentioned activities that were designed to encourage the 
participation of members or supporters in discussions about the EU’s future. 
Some acknowledged that they were distant from their members. The interviews 
support Warleigh’s (2001) research on NGOs and political socialisation, the 
findings of which suggested that EU-level NGOs had limited capacity to 
facilitate the involvement of ordinary citizens in EU politics, largely due to 
their lack of internal democratic structures. 
 
Several organisations questioned whether mass participation in the Convention 
and Futurum debates was ever intended. The implementation of the Laeken 
rhetoric in the Convention and the Futurum suggests mass participation was 
not intended, even though the rhetoric did at times appear to conflate citizen 
participation with organised civil society participation. Ultimately the result is 
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the divergence of reality from the rhetoric. In this light, the rejection in two 
referenda of the constitutional treaty, which was intended to help bring citizens 
and EU institutions closer together, seems rather conspicuous. 
 
A further question is whether the ‘elitist’ conception of participation (i.e. the 
participation of organisations with informational and financial resources) can 
still provide democratic linkage in the context of the debate on the future of the 
EU. Magnette (2003:7-8) argues that it can. Citizen participation is limited in 
all democratic societies (Barnes & Kaase 1979), and as Dahl’s work on 
participation and effectiveness suggest, it seems to become even more limited 
as the size of the political community increases (see also Dahl & Tufte 1973 on 
Size and Democracy). Nevertheless, the idea of citizen participation retains 
great appeal at the EU level, as the incorporation of the ‘citizen’s initiative’ 
into the constitutional treaty indicates. Even this had been identified by civil 
society organisations as an additional tool which can be used in lobbying the 
Commission, by mobilising large numbers of citizens via their national 
members. Elite, as opposed to mass participation seems likely to continue 
characterising attempts to bring the EU institutions and citizens closer together 
through the mechanism of participation.  
 
Were the ‘citizens’ initiative’ ever to be implemented however, there would 
most likely be implications for the relationships between civil society 
organisations and ordinary citizens. The capacity to mobilise large numbers of 
citizens in the member states would be necessary if organisations were to use 
this tool to pursue their objectives. As a result one might expect Brussels-based 
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organisations to develop their downward-facing interactions in order to 
generate the number of signatures necessary for the Commission to consider 
initiating a policy proposal. There are parallels here with Kollman’s (1998) 
notion of ‘signalling’ whereby organisations mobilise large numbers of 
ordinary citizens as a means of demonstrating to decision-makers the extent of 
public support for their cause. In the context of increasing sensitivity to public 
opinion among decision-makers, the capacity of an organisation to signal their 
popular support might become a resource that determines whether 
organisations secure ‘insider’ status with institutions.  
 
As a concept, participation can help describe and explain one particular aspect 
of the linkage role. By looking at democratic linkage in terms of participation 
we are directed towards the activities that comprise participation and the 
different actors involved – questions of who participates, and how? Addressing 
the question of who participates in the context of the Convention and Futurum 
reveals that participation largely involves elite citizens – already organised 
groups. The predominance of elite as opposed to mass participation does not 
necessarily undermine democracy nor preclude linkage. Indeed, for practical 
reasons participation in decision-making will necessarily be the domain of a 
limited number of elite actors. The avoidance of populism, the dominance of 
powerful economic interests and the marginalisation of minority views 
enhances desirability of civil society – with its connotations of inclusiveness 
and equality – as a proxy for mass participation. However it poses questions 
about the basis upon which these organisations might participate as a proxy for 
ordinary citizens. This can be expressed in terms of ‘representation’, the next 
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mechanism of linkage analysed in the thesis. The issue of how this 
participation operates turns empirical attention towards the content of the 
participation, namely the communicative relationships between the 
organisations and decision-makers on the one hand, and citizens on the other – 
highlighted by the mechanism of communication which is analysed in Chapter 
6. 
  
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
Mechanisms of democratic linkage II: Representation 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
 
The participation of organised, elite actors in the Convention and Futurum debates 
poses questions about the extent to which they represent EU citizens more broadly. 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate whether organisations have the 
capacity and willingness to represent citizens as well as interests, so serving as a 
mechanism of linkage, and whether the Convention and the Futurum initiative 
provide opportunities for this kind of representation. In other words, I develop a 
picture of how representation operates as a mechanism of linkage and how we can 
understand it. This in turn indicates the potential contribution of civil society, via 
the mechanism of representation, to enhancing the input legitimacy of the EU. 
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Representation has been the focus of empirical research on the formal democratic 
credentials of the EU (see contributions in Morgan & Steed 2003 and Schmitt & 
Thomassen 1999; and Smith 1999; Hix, Noury & Roland 2007). But arguably, 
political representation in the EU cannot and should not be understood solely in 
terms of elected officials within formal institutional settings. Furthermore, the 
peculiar institutional architecture of the EU has given rise to the suggestion that 
models of representation based on national political systems may not be directly 
applicable to the EU (Hix 2005). In light of this, ‘functional representation’, or the 
representation of individuals in terms of their certain preferences and interests by 
associations might play a role. Such associations are specific to certain functions 
or purposes and since associations can approximate the actual wills and 
preferences of membership it is argued that such forms of functional 
representation should be established alongside territorial representation (Smismans 
2003: 486).   
 
The notion of representation has not featured prominently in the rhetoric 
surrounding the debate on the future of the EU in the way that the notion of 
participation has. However it could be argued that both the Laeken declaration and 
the governance white paper make certain assumptions about the representativeness 
of civil society organisations by calling for the involvement of all citizens in 
debates on the EU’s future but making provisions only for these organisations. 
There are good reasons for assuming that these organisations can and do provide 
linkage through the mechanism of representation. For example, the literature on 
interest representation in the EU has developed a picture of how organisations of 
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the type interviewed in this research amongst others, have contributed to EU 
governance. However, interest representation as a substantive activity operates in 
the context of developing effective policy and therefore rests on output-oriented 
legitimacy arguments (Scharpf 1970). In contrast, the objectives of the debate on 
the future of the EU, like the democratic deficit debate (Meyer 1999), has been 
concerned with strengthening links between the EU institutions and ordinary 
citizens, which also means improving the input-oriented legitimacy of the EU.  
 
The notion of representation is multi-faceted. It can have different meanings in 
different contexts with differing implications for how it provides linkage. A 
theoretical examination of representation brings to light what Pitkin (1967) refers 
to as different ‘views’ of the concept which are right for different contexts in 
which the term is used. Representing interests and representing citizens correspond 
broadly to different views of representation. The empirical investigation examines 
the nature of representation in the two case studies. It considers whether the ways 
in which the Convention and the Futurum initiative were structured provided 
opportunities for or constraints upon the different kinds of representation. It also 
considers the capacities and willingness of civil society organisations to represent 
citizens and interests and how this was played out. 
 
Before outlining the empirical findings it is important to take a closer look at the 
concept of representation in both empirical and theoretical terms. To this end I 
begin the chapter by examining current understandings of representation in the 
EU, and the role played by organised civil society in facilitating representation. 
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This involves referring back to the interest representation literature outlined in 
greater detail in Chapter 3. I also examine the way that the concept of 
representation appears in the reform rhetoric and how this ties in with these current 
understandings. I take a closer look at the concept of representation in the context 
of the major aim of the reform process: improving the legitimacy (and specifically 
the input legitimacy) of the EU. Following this I present the empirical findings 
relating to representation and highlight their significance in the discussion that 
follows.  
 
 
5.2 Political representation in the EU 
 
 
Political representation in the EU is not confined to the activities of institutional 
actors within formal structures of representative democracy (though in Grady’s 
(1993) view this is ‘real’ representation). The representation of a variety of 
interests has been identified as a key feature of EU politics and policy-making ever 
since Ernst Haas (1968) first observed how public and private interests put 
pressure on member states to agree to supranational solutions to common 
problems. Since then a large, empirically-based literature has developed to explain 
the what’s, how’s and why’s associated with the representation of interests in EU 
politics (key contributions include Mazey & Richardson 1993, 2006; Greenwood 
& Aspinwall 1998; Greenwood 2003a; Warleigh & Fairbrass 2002, and 
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summarising much of this literature Coen 2007). Analytically, representation 
outside structures of representative democracy therefore is as important as 
representation within these structures. Indeed, it has been argued that the study of 
interest representation in the EU can ‘explain how public policies emerge, how 
they are framed and processed, why they take the character they do, and how they 
might contribute to our understanding of the course of European integration’ 
(Greenwood 2003a: 1). 
 
The study of interest representation in the EU has tended to be the study of groups 
organised at the EU level. Such ‘interest groups’ are both numerous25 and varied. 
Greenwood’s (2003a) comprehensive study identified the following groups as the 
primary ones involved in processes of EU interest representation: business 
interests, professional interests, labour interests, public interests and territorial 
interests. In recent years, such interest groups have increasingly been termed ‘civil 
society’ organisations – a change in terminology documented in Chapter 3 and 
highlighted by the similarity between Greenwood’s definition and the 
Commission’s 2001 governance white paper which states that: ‘civil society 
includes the following: trade unions and employers’ organisations (“social 
partners”); non-governmental organisations; professional associations; charities; 
grass-roots organisations; organisations that involve citizens in local and 
municipal life with a particular contribution from churches and religious 
communities’ (2001a: 14, footnote 9). In addition to this shift in the political 
                                          
25
 The Secretar iat  of the European Com mission speculated in a policy docum ent  in 1992 that  ‘at  
present  there are thought  to be approximately 3000 special interest  groups of varying types in 
Brussels’ (1992: 4) . Since this was largely speculat ion Greenwood has since calculated that  the 
actual figure is more likely around 1450 formally const ituted EU level groups (2003a:  13) . 
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discourses there is also an analytical shift: Greenwood himself even adopts the 
term ‘civil society’ after the initial chapter in his study of interest representation to 
describe the actors formally known as ‘interest groups’. 
 
The shift in the terminology from ‘interest groups’ to ‘civil society organisations’ 
poses questions about whether there has also been a shift away from processes of 
interest representation as the focus of these actors’ activities. In other words, as 
‘civil society organisations’ do these actors play a different role in EU politics than 
they did when they were referred to as ‘interest groups’? If so, what implications 
are there, if any, for democratic linkage? Do ‘civil society organisations’ make a 
greater contribution to linkage and therefore legitimate governance than interest 
groups? These questions can be addressed empirically by looking at the 
involvement of civil society organisations in the debate on the future of the EU. 
 
The rhetoric of the debate discourses did not invoke the notion of representation in 
the same way as the notion of participation was invoked (as outlined in Chapter 4). 
Indeed, reference to the concept of representation in the Laeken declaration mostly 
referred to the composition of the Convention in terms of ‘representatives’ of the 
European Parliament, Commission, and member and applicant states’ governments 
and parliaments. Rather, the role of civil society was expressed in terms of the 
need to open up the debates on the future of the EU. The Laeken declaration for 
example linked the involvement of civil society organisations with the need for the 
debate to be broadly based and involving all citizens. This could be seen in the 
context of a widespread desire following the Nice IGC to ‘do things differently’ 
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and the development of structures such as the Convention which, it was hoped, 
would facilitate a more open, and ultimately more effective process of treaty 
reform. Taking into account the discourses of reform and the rhetoric therein one 
might expect a break with the past in terms of the role played by these actors.  
 
Although the reform rhetoric did not explicitly address the concept of 
representation as a means of linking the EU institutions and citizens it did hint at a 
representation role played by civil society organisations. I have already argued that 
although the rhetoric of the reform agenda emphasised the importance of ensuring 
that citizens were involved in the debate on the EU’s future, the concrete proposals 
were designed only to facilitate the involvement of civil society organisations. The 
debate discourse is interesting in this context not because of what it said (or more 
to the point, did not say) about representation. Instead it is interesting because it 
appeared to equate ‘all citizens’ with (organised) ‘civil society’, thereby making an 
assumption that the latter in some way represent or is representative of the former. 
 
To what extent do the organisations identified by the institutions represent 
citizens? The organisations involved in the debate on the future of the EU were 
varied, and so too were the ways in which they claimed to, and could be seen to 
‘represent’ their members, supporters or citizens in general. Some were 
representative of citizens in the sense that they mirrored the characteristics of the 
citizens they claimed to represent (i.e. women, young people and so on). Others 
represented by unifying members’ interests and acting collectively on them (i.e. 
employees, students and so on).  
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The debate discourse framed the role of civil society organisations in terms of 
bringing citizens in to the debate. This is in contrast to the literature on interest 
representation which has tended to analyse the contribution of interest groups to 
the effective policy that comes out of the decision-making process. These different 
emphases point towards differing implications for the way in which representation 
as a mechanism of linkage might enhance legitimate governance – in terms of 
either ‘input-oriented-’ or ‘output-oriented’ legitimacy arguments in the words of 
Scharpf (1999). An exclusive focus on strengthening output legitimacy poses the 
question of whether citizens have been brought closer to the institutions rather than 
simply institutions having been brought closer to the interests of citizens. Of 
course, representation in terms of bringing citizens into the debate and 
representation in terms of contributing to effective outcomes are not necessarily 
two conflicting or even entirely different activities. They may more accurately be 
seen as two different ways of looking at how representation can provide linkage.  
 
On closer inspection, the view of representation implicit in the interest 
representation literature is just one interpretation of what the concept means, what 
it ought to mean and what its implications are. As subsequent sections point out, 
different ‘views’ of the concept can have significantly different implications for 
the way representation functions vis-à-vis democratic legitimacy. Just how the 
mechanism of representation might have functioned in the Convention and 
Futurum initiatives is unclear. Certainly the existing research on interest 
representation and the objectives of the reform agenda contribute to a rather 
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confused and confusing picture of how civil society organisations might facilitate 
democratic linkage and thereby strengthen legitimate governance. Like the 
concepts of civil society, deliberation and participation, the notion of 
representation is a multi-faceted and even contested concept. It is frequently used 
in political and academic discourses without adequate consideration of what it 
means and what its meaning implies in different contexts. The nature of 
representation in the debate on the future of the EU is investigated empirically 
here but before this is possible greater clarity surrounding the concept of 
representation, and how it relates to organisations within the structures of the 
debate on the future of the EU is needed. 
 
 
5.3 Conceptualising representation 
 
 
The concept of representation, specifically political representation, is complex and 
has multiple meanings. At first glance it seems simple and it is used as though 
there was agreement on what it meant. But on closer inspection it is remarkably 
difficult to pin down a single, widely accepted definition. The multiple dimensions 
of representation mean that there are differing and sometimes conflicting ideas 
about what and how representatives should represent. Understanding how 
representation can contribute to democratic linkage therefore means understanding 
what the notion of representation entails. Much light has been shed on this subject 
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by Hannah Pitkin’s (1967) classic study of The Concept of Representation which, 
although 40 years old can still help bring new insight to the study of representation 
in the EU.  
 
In this book, Pitkin identifies two formalistic understandings of representation 
which focus on the formal requirements of representation in terms of authorisation 
on the one hand and accountability on the other. Hobbes and Weber defined 
representation in terms of the giving of ‘the authority to act’ from one to another, 
and the subsequent holding of this authority (Pitkin 1967: 38). An alternative 
understanding of representation is in terms of the representative being held to 
account for and to those who are being represented. What both of these 
understandings of representation have in common is that they view it in terms of 
formal arrangements: those that precede and initiate representation in the case of 
the authorisation view; or those which or follow and terminate representation in 
the accountability view. Studies of the nature of representation in the EU have 
tended to focus on such formalistic views of the concept by focussing on 
representation in formal European Parliament settings.  
 
The focus in this investigation is on representation in more substantive terms – as 
an activity or set of activities that occur outside the formal structures of 
representative democracy. Pitkin recognised that representation could be 
understood in substantive as well as formalistic terms - in other words, in terms of 
the activity of representing. At its most basic substantive representation could be 
understood as the ‘making present’ of something that was not otherwise present. 
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She outlined two broad lines of enquiry for analysing representation as a 
substantive activity. The first asks who or what a representative is and the second 
asks what constitutes the activity of representing. The first line of enquiry sees 
representation as ‘standing for’, i.e. the representative is standing for the 
represented. It is all about the characteristics of the representative and their 
congruence with the represented. What is important is what the representative is, 
or looks like, rather than what it actually does (1967: 61). Pitkin argued that 
representation as ‘standing for’ could be either descriptive or symbolic. 
‘Descriptive standing for’ refers to when the characteristics of the representative 
mirror those of the represented (and is often the justification behind proportional 
representation voting systems). The assumption is that a representative’s 
characteristics will determine their activities and ‘representativeness’ is 
ascertained by the extent to which representatives have characteristics which are 
typical of those they represent. ‘Symbolic standing for’ is less about 
representatives mirroring the characteristics of the represented and more about 
providing a referent. In this view the inner qualities of the symbol are more 
important than its outward appearance.  
 
The second line of enquiry refers to what constitutes the activity of representing. 
According to Pitkin, representation as ‘acting for’ is all about what guides the 
representative’s actions, namely, to speak for, look after, or further a particular 
interest. In practical and observable terms this will involve specific types of 
behaviour or actions such as lobbying policy-makers, giving evidence to 
parliamentary committees and so on. However, normative underpinnings which 
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determine which kind of activities occur are multiple and can be disputed. Pitkin 
identifies several analogies which serve to illuminate the normative role of the 
representative including ‘agent’, ‘ambassador’, ‘guardian’, ‘proxy’, ‘substitute’ for 
example. Each of these analogies specifies the exact type of activity that the 
representative ought to be engaged in. For example, if the representative is viewed 
as an ‘agent’ of the represented, the former will be expected to engage in activities 
which allow the latter’s preference (or interests) to be expressed. A slight contrast 
would be the representative as ‘guardian’, where the emphasis would be on the 
best interest of the represented which may be independent of preference. 
 
Pitkin’s disaggregation of the concept of representation into formalistic and 
substantive views and the further division of the substantive activity into 
representation as ‘standing for’ and representation as ‘acting for’ can shed light 
onto the way representation might operate as a mechanism of linkage in the EU. 
The features of interest representation as a substantive activity described by the 
literature demonstrate that the view of representation therein resembles what Pitkin 
would term ‘acting for’ with a stronger focus on what comprises the activity of 
representing. This can be illustrated by several examples. Firstly, there is the 
portrayal of ‘representatives as experts’ in the interest representation literature. 
The so-called ‘capacity deficit’ in the Commission is well-documented (see 
Greenwood 2003a:5) and has made the Commission dependent on what 
Greenwood terms ‘outside input’ (2003a:6) for information sources related to the 
drafting of policy proposals and the successful implementation of policy measures. 
Such technical expertise can be a factor in whether an organisation develops 
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‘insider status’ (Grant 1978) with the Commission and thereby becomes influential 
in a particular policy arena. Related to this is the question of the nature of the 
issues being discussed. The representation literature suggests that if these are 
technical, complex issues which require the judgement of an expert then 
representation as ‘acting for’ will be most appropriate form of representation. This 
is because the representative must use their expertise to make the right decision 
whereas those being represented cannot be expected to have the requisite expertise 
or understanding necessary to make the ‘right’, or most technically appropriate 
decision. In the case of interest representation vis-à-vis policy making in the EU, 
the representative as expert might be the correct interpretation because of the 
technical aspects of the policy (Mazey & Richardson 1999).  Secondly, the 
organisations involved in processes of interest representation are appointed (and 
often self-appointed) rather than elected to represent a particular interest. Although 
individuals within the organisation may have been elected to their post, the 
organisation itself is not elected by the entire constituency to stand for a particular 
interest. Thirdly, according to Halpin (cited in Greenwood 2003a:270) the 
organisations involved in interest representation, and targeted in the reform 
rhetoric are representatives for a particular cause rather than of it. This means they 
do not necessarily have strong links with their constituencies, mirroring Pitkin’s 
observation of representatives who are ‘acting for’ a particular interest.  
 
The representation of interests in informal governance processes in the EU can 
help overcome the weaknesses in representation from which the EU is said to 
suffer (Smismans 2003). Transnational groups from various sectors of civil society 
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have been granted rights of ‘functional participation’ in the EU policy-making 
process, thereby institutionalising them and legitimising processes of ‘functional 
representation’ whereby these groups have legal rights and the authority to speak 
for others. 
 
However, the move from describing associations as ‘interest groups’ to ‘civil 
society organisations’ in the rhetoric of the reform suggests that the representation 
role of civil society is not confined to functional representation or ‘acting for’ 
citizens. There are several factors which suggest the view of representation herein 
resembles Pitkin’s view of ‘standing for’, either descriptively, symbolically or 
both. The concern in the debate on the future of the EU is not only with technical 
political questions to which only experts can be expected to know the answers. 
Instead, the debate on the future of the EU has been presented as something much 
wider than everyday EU policy-making. The rhetoric suggests that the institutions 
want to know what citizens think and want rather than what representatives of 
their interests might think is best for them. One of the aims of the debate, as 
explained by the Laeken declaration and the governance white paper is to find out 
what ordinary citizens want from the European Union. In order to be able to 
communicate what ordinary citizens want the representative must have effective 
links with its constituents, which representation as ‘acting for’ does not offer. As 
Pitkin points out, representation as ‘standing for’ has a greater capacity to perform 
this role. This requires representatives to have clear capacities to engage in 
downward-facing interactions with those they are representing, in order to 
effectively communicate what it is that European citizens want. In this way it 
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seems that a descriptive or symbolic ‘standing for’ the citizens would be a more 
appropriate way to understand the linkage role of civil society organisations.  
 
In addition the reform rhetoric implies that the organisations involved will have 
concrete lines of linkage with their constituents, to such an extent that one is 
possible to stand for another. This is evidenced by the phrase in the Laeken 
declaration which outlines that in order for the debate to be ‘broadly based and 
involve all citizens, a Forum will be opened for organisations representing civil 
society’ (European Council 2001). In this way the rhetoric implies a symbolic 
‘standing for’ on the part of civil society organisations for ordinary citizens. The 
terms ‘citizen’ and ‘civil society’ are used almost interchangeably, particularly in 
the governance white paper (Magnette 2003) which implies an at least implicit 
assumption of their symbolic interchangeability.  
 
The reform rhetoric took a broader view of representation than we have seen in 
processes of interest representation. For representation – as a mechanism of 
democratic linkage – to strengthen input legitimacy we would expect it to 
resemble ‘standing for’ in addition to, or instead of, ‘acting for’.  It is useful here 
to return to Scharpf’s distinction between input- and output-oriented legitimacy 
arguments. Scharpf (1999) outlines the distinction between ‘input-oriented’ and 
‘output-oriented’ legitimacy, recognising the lack of the former in the European 
Union. Traditionally the legitimacy of the European Union rested on outputs, or 
specifically the extent to which the EU produced outcomes that were more 
beneficial than the member states could produce acting individually (Beetham & 
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Lord 1998: 98-114). However, the debate about the EU’s so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’, and more recently the post-Nice reform agenda, has focused on how to 
improve input legitimacy (Meyer 1999).  
 
Representation as a mechanism of democratic linkage can potentially strengthen 
either the input-or output-oriented legitimacy arguments of the EU, depending on 
the view of representation adopted. Representation as ‘acting for’ tends to improve 
the output-oriented legitimacy arguments of the EU. This is because 
‘representation’ in this view is about furthering the interest that the representative 
is defined by, and is directed towards an outcome, for example a policy proposal. 
The activity of representation as acting for others must be defined in terms of what 
the representative does and how he does it, and its success is measured by the 
extent to which the interest is then reflected in the eventual outcome. This can be 
illustrated with a comment made by a Union official that I interviewed:  
 
The European Environment Bureau is very successful at lobbying the 
Commission, [and] as long as they’re successful in lobbying the 
Commission and promoting their members interest, they don’t care, 
they don’t care much about the gap between the institutions and the 
citizens because as far as they are concerned, If [they] are successful at 
lobbying the Commission there is no gap. 
Union official #5, 28.03.06, Brussels 
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Representatives ‘acting for’ a particular interest can therefore contribute to output-
oriented legitimacy arguments by contributing their expertise to discussions which 
result in more effective policy proposals. 
 
Representation as ‘standing for’, by contrast, has greater potential to improve the 
EU’s input-oriented legitimacy arguments. Representation as ‘standing for’ relies 
on a congruence of characteristics between the representative and the represented 
(either descriptively or symbolically). It is therefore better able to support the 
assumption in aspects of the reform rhetoric, of interchangeability between 
citizens and ‘civil society’ and that by involving certain civil society organisations 
the European public is somehow involved. An example of an attempt to create 
representation as ‘standing for’ is the Youth Convention, established by Giscard 
d’Estaing to help fulfil the Laeken concern with ‘bringing closer’ to young people. 
Clear attempts were made to ensure that the characteristics of the Youth 
Convention delegates resembled those of European youth in general (210 persons 
aged between 18 and 25, intending to ensure appropriate diversity in terms of sex, 
occupation and geographical background). However, the Convention was marred 
by acrimony and scandal, when the chair was found to be over the age of 25 
(Norman 2003) calling into question the extent to which the delegates were 
actually ‘standing for’ those they were supposed to represent was. Johannes 
Voggenhuber, one of the Austrian Convention members claimed that ‘it is not 
European Youth that has come to Brussels, but the future bureaucrats of the EU 
institutions’ (in Norman 2003:57). This demonstrates how the capacity to 
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effectively ‘stand for’ becomes increasingly difficult the further removed an 
organisation is from its grass-roots.  
 
Both views of substantive representation can contribute to bringing the EU 
institutions and citizens closer together, or in other words, democratic linkage and 
in turn improve the legitimacy of EU governance. Furthermore, representation as 
‘acting for’ and ‘standing for’ are not mutually exclusive and may occur 
simultaneously. It is important nevertheless to make the analytical distinction 
between these two forms of substantive representation because it allows us to 
observe with greater clarity the way in which representation is functioning as a 
mechanism of linkage, and whether it enhances input- or output oriented 
legitimacy arguments. Understanding what these organisations bring into the 
debates requires turning empirical attention towards the relationship between the 
organisations and who or what they represent – their ‘downward-facing’ 
interactions. 
 
 
5.4 Representation in the Convention and the Futurum initiative 
 
 
Civil society organisations, in their earlier incarnation as ‘interest groups’, have 
traditionally been important agents of representation in the EU political system. 
Studies of interest representation have tended to focus on the contribution of the 
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actors to effective policy outcomes – their ‘upward-facing’ interactions with 
decision-makers – approximating a view of representation as ‘acting for’ or acting 
‘in’ the interests of citizens. Yet the debate discourse outlines the role of these 
organisations in the context of broadening the debate to involve all citizens, 
thereby turning attention towards their ‘downward-facing’ relationship with 
citizens – resembling more closely a view of representation as standing for citizens 
in the debates. 
 
In the empirical investigation I aimed to shed light on the following questions: 
How is representation enabled or constrained within the Convention and Futurum? 
Are civil society organisations willing to represent citizens in the debates and 
furthermore, are they able to do so effectively? In analytical terms, does the 
concept of representation shed light on the contribution made by civil society 
organisations in the debate initiative to enhancing legitimate governance? 
 
As in Chapter 4, the empirical data presented here comes primarily from 
interviews with 25 civil society organisations that were involved in the Convention 
and/or Futurum. These interviews were conducted between January and April 
2005 in Brussels, Paris and London. The two organisations that were based in 
London had a national as opposed to transnational remit, although one of them was 
affiliated to TEAM Europe – a Europe-wide umbrella group for EU-sceptic 
organisations. The remaining 23 organisations were all EU-wide in their scope, the 
majority based in Brussels and five in Paris. The responses from the civil society 
organisations are supplemented (where relevant) with responses from Union 
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officials. Six individuals from the EU institutions, notably the Commission, the 
Council and the Economic and Social Committee, who were involved in the 
debates were also interviewed. 
 
The findings are presented below under the following themes: representation in the 
Convention and the Futurum initiatives; representation as ‘downward-facing’ 
interactions; representation as ‘upward-facing’ interactions; who or what is 
represented; perspectives on representation in the debates; and perspectives on the 
representation role of civil society. I illustrate my analysis with direct quotations 
from the organisations (and in some cases from the Union officials). The 
discussion that follows in section 5.5 returns to the questions outlined above on the 
opportunities or constraints found within the Convention and Futurum; the 
capacities and willingness of the organisations involved; and the explanatory value 
of the concept of representation. 
 
 
Representation in the Convention and the Futurum initiative 
Unlike with participation, organisations rarely viewed ‘representation’ as a 
particular activity or set of activities within the Convention or the Futurum 
initiative. Nevertheless, the role of organisations in ‘making present’ of something 
– whether an interest, opinion or preference of a citizen or group of citizens – in 
the Convention caused palpable excitement among organisations, as one of the 
think-tanks involved observed: 
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[In the Convention] everyone was very excited and everyone wanted to 
explore his or her chance to say something on the part of the interest 
they were defending. 
Civil society organisation #13, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
Some of the other organisations also viewed their Convention-related activities in 
terms of the opportunity to represent their position. However, many of the 
organisations did not appear to see their own involvement in the debates in terms 
of representing something. For them the act of participating appeared to be more 
tangible. 
 
The idea that civil society involvement in the Convention and Futurum was in 
order to make present something that wasn’t there was apparent in some of the 
statements of the organisations nevertheless. One organisation thought that the 
Commission, as administrators of the Futurum website, had made a deliberate 
effort to target organisations that were in some way ‘representative’ of the range of 
interests found within European civil society broadly, and moreover, they had 
been successful in doing so: 
 
They [the Commission in the Futurum initiative] actually have made 
quite a good effort to say ‘what we really want is groups that really are 
representative of where they’re from’, and I think they’ve done quite 
as good a job as they can bearing in mind now that’s means they’re 
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supposed to know who the real representative civil society 
organisations are in 25 member states. 
Civil society organisation #4, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
Other organisations however, were simply unable to see their activities in the 
Futurum as having anything to do with representation. This was less the case for 
the NGO-type organisations than for think-tanks, and specifically one organisation 
which described itself as a ‘citizen’s network’. Their contribution to Futurum was 
to establish a partnership linking to a website which described describing their 
activities: 
 
One hundred people gathered and talked about this topic [constitution 
for the EU] and this is what they think. Are they representative of 
anything? No, they’re just people who came together. 
Civil society organisation #8, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
 
Representation as ‘downward-facing’ interactions 
By breaking representation down into its component parts it was easier to observe 
it empirically. On the one hand representation could be observed in the so-called 
‘downward-facing interactions’ of organisations whereby they would define and 
outline their position through interactions with members (individual or groups), 
supporters or citizens in general. On the other hand another facet of representation 
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could be observed in ‘upward-facing’ interactions whereby the organisation would 
present their position to decision-makers. 
 
When asked about their involvement in the Convention and Futurum several 
organisations mentioned the ways in which they drew up positions which would 
become the basis of their activities in the Convention and Futurum. The following 
two comments come from organisations with national and regional member 
organisations whom they consulted in the process of drawing up their position - on 
the basis of which they then lobbied the Convention members: 
 
We have to have a common opinion and then we try to draft an opinion 
which could be accepted by our affiliates, then we have our executive 
and steering committees when the leaders of the national centres come 
to Brussels then we discuss it with them, and we publish the opinion. 
And on the basis of this position, we lobby. We try to influence [the 
institutions]. 
Civil society organisation #12, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
What happens when the Commission produces a document, we go 
away and we ask our members to think about it themselves, then come 
back together and think about it together then draft a position paper. It 
takes time but it’s the only way in which we can say ‘we represent all 
of this wide range of groups and we can say with confidence agree that 
these are the key issues’. In order to do this civil society can move 
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quite slowly sometimes but I think that’s essential if you’re going to 
have any credibility when you say ‘we speak for these groups’, or 
‘together this is what we say’. 
Civil society organisation #21, 17.02.05, Brussels 
 
As these quotations indicate, the process of drawing up positions could be long 
and drawn out because of the numbers of additional actors involved. One of the 
organisations explained this process in detail, pointing out that their contributions 
in the Convention and Futurum, in addition to their activities outside the debate 
initiative, arose from a process which was, in their view, ‘democratic’: 
 
Every policymaking document that we do has a democratic process. It 
is first drafted by the policy officer, then presented to the bureau, the 
bureau can do changes, then present it to the member organisations. 
We have two meetings every year and more than 90 member 
organisations are represented there by delegates that represent the 
opinion of the organisation so we’re talking 90 different ways of 
thinking. In the end it’s voted and the majority will draft the document 
that is presented to the political level [i.e. the position that forms the 
basis of lobbying activities]. So on that level the 90 member 
organisations are represented in a very precise way and a very 
democratic way and that’s why I say we represent the member 
organisations and in that sense we represent a lot of different ways of 
thinking very well. 
Representat ion 192 
 
Civil society organisation #5, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
In the interviews, organisations were generally open and honest about the 
difficulties of maintaining ‘downward-facing’ interactions, and therefore of being 
able to effectively represent members or their interests at the European level. 
Nevertheless they clearly felt that this process bestowed the legitimacy necessary 
in order for them to claim that they could ‘represent’ their constituents as this 
Youth organisation explained: 
 
It’s very difficult to get a clear picture of what your members want. In 
our case it’s easier than for other organisations, because we don’t have 
a national level…the thing with the other organisations is that having a 
national level is like if you have traffic lights. We have a network and 
the workload for us is huge but it means we ensure the results…we 
want to know what our members want so that we are able to stand for 
them when it comes to lobbying the institutions for the students’ 
interests…you can’t have a real representation of your aims and you 
cannot really lobby for people if you don’t involve them. 
Civil society organisation #10, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
The internal connections between the centre of the organisation and its members or 
constituents was emphasised by a number of organisations, making the point that 
being able to demonstrate a large membership or group of supporters could be a 
useful resource for organisations: 
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[Our] internal network gives us direct access to these organisations, 
national youth councils are connected with national NGOs, from 
national to regional to local. And also then the international NGOs for 
example Red Cross, can [lead] directly into the local level. So we 
calculated once that we represent 20 million young people in Europe, 
indirectly of course, and that’s more or less the power of [our 
organisation]. 
Civil society organisation #5, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
 
Representation as ‘upward-facing’ interactions 
For many of the organisations that were interviewed, it appeared that their 
‘upward-facing’ interactions were at the forefront of their minds when asked to 
describe their involvement in the debates. For these organisations, the essence of 
representation was the interactions they maintained with decision-makers. 
Representation involved lobbying institutional actors on the basis of a predefined 
position, and ‘representation’ in the context of the debate on the future of the EU 
largely resembled their interest representation activities. 
 
The primary task or the primary objective of [our organisation] has 
really been to ensure that someone is ensuring a greater focus on urban 
issues, on the concerns of cities at the European level…obviously 
Representat ion 194 
 
without having a strong input or a strong basis from our membership to 
build on there couldn’t be any lobbying vis-à-vis the EU institutions. 
Civil society organisation #7, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
For some organisations, it was clear that the European level was active in 
consulting and approaching their members. For others however, it appeared that 
they relied on their national level organisations to take on the burden of feeding 
information from individual members to the EU-level centre. 
 
An analytical distinction has been drawn here between downward-facing and 
upward-facing interactions but in practice there can be a degree of overlap 
between the two. Several of the organisations interviewed explained how they felt 
they could not have success in one without effectively maintaining the other: 
 
In the past of course we’ve mounted a number of lobbying actions to 
preserve and to promote our interests and what we found became 
obvious right in the beginning is that you can have very good lobbying 
at the European level but if this is not relayed by the national level then 
it can’t succeed. 
Civil society organisation #18, 03.02.05, Paris 
 
I think without it [our membership] we could be legitimately seen as 
an empty shell. I mean we, us sitting here in Brussels is not the point. 
We are sort of the intelligence gatherers, the eyes and ears, it’s our job 
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to know what’s going on, but without our membership who will 
actually take on the issues and work with their government and groups 
up here there would be no point. 
Civil society organisation #3, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
Several of the membership organisations explained that in their view, their 
interactions with the membership – whether national or regional organisations or 
individuals – enabled them to perform their lobbying activities more effectively. 
Incorporating consultation with membership into their lobbying activities became 
an important objective. 
 
 
‘Who’ or ‘what’ organisations represent 
An issue which was raised by some organisations is a theme of this investigation 
that has already been discussed in other parts of the thesis, namely the 
heterogeneity of civil society at the EU level. Chapter 3 discusses the discourses of 
‘bringing closer’ and ‘debate’, and the language used by the various institutions 
which serve to create a picture of civil society in terms of a series of organisations 
active at the EU level. There is very little discussion about the differences within 
organised civil society, between different types of group, across sectors or at 
national and EU levels for example. Imposing a homogenous picture of civil 
society can obscure variations between the different organisations that are active, 
their characteristics, and in part a function of this, their capacity to help strengthen 
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input legitimacy. This NGO umbrella group also recognised the different bases 
upon which NGOs might represent certain citizens: 
 
If you take a network like the European Disability Forum which is one 
of our members, that’s a network which was built up in the 
foundations of the network of people with disabilities working 
together. They created a network which tries to give a democratic 
voice to those people and you can look at the network and say ‘this is 
straightforward democratically’ so they can bring their concerns 
forward, and the reason for the network existing at the European level, 
one of the main reasons is to take those concerns to the European 
policy-makers and see if they want to listen to them or not. I think 
they’d be willing to be judged on the basis of people saying ‘you claim 
to be representative of these groups, how do you do it?’ and them 
saying, ‘this is the structure we have, this is the way we can transmit 
from individual people with disabilities through to a political statement 
at the European level’. 
Civil society organisation #21, 17.02.05, Brussels 
 
Other organisations acknowledged the problems and difficulties associated with 
claiming to represent citizens or interests: 
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It’s hard to say that of course we represent them [all European youth], 
it would be impossible, but what we do represent are the interests the 
common interests of our 90 member organisations. 
Civil society organisation #5, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
I would say that we represent a constituency within the broader 
population, we do not represent all European women, that would just 
be a ridiculous claim. But we do represent those European women who 
are organised in structures at national level as well and then join 
together. And the same you could say I guess, for the anti-poverty 
networks and the disability networks and the racism networks and the 
migrant networks and all these other groups that all exist in Brussels. 
Civil society organisation #3, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
In general we could say that [we are] a bottom up organisation, a 
representative organisation…[our] goal is to represent the students of 
Europe and then the students of Europe through their national 
organisations can say whether they like the European Union or the EU 
institutions or not. 
Civil society organisation #15, 14.01.05, Brussels 
 
The three comments above were made by organisations characterised as ‘Other, 
NGOs’ by the Commission in the Convention Forum and Futurum. In these 
statements it is possible to identify a claim or belief that the views or voices of 
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citizens could be channelled through the organisations. These organisations had 
evidently engaged in a process of self-reflection, and seemed to regard themselves 
as having a mandate to speak for (or ‘act for’) certain interests. But another 
organisation (also in the ‘Other’ category) was aware of the problems with this:  
 
MEPs or MPs at national level are elected by thousands of people and 
they’re the ones who can say with some degree of legitimacy, although 
you can argue about how effective it is, but with some degree of 
legitimacy ‘I do speak for the people I’ve been given a mandate’. We 
can’t do that, we don’t do that and we should never say so. What we 
can do is say we speak for groups of the population who have given a 
mandate to people but we need to be very careful there. 
Civil society organisation #21, 17.02.05, Brussels 
 
Another organisation explained who or what they represented, referring to several 
different views of representation, and demonstrating how the term is often used to 
mean different things without examining the meanings of various usages: 
 
Yes, that’s what I’m elected for. I’m representing the organisation in 
other organisations in Youth Forum, in the International European 
Movement, in the European Federalists, in the World Federalist 
Movement. And I’m elected for that so when I go to these places I try 
to represent as well as I can the European interests. This organisation 
stands for having more Europe and in this wider sense I can be 
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representing all of that, when it comes to more specific issues I know 
that I’m not that representative. 
Civil society organisation #9, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
The discussion of ‘who’ or ‘what’ is represented highlights important variations 
between the organisations. Even though they have been referred to collectively as 
‘civil society organisations’ there are important differences between the 
organisations which have implications for the nature of representation. In various 
cases the NGOs were representing the opinions of their member organisations on a 
particular proposal of the Convention. In other cases they were representing the 
interests of their members vis-à-vis a proposal. The former can be seen, in Pitkin’s 
words as ‘standing for’ and the latter acting ‘for’ or ‘in the interest of’. 
 
 
Perspectives on representation role of civil society in the debate on the future of 
the EU 
Some organisations addressed the issue of representation in the abstract. Rather 
than refer to their own claims to representativity some organisations commented 
on the issue of representation in terms of civil society as a whole. One of the think-
tanks commented on the problems of representation faced by, and in their view, 
reproduced by NGOs: 
 
The problem of these organisations is often representativity, even 
within their sector. Some claim that they have a democratic system and 
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their organisation is representative. But some organisations are 
considered as being self-selected so there is a debate even within civil 
society about representativity. 
Civil society organisation #22, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
Conversely, one of the NGOs commented on the role of trade unions: 
 
I think the issue of how civil society represents public or certain 
constituencies in the public is a very important issue that we need to 
pay attention to in general. The social partners - the trade unions and 
the employers have a hugely central and privileged role within the 
process, and I would argue again as I’ve just argued governments and 
media fail to translate the message or the process of the EU 
developments to the public so too do the social partners abysmally fail 
in my view. 
Civil society organisation #3, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
Finally, one organisation recognised that there was a link between a particular kind 
of representation and the extent to which civil society could perform a linkage 
role: 
 
The key issue for me in this whole debate about what NGOs bring in 
terms of policy paper democracy and bridging the gap with the 
citizens, is transparency. NGOs have a responsibility to be very clear 
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about who they are representing and how they do that. I think, I hope 
we take that seriously, because that’s something that’s fundamental. 
Civil society organisation #21, 17.01.05, Brussels 
 
 
5.5 Discussion  
 
 
The empirical findings presented in section 5.4 outline the nature of representation 
in the Convention and Futurum and the role of civil society organisations therein. 
On the basis of these findings I now return to the questions outlined at the 
beginning of the previous section: How is representation enabled or constrained 
within the Convention and Futurum? Are civil society organisations willing to 
represent citizens in the debates and are they able to do so effectively? 
Furthermore, and in analytical terms, does the concept of representation shed light 
on the contribution made by civil society organisations in the debate initiative to 
enhancing legitimate governance? 
 
Although the term ‘representation’ did not form part of the rhetoric of the debate, 
arguably the notion of representation informed some of the strategies that were 
developed to transform the ‘deeper and broader debate’ into concrete actions. The 
role of civil society organisations in the debates, as outlined in both the Laeken 
declaration and the 2001 governance white paper, was invoked in response to the 
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desire to bring citizens and EU institutions closer together. This in turn was based 
on an assumption made by the institutions that civil society organisations would 
‘make present’ EU citizens in some way. 
 
One of the strategies, which appeared to be informed by this assumption of 
representativity, was the Youth Convention. When Giscard d’Estaing convened 
the Youth Convention he did so hoping that it would be an opportunity to hear the 
voice of young people and their ideas about what the EU should be doing to secure 
its future which could then be fed into the Convention’s discussions. To a certain 
extent the Youth Convention could also be seen as a symbolic exercise to 
demonstrate that a debate on the EU’s future involved its future citizens. Using 
Pitkin’s terminology, the delegates were seen to ‘stand for’ young people, both 
descriptively and symbolically. Yet one of the organisations interviewed doubted 
whether the delegates were representative of the average young person in the way 
intended, and what the consequences of this were. In their words, the Youth 
Convention comprised: 
 
People who were very close to the [EU institutions] and who would, 
not surprisingly come up with some kind of result draft declaration that 
it was very much in line with the usual, what you would expect from 
people who are very pro-European, very close to the issues using this 
Euro-speak, and so forth. 
Civil society organisation #13, 13.01.05, Brussels 
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The members of the Youth Convention were selected by the member states, the 
Commission and the European Parliament and ultimately the view of both Union 
officials and other civil society organisations was that they were more 
representative of the institution or member state that sent them than of others in 
their age cohort.  
 
In a similar fashion, the civil society plenary session appeared to have been 
designed partly with the representation of citizens in mind. Recognising the 
logistical problems of trying to accommodate the hundreds of organisations that 
had already sent their contributions to Futurum and the Forum, the Convention 
secretariat tried to narrow down the number and type of organisations addressing 
the Convention members. In the end, the decision on which of the organisations 
would speak for each ‘sector’ of civil society was left to the organisations 
themselves – so that the organisations that spoke during the plenary were intended 
to represent their particular part or sector of civil society. From the point of view 
of one of the Union officials involved in the Convention, the extent to which this 
initiative successfully resulted in the representation of citizens and their interests 
was limited: 
 
Very few of the NGOs who intervened said ‘we want the European 
Union to be able to do able to more in this particular policy area, at the 
moment the necessary powers don’t exist’… they were about 
declaratory language and not about policies and substance. 
Union official #3, 28.03.06, Brussels 
Representat ion 204 
 
 
A perspective on the Youth Convention from the civil society organisations was 
presented by one of the organisations that had addressed the Convention during the 
plenary. They also felt that the plenary had been of limited usefulness but in 
contrast to the institutional actors, they attributed this to the structures of the 
debate, claiming that there was simply not enough time for them to present the 
voice of their members or their sector of civil society. 
 
In the case of the Futurum initiative there were also attempts to facilitate the 
representation of citizens and interests. Some of the organisations that were 
interviewed felt that the partnership initiative was an attempt by the Commission 
to identify and co-opt organisations representing all the different elements of civil 
society – an attempt which some believed to be more successful than others:  
 
I think the whole Futurum thing and in general the whole civil society 
drive at the Commission level has brought in groups not individuals, 
but I think that was the idea. The Commission can’t cope with having 
thousands of individuals saying what their views are, but they have 
actually made quite a good effort to say ‘what we really want is groups 
that really are representative of where they’re from. 
Civil society organisation #4, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
The 26 partnership organisations listed on the Futurum website therefore included 
NGOs, trade unions, regional organisations and think-tanks. In the interviews, 
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some of the organisations involved in Futurum were sceptical about the 
effectiveness of the Futurum initiative as a vehicle for contributing to a debate by 
representing their positions. Involvement in the Futurum initiative did not give 
organisations direct access to Convention members and involved very little 
interaction or active involvement at all. The absence of an audience, or ‘object’ 
constrained the effective representation of citizens or interests. 
 
The debate discourses emphasised the role of civil society organisations in relation 
to bringing citizens and EU institutions closer together, and not merely to bringing 
certain interests closer to the institutions. Processes of interest representation in the 
EU have helped the EU policy-making institutions get closer to the preferences, 
opinions and interests of EU citizens. However representation in the debate on the 
future of the EU has not necessarily allowed citizens to get closer to the 
institutions. The notion that organised civil society (as defined by the institutions) 
represented EU citizens was contested by some of the actors involved in the 
Convention and Futurum. Several of the organisations interviewed instead argued 
that the organisations involved in the debates could not necessarily be equated 
with civil society broadly defined or ordinary citizens. 
 
In addition to the ways in which the structures or rules of the Convention and 
Futurum facilitated or constrained representation, the activities of civil society 
organisations also affected the extent to which representation operated. As we 
have seen, representation as a substantive activity involves interaction on the part 
of civil society organisations in two directions: upwards towards decision-makers 
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and downwards towards members, supporters and citizens. The extent to which the 
organisations interviewed here were able to maintain interactions in both 
directions varied, as did their willingness to do so. 
 
The most visible part of the representation process involved the presentation of a 
position to Convention members and other actors involved in decision-making, in 
other words upward-facing interactions. The responses of the organisations here 
(and in Chapter 4 with reference to participation) indicate that it was these 
interactions with decision-makers – Convention members primarily – which were 
viewed as crucial. In this respect, the majority of the organisations interviewed 
demonstrated a willingness to ‘make present’ the interests of their members in the 
Convention and Futurum.  
 
To a certain extent this willingness was matched by the ability of organisations to 
perform this role. Most of the organisations that were interviewed were based in 
Brussels. They were intimately familiar with the EU decision-making process and 
experienced at dealing with the institutions. Maintaining effective upward-facing 
interactions tended to be something they were good at. However, the comments of 
Union official #3 (on page 198) suggested that the context proved challenging for 
the organisations. He expressed frustration with the organisations that addressed 
the Convention plenary because they did not present their opinions, preferences or 
interests of their members and instead resorted to ‘declaratory’ and abstract 
language on the future of the EU and their own role in it. This he attributed in part 
to the occasion and the desire of the organisations to ‘put their own stamp’ on the 
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constitutional treaty. However, if the civil society organisations did respond to the 
pomp and ceremony of the Convention by resorting to declaratory statements it 
could be argued that they were taking cues from some the Convention members 
themselves, not least Giscard d’Estaing who was also a user of declaratory 
language and was reportedly fond of reminding the members of the gravity of their 
task.  
 
The downward-facing interactions of the organisations which lay behind the 
presentation of the position of a particular organisation in the Convention or the 
Forum were less visible. Here, the wide variation between the organisations 
interviewed became apparent. On the one hand the nature of the position they 
presented in the civil society plenary, Forum or Futurum debates depended on the 
organisation. For example, in the case of several NGOs with national or regional 
memberships this usually referred to the collective preference, opinion or interest 
of the organisation’s members. For the think-tanks by contrast, their position 
tended to be based on research findings, analysis or the promotion of a certain 
idea. 
 
The process by which the position that was presented was arrived at also varied – a 
consequence of the fact that such a diverse range of organisations from across civil 
society were involved. Some organisations were able to demonstrate often 
complex processes whereby the preferences, opinions or interests of the 
membership informed the position which was subsequently presented to the 
Convention members. For others this process was far more opaque. Therefore the 
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extent to which citizens – either as supporters or members of an organisation – 
were involved in the development of a position which then became the basis of 
what was represented to Convention members varied among the organisations 
interviewed. 
 
There were evident disparities in the capacity of organisations to maintain 
downward-facing relationships, with implications for their capacity for 
representation. Organisations cited the difficulties involved in consulting their 
memberships or supporters when drawing up positions that would become the 
basis of their lobbying of Convention members. For the same reasons that many 
organisations did not facilitate the participation of citizens (members or 
supporters) in their activities and thereby the activities of the debate, organisations 
did not have the capacity to incorporate citizens into their representation activities. 
 
Notwithstanding the organisational capacities of the different organisations, there 
is also the issue of whether the organisations were willing to perform a 
representation role. Again, willingness to represent citizens or their interests varies 
between the organisations interviewed. For some of the NGOs, representing a 
particular group of citizens was viewed as their central task, though this did not 
always guarantee that they were effective in doing so. Others did not view 
representation as part of their job. This attitude can be attributed in part to the way 
the EU level organisations have developed in response to the preference of EU 
institutions to deal with EU level federations rather than multiple national 
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organisations. The raison d’etre for such organisations is to lobby and be consulted 
by the EU institutions so they are necessarily upward-facing. 
 
Dividing the process of representation into two components helps us to understand 
how it operates as a mechanism of linkage. Research on associations and 
representation in the EU has tended to focus on the upward-facing interactions of 
the organisation involved. What is perhaps less well-understood is the 
organisations’ ‘downward-facing’ interactions – the relationships between the 
organisation and its members. Effectively representing members does not of 
course wholly depend on whether an organisation maintains ‘downward’ 
connections or draws upon these in the production of positions which are then 
presented to Convention members (or policy-makers more broadly). Some 
organisations felt that they served their members’ interests better by ‘getting on 
with the job’ of lobbying policy-makers at the EU level rather than constantly 
asking them what they thought. Others felt that they did not need to consult 
regularly with members or supporters in order to be able to represent them or their 
interests effectively. In other words, there are different understandings of what it 
means ‘to represent’ held by the organisations and the EU institutions, which are 
reflected in the theoretical literature on the concept of representation.  
 
The activities of the organisations involved in the Convention and Futurum 
debates appeared to resemble representation as ‘acting for’ more frequently than 
they resembled representation as ‘standing for’. The former is perhaps more 
consistent with the organisations’ conventional role in processes of interest 
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representation which might imply a continuation of this role rather than a break 
with the past. The latter, by contrast, seems to be a new way of working for many 
of the organisations and different to the functions that they were originally 
intended to perform. Nevertheless, in the context of the debates on the future of the 
EU it could be argued that these two forms of representation are interconnected, 
and that for organisations to successfully ‘act for’ citizens they must also ‘stand 
for’ the citizens or interests they represent. 
 
Looking at linkage through the framework of representation requires an 
examination of the relationships between civil society organisations and citizens as 
well as the relationships between civil society and decision-makers. The interest 
representation literature has tended to focus on the latter of these relationships, 
specifically how representation affects policy outcomes. The issue of how 
associations contribute to input legitimacy through the process of interest 
representation has not been addressed as thoroughly. Furthermore, some research 
has cast doubt on whether interest representation contributes to input legitimacy by 
highlighting evidence of how associations might distort or undermine rather than 
strengthen the EU’s democratic structures through their contribution to the policy-
making process.  
 
Representation was less easily-identifiable as a substantive activity as was the case 
for participation. Often, the organisations themselves didn’t always view what they 
were doing in terms of representation, or at least not primarily in terms of 
representation. This underlines how analytical concepts help to isolate and 
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categorise different types of behaviour but in practice, the distinction becomes 
more blurred. Similarly, the distinction drawn here between upward-facing 
interactions and downward facing interactions helps to emphasise the way in 
which representation operates as a mechanism of democratic linkage. The 
interviews produced far less evidence of the downward-facing interactions of the 
organisations. They did however, underline that in practice the interactions cannot 
always be so neatly divided since they are not mutually exclusive and a particular 
activity might involve elements of both. Nevertheless, when the downward 
interactions are taken into account the concept of representation can outline quite 
well the interconnectedness between the different relationships. 
 
  
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
Mechanisms of democratic linkage III: Communication 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
The concepts of participation and representation offer useful frameworks 
within which the role of civil society organisations in bringing EU institutions 
and citizens closer together can be studied empirically. As such they tend to 
focus on the traditional role of interest groups in processes of policy-making, 
namely enhancing popular involvement and promoting interests, opinions or 
preferences in decision-making. However in recent years the EU institutions, 
notably the Commission, have outlined a role for civil society in 
‘communicating Europe’, the latest attempt to enhance the legitimacy of EU 
governance by strengthening the links between EU institutions and citizens.  
 
‘Communication’ has been a key concern for the Barroso Commission since its 
inauguration. By 2006 a clear ‘communication strategy’ had emerged from the 
Commission, under the guidance of the Vice President of the Commission and 
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Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy Margot 
Wallström, which aimed to restructure the relationship between the EU 
institutions and citizens in the member states. The major components of this 
strategy are the White Paper on Communication, published in February 2006, 
Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, launched in October 2005 and 
the Action plan to improve communicating Europe by the Commission of July 
2005.  
 
The Commission has been at pains to emphasise that the strategy represents a 
radically new approach to communication with citizens. There are however 
definite and identifiable similarities with the debate on the future of the EU in 
terms of both the aims of the strategy and the means by which this is to be 
achieved. Like the debate initiative, the communication strategy is all about 
enhancing the democratic legitimacy of EU governance based on the notion 
that if citizens knew more about the benefits of integration they would be more 
supportive and trustful of EU governance. One way of securing this outcome 
that has been identified by the strategy was to enlist the help of civil society, 
again much like the debate initiative had done previously. 
 
One of the questions arising from this comparison asks what communication is 
and what it is not, since there appears to be overlap with what could be 
understood as linkage through participation and representation. The notion of 
political communication is useful here because it informs theoretical literature 
on the relationship between communication as a process, and enhanced 
democratic legitimacy. 
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I begin in this chapter by examining more closely these similarities between the 
debate on the future of the EU and the Commission’s communication strategy. 
I consider whether, given these similarities, the communication strategy 
implies a new way of working for civil society organisations, by drawing upon 
the concept of political communication. The conceptual analysis allows for the 
operationalisation of communication before an empirical analysis of 
communication in the debate on the future of the EU, the findings of which are 
presented in section 6.4. This sheds light on the nature of communication as a 
mechanism of linkage and the extent to which it is facilitated by civil society 
organisations operating in the two case studies: the Convention and Futurum.  
 
 
6.2 From debating the EU’s future to ‘communicating Europe’ 
 
 
Communication was established as one of the Barroso Commission’s strategic 
objectives when it began its term of office in 2004, and as a policy in its own 
right. The communication strategy which has since emerged under the 
guidance of Margot Wallström can be seen largely as another attempt to 
strengthen the relationship between the EU institutions and citizens. It is based 
on the idea of a ‘communication gap’ which mirrors the EU’s legitimacy gap. 
The white paper outlined how as integration has progressed the EU has been 
transformed but communication with citizens has not kept up the pace. Instead 
a gap has emerged, one feature of which is that citizens know very little about 
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how the EU touches their lives, resulting in a feeling of remoteness and 
alienation from Brussels. In addition, citizens have the impression that the 
channels through which they can take part in debate are limited or inaccessible. 
This, argues the Commission in the white paper, is exacerbated further by the 
absence of a European public sphere where debate can unfold. More effective 
communication is seen by the Commission as a way of closing this gap by 
strengthening the bonds between EU institutions and citizens. In other words, 
communication can act as a mechanism of linkage and thus can in turn enhance 
the legitimacy of EU governance. 
 
The rhetoric that surrounds the communication strategy seems to imply a clear 
break with the past in terms of the way the EU has been communicated. It has 
been presented as ‘a move away from monologue’, whereby the Commission 
would simply provide information (or propaganda). This is replaced with 
‘genuine dialogue between the institutions and the citizens’26. However, rather 
than an entirely new development, the communication strategy should be seen 
in the context of several longer-term processes. A concern with communication 
predates the Barroso Commission, as under Prodi the Commission had begun 
to address the issue of how the institutions communicate with citizens27. More 
broadly, the communication strategy can be seen as the continuation of a 
strategy dating back to the post-Maastricht era to respond to the EU’s 
perceived legitimacy crisis.  
 
                                          
26
 As explained on Margot  Wallst röm ’s hom epage:  
ht tp: / / ec.europa.eu/ com mission_barroso/ wallst rom/ index_en.htm  
27
 Previous at tem pts at  developing a com municat ion st rategy have been m ade:  see European 
Comm ission (2001c)  which called on the other inst itut ions and, important ly, the member 
states to cont r ibute to the new approach and European Comm ission (2002)  in which the 
Comm ission out lined a new st rategy for it s inform at ion and com municat ion policy. 
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In the Treaty on European Union, the EU leaders stated their intention to 
improve access to information regarding the decision-making process, an 
intention compounded by the difficulties in ratifying the treaty which 
accelerated the momentum of reform. Since Maastricht it has been increasingly 
recognised that levels of public ignorance about and even hostility towards the 
EU are considerable. With this came an acceptance in principle that informing 
the public about, and involving them in the process of integration was 
necessary. Following the report of a ‘reflection group’ set up to assess the 
information and communication policies of the EU, the Commission decided 
that its lack of public support was largely due to inadequate information and 
understanding and so endeavoured to increase the transparency of its policy 
making. Further integration was to be ‘based on information, which means 
giving the facts and explaining, communication which means listening and 
dialogue, and transparency, which means priority to total openness in pursuing 
the first two objectives’ (European Commission 1994). 
 
Furthermore, there are distinct similarities between the communication strategy 
and the debate on the future of the EU, both of which have been attempts to 
bring citizens and institutions closer together, or in other words, strengthen 
legitimate governance. The continuity between the debate initiative and the 
communication strategy is embodied by Plan D. This was the Commission’s 
response to the ‘period of reflection’ called for by the European Council 
following the 2005 referenda on the constitutional treaty in France and The 
Netherlands. Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’ which was 
published in October 2005 reflected the Commission’s view that the period of 
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reflection should be used for a broad and intensive debate on European policies 
which would allow the development of a clear view of citizens’ needs and 
expectations vis-à-vis the European Union. Plan D, it argued, would not be 
limited to the period of reflection but rather would run the lifetime of the 
Barroso Commission and beyond. This document outlined several initiatives 
designed to ‘stimulate a wider debate between the European Union’s 
democratic institutions and citizens’ (2005b:2) which would seek to ‘clarify, 
deepen and legitimise a new consensus on Europe and address criticisms and 
find solutions where expectations have not been met’ (2005b:11). The 
reference to debate also underlined the continuity between this initiative which 
arose out of the rejection of the constitutional treaty, and the earlier initiative 
which had produced the constitutional treaty. 
 
Plan D was followed shortly afterwards by the Commission’s White Paper on a 
European Communication Policy. The white paper, which was published on 1st 
February 2006, outlined the Commission’s intention to close the gap between 
EU institutions and citizens by moving from ‘one-way communication to 
reinforced dialogue, from an institution-centred to a citizen-centred 
communication, from a Brussels-based to a more decentralised approach’ 
(2006a:4). Two-way communication was presented as a means of 
strengthening the bonds between citizens and institutions, and the white paper 
is littered with references to citizens, establishing communication as a 
mechanism of linkage. Five ways in which this might be achieved are outlined, 
including ‘defining common principles’, and ‘empowering citizens’, and 
crucially ‘doing the job together’. Like the governance white paper in 2001, it 
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called for joint action from the other EU institutions, national, regional and 
local authorities and civil society. However another similarity was that the 
communication white paper, just like the governance white paper, was also 
rather vague on the exact role played by civil society in this respect. It did point 
out that civil society had a role to play in ‘raising public awareness of 
European issues and policy debate’ and also ‘encouraging people to take part in 
these debates’ (2006a: 12). However, the extent of the concrete suggestions for 
ensuring this was ‘targeted co-operation projects in the field of public 
communication’ (2006a: 12-13) which gives very little away. 
 
Further similarities can be found in the principles underpinning 
communication. The action plan to improve communicating Europe by the 
Commission (European Commission 2005a) introduced and set the parameters 
of the communication strategy in July 2005. It defined three strategic principles 
to guide the strategy which were aimed at earning people’s trust: Listening, 
Communicating, and Connecting with Citizens by ‘going local’. The principle 
of listening establishes that communication is ‘not a one-way street’; that it is 
not just about informing citizens, but also about citizens expressing their 
opinions so the Commission can understand. The intention is that the voice of 
citizens can have a direct bearing on EU policy formulation and output. In this 
way it resembles the principle of participation outlined in the governance white 
paper which also focused on popular involvement in decision-making.  
 
The second strategic principle, which refers to communication, states that EU 
policies and their impact on people’s everyday lives must be communicated 
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and advocated in a way that people can understand. This can be seen as a subtle 
advancement from the debate strategy which also emphasised the importance 
of giving citizens and civil society the informational tools necessary for them 
to participate in debates. However, the inclusion of the suggestion that EU 
policies should be advocated implies a more active ‘selling’ of the EU than was 
apparent in the rhetoric of the debate initiative.  
 
The third and final strategic principle, ‘going local’, means that communication 
activities should be related to particular national and local concerns, and 
delivered in a language that people can understand. This also seems to take a 
step further than the debate initiative in recognising that listening and 
communication cannot take place only at the transnational level. 
 
In short there are many similarities between the communication strategy and 
the debate initiative. This poses questions about whether communication is a 
genuinely new way of working for civil society organisations in the EU, or 
whether it is simply a new and convenient term for same kind of activities, 
with the same objectives. It is important to understand what communication as 
a mechanism of linkage involves, and thereby understand how it works. In the 
following section I take a closer look at the concept of political 
communication(s) which can help us to understand how communication can 
link citizens and institutions, and the role civil society plays in this. 
 
 
6.3 Communication and legitimacy and the role of civil society 
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Communication, as the previous section demonstrates, has been identified by 
the Commission as a mechanism of linkage which can strengthen the 
democratic relationship between EU institutions and citizens, and thereby 
enhance the legitimacy of the EU and its governance structures. The rhetoric of 
the communication strategy states that effective communication can close the 
gap between citizens and the EU institutions. But much like that of the debate 
initiative, it gives little away on exactly how effective communication leads to 
legitimate governance, and the precise role played by civil society in promoting 
it. However, the concept of political communication, as elaborated in the 
theoretical literature on the public sphere, public opinion, agenda-building and 
agenda-setting, censorship and propaganda can help explain the relationship 
between communication and democracy, and help identify the actors involved.  
 
As McNair (2003:3) points out, the notion of political communication has been 
difficult to define with a great deal of precision because of the multiple 
potential interpretations of both components of the term. Pippa Norris defined 
political communications as ‘an interactive process concerning the 
transmission of information among politicians, the news media, and the public’ 
(2001: 127). However missing from Norris’ original definition is an 
acknowledgement of the role played in political communications by actors 
other than politicians, the media and citizens, notably civil society. McNair 
adopts a broader definition which sees political communication as ‘all forms of 
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communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the 
purpose of achieving specific objectives’ (2003:4 emphasis added).  
 
Theories of political communication see a causal connection between the 
communication of political information (often in the news media) and civic 
engagement – specifically knowledge and understanding of political issues, and 
political participation – both formal and informal. There are therefore, 
normative and practical reasons why communication is crucial in democratic 
political systems, and in turn why communication has been so attractive to the 
Commission in its quest for greater legitimacy. Habermas outlines the notion of 
the ‘public sphere’ to describe and explain the development of public opinion 
(1962/1989). The public sphere is a realm that is separate from the state but in 
which political issues can be raised and discussed. According to this view, 
access to the public sphere is crucial for the development of public opinion and 
as such, this public domain is a key feature of freedom of expression which is a 
feature of contemporary democracy (Schlesinger & Kevin 2000). A real public 
sphere has various components which can be understood as ‘functions’ 
performed by communication in democratic political systems (McNair 
2003:21-22) some of which are outlined below. 
 
One of the functions of communication in democratic societies, and of a public 
sphere in facilitating this is to inform citizens about political issues which 
affect them indeed which are an intrinsic part of their lives. In his article ‘On 
Legitimacy and Deliberation’, Bernard Manin (1987) argues that deliberative 
processes impart information. New information is imparted because no single 
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individual can anticipate and foresee all the variety of perspectives through 
which matters of ethics and politics would be perceived by different 
individuals; and because no single individual can possess all the information 
deemed relevant to a certain decision affecting all. Deliberation, therefore 
argues Benhabib (1996) is a procedure for being informed. In a democratic 
system it is normatively desirable for citizens to be informed about political 
issues, but the potentially beneficial effects of simply informing citizens are 
limited. 
 
A second and related function is to educate citizens about the meaning or 
significance of such issues. Education involves a transformation in the 
recipient of the information. In his analysis of the trade offs between 
effectiveness and participation in supranational governance, Dahl (1994) 
underlined the importance of communication by linking strong democracy with 
an informed and educated citizenry. Democracy, as a system of rule by the 
people, makes it more likely that people will get what they want or what they 
think is best. But their knowing what is best depends on their becoming 
enlightened about political issues which affect their lives and which they have 
a degree of control over (1994: 29-30). Consequently, measures such as 
education, public deliberation, political communication which lead to a more 
informed citizenry, he argued, were to be valued. Dahl condemns the tendency 
(at least in the past) to avoid public deliberation on EU issues, for fear that it 
might arouse hostility from citizens who are too ill-informed to understand the 
advantages of supranational governance. A more stable long-term solution, he 
argued would be to encourage public deliberation which, according to 
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deliberative democracy theorists, may help develop a consensus on EU issues. 
Dahl would, presumably be supportive at least of the principles of the 
communication strategy. 
 
The information and education roles played by communication in the public 
sphere can be beneficial to the individual citizens themselves as well as the 
political system (Habermas recognised both types of benefits resulting from the 
public sphere), and sometimes these benefits overlap. Dahl implies that 
informed citizens are more likely to make informed choices at election time; 
choices which, presumably, lead to a more optimal outcome because they are 
based on rational judgments rather than ignorance. A further benefit for the 
political system of informed and educated citizens is that it allows policy-
makers to find out what citizens want from government, in a much more 
detailed and ongoing way than periodic general elections which only give the 
merest hint of preference, presuming that communication is two-way, i.e. 
political elites are both talking and listening to people. In addition, and 
particularly relevant at the EU level, is the suggestion that education positively 
correlates with public support. Inglehart’s research on ‘Cognitive Mobilization 
and European Identity’ (1970) found that cognitive mobilisation (whereby 
individuals develop the skills necessary to relate to a distant political 
community) was dependent in part on levels of education. Processes of 
cognitive mobilisation would lead to an increased awareness of the European 
Union and, alongside the ‘internalisation of values’ (whereby citizens accept 
these values and make them their own) would result in increased support for 
and commitment to the EU among citizens. The current and previous 
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communication strategies have tended to be based on the assumption that 
support for the decision-making institutions of the EU and their outputs is 
higher among citizens with a greater awareness of the EU.  
 
A third function of the public sphere, as outlined by McNair, is that it provides 
a space for political discourse in which processes of communication allow for 
the formation of public opinion. Habermas’ original conception of the public 
sphere was one which was bounded at the national level, posing the question of 
whether there can be a supranational European public sphere generating a 
European public opinion. Schlesinger & Kevin (2000:206) have investigated 
whether processes of EU integration have contributed to the development of 
European spaces in which communicative processes can take place. They 
suggest that a sphere of discussion is emerging at the level of political 
economic elites, but that this can hardly be called a ‘public’ sphere. There are 
parallels here with the notion of ‘elite participation’ outlined in Chapter 4, with 
the consequent implications for whether this can be seen to be bringing 
ordinary citizens closer to the EU institutions and governance processes. 
Furthermore, and with implications for the communication strategy, they argue 
that emergence of a genuinely European, genuinely public sphere is hampered 
by the tendency of the institutions to adopt a top-down approach to 
communication rather than to establish two-way dialogue. 
 
A further reason why processes of communication found within the public 
sphere are important is because of the transparency regarding the activities of 
political authorities that they encourage. Such visibility in turn facilitates 
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accountability. When political elites explain why certain decisions are taken, 
lines of accountability between governments and citizens are improved.  
 
Finally, processes of communication within a public sphere can endorse certain 
political viewpoints, playing what McNair describes as an ‘advocacy’ or 
‘persuasion’ role (2003:22). The debate which then ensues can have 
transformative effects where the force of the better argument determines 
outcomes, rather than strategic bargaining or functional adaptation (Eriksen & 
Fossum 2000b:3). 
 
The extent to which communicative processes within the public sphere perform 
the functions outlined by McNair depends, according to Habermas, upon 
communication being comprehensible to citizens and truthful (truthful in so far 
as it recognises the genuine and sincere intentions of the speakers). Habermas’ 
conception of the public sphere was an ideal which is not actually realised in 
any national, let along European setting. It is fairly clear that the situation in 
the EU falls short of this ideal, but this appears to be what the current 
communication strategy seeks to address.  
 
The role identified for civil society by the Commission in the communication 
strategy resonates with these functions and the suggestion is that the 
communication role played by civil society will help strengthen the democratic 
relationship between EU institutions and citizens. This poses the question of 
whether, and if so, how civil society actors engaged in communication 
strengthen democratic linkage while at the same time pursuing their objectives 
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of influencing decision-making. Civil society organisations may use political 
communications to influence the media, public opinion, and ultimately elite 
decision-makers and the decisions they make. Finally, the role of organisations 
as communicators might have additional legitimating consequences, for 
example greater trust on the part of the citizens in the content of the 
communication, than if policy-makers are the communicators.  
 
In taking a closer look at the concept of political communication I have 
underlined some of the reasons why EU decision-makers have often framed 
attempts at strengthening legitimate governance as communication exercises. 
However a number of issues are raised regarding how communication operates 
as a mechanism of linkage in practice, and the specific role played by civil 
society in this regard. The empirical investigation of the role played by civil 
society organisations in the Convention and Futurum, which is outlined in the 
following section, can throw light on some of these issues.  
 
 
6.4 Communication in the Convention and the Futurum initiative 
 
 
The notion of communication has, as we have seen, framed recent discourses 
on the contribution of civil society to legitimate EU governance. The 
Commission’s communication strategy, for example, outlines the role played 
by civil society organisations in ‘communicating Europe with the citizens’. The 
literature on political communication in democracies helps explain the ways in 
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which processes of communication can provide democratic linkage between 
citizens and EU institutions, and the role played by intermediary civil society 
organisations in these communicative relationships. The aim of this thesis has 
been to investigate empirically the ways in which civil society - acting in the 
context of the debate initiative – can enhance the legitimacy of EU governance. 
This chapter outlines and assesses the empirical findings within the framework 
of communication, in order to shed light on three key questions: what are the 
opportunities for and the constraints upon communication in the Convention 
and Futurum? Do the organisations involved have the capacity and the 
willingness to create linkage by engaging in communication? What is the 
explanatory value of the concept of communication vis-à-vis the linkage role 
played by civil society in the context of the debate initiative? 
 
The empirical data on communication as a mechanism of democratic linkage 
are drawn largely from the 25 in-depth interviews with officers from civil 
society organisations conducted between January and April 2005. Chapter 3 
outlines in depth the nature of the interviews and the organisations involved but 
to recap briefly, NGOs, think-tanks, trade unions and regional associations 
were interviewed. Many were Brussels-based federations of national member 
organisations. Some were Brussels-based but with no national-level 
membership. Yet others were based at the national level but dealt with EU-
related issues. Though not representative of the breadth and depth of civil 
society in a numerical sense, between them they reflected a wide range of 
perspectives and voices found within civil society. 
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In addition to the interviews with civil society organisations, a further six 
interviews were conducted with Union officials that had been involved in the 
debate initiative. These actors were drawn from the Commission, the Council 
(Secretariat) and the Economic and Social Committee. At the time of the 
interviews (March 2006) two of the Commission representatives were involved 
in the launch of the communication strategy and consequently brought a 
perspective on continued attempts at bringing citizens and institutions closer 
together through debate and the role of civil society organisations. 
 
The interviewees were asked to describe their involvement in the Convention 
and Futurum initiatives. This produced (self-reported) data on the kind of 
activities in which they organisations engaged, the objectives of the 
organisations and their perspectives on whether it had been successful or not. 
They were asked whether they thought the debate initiative had given them 
greater scope to act, to get involved, or whether they felt constrained by the 
requirements of the different initiatives. They were also asked to reflect on the 
role of civil society in helping to make EU governance more legitimate, and 
specifically their own organisation’s contribution to this. The empirical 
findings are summarised below and key points are illustrated by direct 
quotations from the interviews in order to present the perspective of the 
organisation in their own words as far as possible. They are presented 
thematically under several headings: Communication in the Convention and 
Futurum; Reasons for communicating downwards; Perspectives on civil 
society and ‘Communicating Europe with citizens’; and Perspectives on two-
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way communication in the debate on the future of the EU. In the discussion 
that follows I relate the findings back to the three questions outlined above. 
 
Communication in the Convention and Futurum 
Many, if not all of the activities in which the organisations were engaged in the 
Convention and Futurum involved the transmission of information in one way 
or another. However, in order to identify the exact nature of communication in 
this context it is possible to distinguish between different ‘audiences’ or 
‘addressees’ of the communication activities. Communication activities could 
be ‘upward-facing’ in which case the audience would tend to be Convention 
members or other elite decision-makers. Alternatively activities could be 
‘downward-facing’ in which case the audiences might be members (either 
groups or individuals), supporters or citizens as a whole. 
 
In terms of downward-facing communication activities, the most widely-used 
activity involving the transmission of information was the awareness-raising 
campaign. Several of the organisations described such campaigns relating to 
the Convention process, the constitutional treaty itself, or the ratification 
process, which involved preparing information for members – both individuals 
and groups. One of the trade union organisations explained their awareness-
raising role in relation to their membership structures: 
 
We have to inform our members about what happens here in the 
European Union. We do it via our structure; that means the national 
centres. We have to socialise them about European issues and we 
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have to intervene in public debates as we do on the constitution for 
instance. 
Civil society organisation #12, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
The publication of the draft Constitution by the Convention provided an 
impetus for some of the organisations to develop awareness-raising campaigns 
for their members. One of the NGOs that was interviewed was involved in an 
umbrella group for civil society organisations that had launched a campaign to 
encourage civil society organisations to engage with the debate on the future of 
the EU28. This organisation described the information asymmetries they felt 
were apparent between the officers of the organisation based in Brussels and 
the national officers and individual members which provided motivation for 
their involvement in the campaign: 
 
Part of our mission as civil society actors here in Brussels was to 
provide as much connection and as much information to the 
national constituencies as we possibly could because what we 
became aware of was we actually had an awful lot of detailed 
information but we felt our own constituencies, our members at the 
national level didn’t really have this let alone the wider audience 
and people not even in NGOs at the national level…the 
Act4Europe campaign was of civil society aiming to communicate 
Europe to civil society if you like, I mean it’s one thing the 
                                          
28
 Act4Europe is a cam paign of the EU Civil Society Contact  Group which br ings together 
organisat ions from  eight  sectors of civil society – including environment , developm ent , hum an 
r ights, and social sectors. The campaign was launched to encourage m em ber organisat ions at  
the EU, nat ional and regional levels to engage in the debate on the Future of Europe. See the 
cam paign website:  ht tp: / / www.act4europe.org  
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institutions trying to communicate Europe, effectively or not as 
they do, but we felt  we needed to communicate what’s happening 
at the EU level to civil society as well. 
Civil society organisation #3, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
Information campaigns on the constitutional treaty referred to aspects of the 
treaty in general, or specific accounts of how the implementation of different 
parts of the treaty would affect the organisation, its members and supporters, or 
citizens broadly. All of the different types of organisation; whether think-tank, 
NGO, public authority or socio-economic organisation; claimed to use 
awareness-raising campaigns (though not every single organisation interviewed 
used them). Several organisations with national (or regional or local) member 
organisations, particularly NGOs even suggested that this form of 
communication with members was one of their foremost activities. However, 
the prevailing feeling about such campaigns among the organisations seemed 
to be that they were hard work and fraught with difficulties. A range of 
problems were identified by different organisations. One of the regional 
organisations explained how they had hoped to encourage their member 
organisations to organise debates with citizens on issues relating to the debate 
on the future of the EU, but that these had not been as successful as hoped: 
 
The interest and the willingness to organise debates on the 
constitutional treaty [on the part of members] was not as huge as 
we had hoped because it is still considered as difficult and as 
something which citizens will not necessarily attend or care about. 
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Civil society organisation #7, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
Other organisations also found that getting members, supporters and the public 
in general interested in the issues was one of the biggest challenges facing 
awareness-raising initiatives and activities. For one of the NGOs, the 
difficulties were of communicating often complex issues to members: 
 
[The process of raising awareness on the Constitution was difficult] 
because we could not translate these issues into direct concrete 
terms…it is not an issue that has caused a lot of discussion [with 
members] because the level of debate is high, it’s very political. 
Civil society organisation #18, 03.02.05, Paris 
 
And for others, raising awareness on the debate on the future of the EU or more 
specifically the constitutional treaty was not central to the organisation’s core 
concerns:  
 
[The debate on the future of the EU] not a key interest to members, 
it’s something we would be happy to look back at now and again 
but it wasn’t something we’d be devoting a lot of resources to…I 
think it’s also quite important it’s there in a publicly accessible way 
so at least some people will happen upon it even if they’re not 
deliberately looking for it. I think that’s probably the best we can 
hope for. I don’t know if that’s what the Commission aimed for [in 
the case of Futurum] but it’s probably the most realistic. 
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Civil society organisation #4, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
Furthermore, awareness-raising campaigns on the constitutional treaty were not 
completely uncontroversial. One nationally-based organisation believed that 
there were issues of neutrality concerning the content of the information being 
communicated:  
 
Awareness-raising, as we call it propaganda. I don’t necessarily see 
why that term has negative connotations; it’s important people are 
honest about what they do. I don’t think there’s anything like 
objective public information, obviously there are degrees of truth 
and there is some propaganda which is outright distortions of 
empirical reality. But clearly what we or our opponents will put out 
will be selective. 
Civil society organisation #25, 22.04.05, London 
 
As these quotations indicate, the organisations perceived significant difficulties 
associated with awareness-raising which appear to have implications for the 
prospects of establishing genuine two-way dialogue. 
 
Although the majority of the organisations’ activities could in one way or 
another be seen to involve communication, the focus here has been on 
communication downwards. Activities characterised as involving two-way 
downward-facing communication could also be seen in terms of representation: 
as the previous chapter highlighted, several of the organisations engaged in 
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consultations with members in the process of drawing up of positions which 
were then presented to Convention members and Commission officials. 
Viewed in this way there is an overlap between the mechanisms of 
representation and communication. There may also be an overlap between the 
mechanisms of communication and participation. So far the focus has been on 
the activities which involve the exchange of information between the 
organisation and their members or supporters, in other words in a downward 
direction. However, information could also flow horizontally between 
organisations and upwards to the institutions. In this way, many of the 
participation activities outlined in Chapter 4 can be seen as having 
communicative characteristics.  
 
 
Reasons for communicating downwards  
The difficulties associated with awareness-raising campaigns pose the question 
of why the organisations that were interviewed bothered with them. However 
when I asked organisations about the reasons behind their involvement in the 
Convention and Futurum it became clear that the perceived need to inform 
members or citizens about certain issues could in many cases be related back to 
the objective of influencing decision-making as this quotation from an NGO 
illustrates: 
 
We think that if we are not aware of what’s happening around us 
we cannot say that we are part of the future of Europe we want to 
build. We can make the difference only if we are informed and we 
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also develop our own ideas by discussing it with other students. We 
are not linked to any political party but it doesn’t mean that we 
don’t discuss political things like the Constitution…also the reason 
why we debate [is that] we want to know what our members want 
so that we are able to stand for them when it comes to lobbying the 
institutions. 
Civil society organisation #10, 12.01.05, Brussels 
 
Here, awareness-raising was linked to the process of drawing up a position on 
which to lobby the institutions – and in this way resembles activities 
characterised as involving ‘representation’ in the previous chapter. For this 
organisation, two-way communication with members was viewed as crucial to 
developing a position which could then be used to influence the institutions – 
thereby linking communicating with members, and effective lobbying. There 
are similarities here with Kollman’s (1998) research which found that interest 
groups often engaged in ‘outside lobbying’ (i.e. the lobbying of citizens as 
opposed to elite political actors) as a means of influencing decision-makers. 
Campaigns designed to raise awareness on a particular issue among members 
or supporters allowed interest groups to ‘signal’ to decision-makers the large 
amount of public support for a particular issue which in turn made their own 
lobbying more persuasive.  One of the strengths of this organisation was being 
able to signal to the Convention members and the Commission that their 
position arose from, and therefore had the support of, their members. 
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For another NGO, communication with members was also linked to lobbying 
the institutions, but in this case the emphasis was on explaining the importance 
of the EU level to members as well as influencing decision-making:  
 
We have launched a number of information campaigns to our 
members to explain the future of blind and partially sighted citizens 
lies in Europe because 60% of legislation that we have comes from 
Europe. We have a lobby on a number of directives with specific 
relevance to our group of people and we’ve managed to secure 
good results and through these achievements we’re starting to 
convince our people that it is through Brussels, through the EU that 
we can further their case. 
Civil society organisation #18, 03.02.05, Paris 
 
Some of the organisations that were interviewed were not necessarily 
concerned with influencing decision-making in line with the interests of their 
members. For some of the think-tanks, downward-facing communication was 
motivated by a desire to improve the quality of communication on EU-related 
issues as the following two quotations from think-tanks operating in two 
different national contexts illustrate: 
 
We’re non-partisan, we haven’t got an agenda. Our main aim is to 
inform people and encourage and stimulate debate around issues of 
citizenship. We want to arm people with information in order to 
make more informed choices. 
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Civil society organisation #24, 22.04.05, London 
 
It is our goal, our objective not to defend particular interests but to 
draw the limits, the frame of the public debate…one of our main 
objectives is information. There is a lack of information about 
Europe in France and [our] function is to inform French citizens 
about Europe, about European issues and the means to achieve this 
goal is an electronic newsletter. Each week we send to a lot of 
people, 10,000 people a newsletter containing a lot of European 
information. 
Civil society organisation #23, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
Others considered the reasons for engaging in downward-facing 
communication activities in a broader sense. The normative desirability of 
having an informed EU citizenry was apparent to one of the NGOs, an EU-
level Youth federation that identified a link between public support for the EU 
and awareness of EU-related issues on the part of citizens: 
 
I believe that if Europe is to work it will be thanks to people 
knowing what Europe is about. I think you can not like it but at 
least you know what you’re criticising. People don’t like Europe 
because they don’t know what it is about and I understand that 
because it’s very difficult to understand and because the institutions 
are not clear. 
Civil society organisation #9, 12.01.05, Brussels 
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Perspectives on civil society and ‘communicating Europe with citizens’ 
Although all of the organisations that were interviewed maintained some form 
of communication with their members (or supporters or citizens in general), 
opinions were mixed on whether civil society played a ‘role’ in communicating 
with citizens. This think-tank reflected the views of several others in that it was 
sympathetic to the idea that civil society might play a role in ‘communicating 
Europe’, but that this could certainly not be the only strategy: 
 
Relying on civil society to reach out to wider audiences and use the 
people who are actually committed to European integration I think 
is a very good policy, but not only relying on that. 
Civil society organisation #22, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
One of the regional organisations highlighted that playing a communication 
role was, for civil society, only one amongst several roles it played vis-à-vis 
citizens, and in this case, was not the most important role: 
 
[We] work in three ways. The two dominant ones are the policy 
work and project work. And the third is awareness-raising and 
working directly with the citizens. 
Civil society organisation #7, 12.01.05, Brussels 
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Another regional organisation was in a similar position: whilst it was not 
hostile to the notion that civil society should be engaged in communication 
activities, it explained that such activities were certainly not a priority: 
  
We do not have a communication policy directly with the 
population, we are interested in the media when they take into 
account our positions in our negotiations with the Council, the 
Parliament, the Commission…Our member regions are more 
directly involved with the discussions directly with their citizens 
about what they are doing in participating in such an 
organisation…when we have possibilities to have wider 
communication about such a thing we do it of course. 
Civil society organisation #19, 04.02.05, Paris 
 
One organisation explained that, as a think–tank, they were different to other 
civil society organisations in that their audience was only political elites or 
decision-makers. They felt that rather than communicate with citizens, instead 
their role was to be a bridge between academic and policy-makers: 
 
Mass education is not our vocation, it’s not our role. We try to be 
part of the process of explaining to people but in different ways, 
whether we publish papers that are readable by people other than 
experts or organising small events with potential multiplier effects. 
We don’t have the capacity to go and mobilise huge audiences, but 
other organisations can. 
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Civil society organisation #22, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
One of the Union officials appeared to recognise the differences within civil 
society from one type of organisation to another. She explained that the kind of 
organisations that they envisaged getting involved in activities aimed at 
communicating Europe with the citizens would be different to those 
organisations that took part in the Convention debates: 
 
I think in the Convention it was organisations like Greenpeace, 
because they were very active defending ideas about the 
environment. For this next exercise which will be to debate with 
the citizens, it will probably be more organisations dealing with 
experts but not defending ideas or a political point of view – two 
totally different kinds of organisation. 
Union official #4, 28.03.06, Brussels 
 
Interestingly, the view from the institutions was that organisations like NGOs 
were perhaps less suitable and less likely to engage in communication activities 
than think-tanks for example. 
 
Variations in the capacities and the willingness of organisations to engage in 
downward-facing communication activities between the different types of 
organisations were apparent as these quotations indicate. Several organisations 
suggested that, ideally they would like to engage in communication with 
members, citizens and so on. In reality however they felt unable to do so for 
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financial reasons. This NGO made a direct link between downward-facing 
communication activities and funding: 
 
In order for the EU to say “we want civil society to be involved” 
the main question for youth organisations is that they need to be 
funded…that is in direct relation to communication…the EU now 
has a new approach to communication…but there is still a big 
effort to be made in the area of supporting organisations because 
they in the end are the multipliers, they can transmit the message 
that the EU wants so hard to pass to young people, organised young 
people but that in the end will transmit that message to normal 
young people. 
Civil society organisation #5, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
This particular organisation explained that they were heavily dependent on the 
Commission for funding. They estimated that around 80% of their budget came 
from EU funds. Other organisations were also critically aware of the financial 
implications of playing a communication role: 
 
It’s expensive in all meanings of the word, it costs energy, time, it 
is difficult to bring people together. It’s not easy, therefore we ask 
the Commission to provide funding for organisations like [ours] 
because at this stage we are obliged to jump from project to 
project…the Commission wants us to play a stronger role and at 
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the same time we are not offered the conditions to make this 
possible. 
Civil society organisation #16, 14.01.05, Brussels 
 
The important responsibility for the Commission is that it must 
then provide the means which is still not always the case. 
Obviously there is always a financial aspect to things. If it comes to 
more proactive activities there will always be the question “who 
pays for it?” Cities have great budget difficulties and as an 
intermediary you can only spend so much on promoting 
Commission initiatives. 
Civil society organisation #7, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
The second quotation indicates that, from the point of view of the 
organisations, ‘communicating Europe with citizens’ was a job for the 
institutions. One of the trade union organisations that was interviewed shared 
the view that whilst civil society might play a role, the institutions themselves 
played an even more crucial role in raising awareness of EU issues among 
citizens.  
 
I think it’s the job of the Commission to elaborate a communication 
strategy [on the constitutional treaty] and to do something in 
favour. The answer from Mrs Wallström was “we’re not doing 
propaganda”, that I find very strange because they do a lot of, let’s 
call it propaganda or information on the services directive. They 
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have the means, they have the finances and they don’t do much on 
the Constitution. What can the small civil society organisations in 
Europe do? To take one of the biggest, the social NGO platform, 
they have 20 people. The Commission has 20,000. 
Civil society organisation #12, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
The view from the Commission, presented by the Union officials that were 
interviewed for the research, was quite different. Two of the three Commission 
actors that were interviewed were eager to make the point (without being 
prompted) that communicating with citizens – in the context of either Plan D or 
the debate on the future of the EU – should not be viewed as the Commission 
trying to spread ‘propaganda’: 
 
Debate is to be able to hear the voice of everybody, and for 
everybody to be able to say what they think: ‘I like the EU, I hate 
the EU, I am euro-sceptic’. If we were telling people ‘you have to 
love the EU’, this is not a debate, its propaganda. We don’t want 
that we just want everybody to be able to express their voices. Yes 
or no, no problem we just want to know if they are in favour of 
Europe or they are against Europe that’s all. 
Union official #4, 28.03.06, Brussels 
 
By contrast, another Union official, from the Economic and Social Committee, 
recognised that a communication role for civil society organisations might be 
problematic: 
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Most civil society organisations think they have been created to 
promote the interests of their members in a particular field. And 
they have a very straightforward approach to their activities. But 
when you come to two-way communication its very difficult for 
them to commit themselves because they are not prepared for that – 
they don’t have the structure, they don’t have the resources…I’ve 
heard comments from European civil society organisations saying 
“there’s nothing we can do about the constitutional treaty, yes 
we’re in favour but at the national level people don’t know the ins 
and outs of the institutions, the treaties” and so on. 
Union official #5, 28.03.06, Brussels 
 
In comments from both the civil society organisations and the Union officials 
there was evidence of tension between the view that civil society organisations 
should communicate with their members (or supporters or citizens in general) 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the notion that ‘communicating Europe’ 
was a job for the institutions, notably the Commission.  
 
 
Perspectives on two-way communication in the debate on the Future of the 
EU 
Several organisations commented on communication activities in the context of 
the debate on the future of the EU. Some organisations thought that the 
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Convention and Futurum initiatives were not ambitious enough in 
communicating to citizens, as these comments from two organisations indicate:  
 
I think the passive communication [around the Convention] of 
being transparent, having the website, having documents ready, 
having open meetings which work like plenary sessions for 
everyone, all this is good. But the proactive side that you want, the 
reaching out, getting people who don’t have the slightest interest in 
it, getting them involved and getting them interested is very 
difficult. 
Civil society organisation #13, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
Maybe with a look into the future and the ratification process I 
think the Commission has realised that, at least in some countries, 
there needs to be promotion or campaign to reach a high level of 
support and I think that there the Commission will apply other 
measures than a website. 
Civil society organisation #6, 11.01.05, Brussels 
 
According to these organisations, the first comment from a think-tank, the 
second from a trade union, the tools of the Convention and Futurum were not 
sufficient to guarantee effective two-way communication involving civil 
society organisations with citizens and EU institutions. By contrast, other 
organisations felt that the debate initiative was too ambitious in trying to bring 
citizens into the debate: 
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I think that was one of the weaknesses of the ambitions of this 
discussion on the constitution that the Commission thought it could 
involve citizens in general to the debate. Citizens are not really 
interested in how the institutions work, I mean they don’t care if 
there is a President of the Council or if the Council works with 
these rotating presidencies. What they care about is what comes out 
as a result for their life. I think it is quite a bit wishful thinking of 
the Commission at the time that it would be possible to involve 
citizens, [though] of course they have involved with these 
partnerships certain sectors of citizenship. 
Civil society organisation #2, 07.01.05, Brussels 
 
In this view, to aim for two-way communication with citizens was too 
ambitious and unrealistic. As other organisations had observed there was a 
sense that citizens simply would not be interested in the issues with which the 
communication activities aimed to address.  
 
Finally, one of the organisations reflected on the role of communication more 
broadly. Although communicating with citizens was generally accepted to be a 
useful and worthwhile activity, this organisation recognised that 
communication did not always generate support from the public and lead to 
strengthened legitimacy in the ways envisaged by the EU institutions: 
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It is certainly true that more awareness, more public debate doesn’t 
necessarily mean that there would be more public support [for the 
EU institutions and integration]. This is the assumption of most 
people, for example it makes sense to the Commission – but the 
situation in Denmark is rather the opposite. 
Civil society organisation #13, 13.01.05, Brussels 
 
 
6.5 Discussion  
 
 
I return now to the three questions outlined at the beginning of section 6.4: 
what are the opportunities for and the constraints upon communication in the 
Convention and Futurum? Do the organisations involved have the capacity and 
the willingness to create linkage by engaging in communication? What is the 
explanatory value of the concept of communication vis-à-vis the linkage role 
played by civil society in the context of the debate initiative? As section 6.2 
outlined, the Commission’s 2006 communication strategy was motivated by 
many of the same concerns that motivated the debate on the future of the EU. 
The empirical investigation of civil society organisations involved in the 
Futurum and Convention debates highlights several issues relevant to the 
communication strategy which are also discussed below. 
 
The responses of the civil society organisations in the interviews highlight that 
the way in which the debate initiative was organised had implications for the 
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nature of communication in the Convention and Futurum. By adopting a broad 
definition of civil society, the Laeken declaration and governance white paper 
could not take into account the differences between organisations which 
affected their capacity and willingness to engage in communication activities. 
Furthermore, the reform discourses were naturally vague on details, leaving 
scope for different interpretations on the part of the different actors of what 
communication involved. Finally, the presence or absence of EU funding for 
civil society organisations had implications for communication activities and 
their contribution to legitimate governance. 
 
The notion of civil society, as conceptualised in both the Laeken declaration 
and the governance white paper is significant and has implications for the way 
in which communication operates as a process and an activity in the debates. In 
the debate discourses, the type of organisations included in ‘civil society’ is 
defined in broad terms. This can be seen as part of the effort to make the debate 
inclusive and to involve as wide a range of participants as possible. However, 
by adopting a broad definition there is very little acknowledgement of the 
many and significant differences that exist between the organisations that 
belong to civil society. In turn these differences have implications for the 
capacity of organisations to engage in (particularly downward-facing) 
communication activities, and for their willingness to do so. For example, the 
Futurum initiative required all organisations wishing to become ‘partners’ to 
devote a page on their own websites to the debate on the future of the EU and 
link this page to the Futurum website so that individual members could access 
Futurum via their organisation’s website. Although one of the regional 
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organisations thought this could be a useful way of communicating with 
citizens who happened to be using their website, some of the NGOs doubted 
whether the content of the websites would be interesting to or used by their 
members. 
 
The communication strategy, like the debate initiative, tends to address ‘civil 
society’ as a whole as though it were an homogenous entity. However in ‘Plan 
D’, the Commission acknowledged the relevance of ‘going local’, or 
mobilising local and national in addition to EU-level organisations. This 
implies an understanding of the unique capacities of civil society organisations 
operating at a national or local, rather than a Brussels level in communicating 
with citizens.  
 
The Laeken declaration set out the parameters of the Convention debates and 
the Futurum initiative was defined in part by the Commission’s communication 
on ‘Certain arrangements for the debate on the future of the EU’ (European 
Commission 2001b). By its very nature, the Laeken declaration was vague and 
did not go into details of the exact ‘role’ that civil society organisations would 
play. It made reference to a ‘Forum’ for civil society but gave no indication of 
what form this would take. The precise role played by civil society therefore 
became a matter of interpretation on the part of the secretariat of the 
Convention which had the responsibility for transforming the spirit of Laeken 
into concrete results, and the organisations themselves. Although the 
Commission’s document on arrangements for the debate went into more detail 
there was still a sense of confusion among the organisations that were 
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interviewed about how communication between civil society organisations, the 
Commission and ordinary citizens could be facilitated through Futurum. 
 
The communication strategy has been accused of lacking focus (Sain ley Berry 
2005). For example, Plan D called for a debate, but the uncertainty that 
surrounded the future of the constitutional treaty meant that it was not entirely 
clear what exactly should be debated. The communication white paper made 
much of the need to listen to citizens, but it is unclear what citizens will 
actually be saying, or whether they will be saying anything at all. Furthermore, 
the white paper is based on the assumption that it is not the EU per se that 
people have a problem with, but rather the way it has been communicated. 
However this rests upon an assumption that as people develop a greater 
understanding of the EU they will become more supportive and trustful of it, 
despite some empirical evidence to the contrary29. 
 
The comments made by the organisations interviewed highlights that the issue 
of funding might in part govern the extent to which organisations engage in 
downward-facing communication activities. Most of the organisations that 
were interviewed were in receipt of funding from the Union budget, and 
several argued that if there were going to engage in activities designed to 
‘communicate Europe with citizens’ they ought to be funded for doing so. One 
of the organisations that did not receive funding from the Union budget 
claimed that the availability of Union funding for groups resulted in numerous 
                                          
29
 The ‘cognit ive m obilisat ion’ thesis claim s that  public support  for integrat ion is posit ively 
correlated with knowledge about  the EU and integrat ion ( I nglehart  1970) . However, Gabel’s 
(1998)  research called into quest ion the extent  to which this st ill holds in the EU, cit ing factors 
such as lack of empir ical evidence to support  the thesis, potent ial intervening var iables such 
as educat ion or date of accession, and the superior ity of other explanat ions. See also McLaren 
(2002)  
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civil society organisations based in Brussels motivated by the prospect of 
financial gain. Arguably this is a largely unjustified picture of a mercenary 
Brussels-based civil society but it does pose the question of whether Union 
funds ought to support communication activities and if so whether such 
funding is compatible with strengthening legitimacy. If civil society 
organisations are being enlisted precisely because they are independent from 
the institutions, their receipt of Union funds to engage in projects aimed at 
increasing awareness of the value-added of the EU might undermine this. The 
flip-side of this, which was pointed out by several organisations in receipt of 
financial support from the Union budget, is that if the institutions are placing 
part of the responsibility for implementing the proposals with civil society they 
must match this with resources.  
 
There results a paradoxical situation in which the effectiveness of 
organisations’ participation, representation and communication roles might be 
compromised by the fact that they receive funding from the EU budget. 
Messages coming from civil society organisations might be undermined if they 
are seen to be influenced by the fact that the organisation receives funding 
from the EU budget. However if the organisation is not communicating the 
official ‘message’ of the EU it calls into question the appropriateness of it 
being in receipt of public funds to promote its own interest. Clearly the issue is 
complex but understanding civil society involves understanding the financial 
situation of the organisations that are targeted by the debate and 
communication reforms. Understanding this would allow the Union to develop 
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a more realistic and informed approach to funding driven by the needs and 
requirements of the recipients as well as by the institutions’ protocol.  
 
Issues of funding are not fully resolved in the communication strategy. There is 
no suggestion that the Commission expects civil society organisations to 
promote the value added of the EU without any financial assistance. Rather, 
Plan D makes provision for funding for organisations that will organise debates 
with members of the public. However, there is the issue of whether the 
requirements of the co-financing principle30 would preclude organisations with 
the potential to engage in communication activities from receiving funding. 
Ultimately co-financing means that larger organisations with alternate sources 
of funding, or staff time that can be devoted to the project, and organisations 
which are able to conduct their activities in multiple member states, will be the 
most likely to be successful in their applications. Whether these organisations 
are the ones who will have the connection with ‘ordinary citizens’ that are 
necessary for facilitating their participation in debates, and whether this is 
compatible with the need to connect by ‘going local’ which is one of the 
‘strategic principles’ outlined in the 2005 action plan (2005a:3-4) are other 
questions.  
 
The rules that governed the debate on the future of the EU evidently had 
implications for the nature of communication within the Convention and 
                                          
30
 The co- financing pr inciple states that  the Union does not  finance projects up to 100%  (only 
projects taking place outside the EU have the possibilit y to be financed in full) .  A call for 
proposals related to Plan D st ipulated that  Union funds m ust  account  for no m ore than 70%  of 
the total project  costs. The remaining 30%  had to be secured from  elsewhere (and could 
include working hours devoted to the project )  because ‘comm unity cont r ibut ions are m eant  to 
facilitate the implem entat ion of a project  which could not  otherwise be implem ented easily 
without  the support  of the European Union’ (European Comm ission 2006b: 2) . 
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Futurum initiative, but so too did the characteristics of the organisations 
involved – specifically the extent to which they were capable of engaging in 
communication activities, and their willingness to do so. Different 
organisations had differing ideas about what their own role and the role of civil 
society in communicating with citizens was and ought to be. Furthermore, 
there were differences in the internal characteristics of the organisations which 
made some organisations better able to communicate with citizens than others. 
However, it also became apparent that both the capacities and the willingness 
of organisations to communicate could be transformed over time. 
 
The comments made by the organisations exposed differences in opinions 
about the role of civil society in communication activities. Several of the 
NGOs thought that awareness-raising campaigns were crucial to their work. 
One NGO believed that trade unions ought to do more to communicate with 
citizens as their membership structures gave them access to large numbers of 
citizens. One of the think-tanks thought it was important for them to raise 
awareness of EU issues among citizens whilst for another this was not a 
priority at all. Differing opinions on the role of civil society in communicating 
with citizens corresponded to differences in the extent to which organisations 
were willing to engage in communication activities. Overall there appeared to 
be consensus on the normative desirability of communicating with citizens 
about the future of the EU was desirable, but not on the role of civil society 
therein. 
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The capacity of the organisations that were interviewed to engage in 
communication activities also varied. To a certain extent the varying capacities 
were related to the type of organisation. For example, the NGOs were mostly 
Brussels-based federations of national organisations and therefore had potential 
downward-facing linkages through their membership structures (even if they 
were not always utilised). By contrast, the think-tanks did not always have 
individual or even group members and so their downward-facing interactions 
were not always as easily identifiable. 
 
As discussed above both the capacity and the willingness of organisations to 
engage in communication activities were related to issues of funding. The 
discussion of funding in turn highlights the potential for a transformation in the 
capacities and the willingness of organisations to engage in communication 
activities. A call for projects to receive funding under the Commission’s Plan 
D resulted in a successful bid for one of the think-tanks interviewed in this 
research. The organisation in question had, during the interviews, explained 
how they were not in a position to organise events with citizens, instead using 
multipliers such as the media, and how they preferred to direct their 
communication activities upwards towards decision-makers. They did however 
acknowledge that the extent to which they might play a communication role 
could change, and indeed already had done as a result of new technologies and 
working methods: 
 
If there hadn’t been the internet perhaps this organisation would 
have remained networking and influencing decision-makers. But 
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the internet obviously reaches out to a much wider public so that 
gives you another mission and that mission is also to think about 
saying and presenting things in a simple way so that not only a 
decision-maker but everyone who comes to the website can 
actually read a study that we do. 
Civil society organisation #22, 24.02.05, Paris 
 
Investigating linkage within the framework of communication has turned 
empirical and analytical attention towards several important issues. 
Organisations seemed to view communication activities in terms of a role they 
were assigned by the institutions, notably the Commission. This turned 
attention towards issues of funding, with implications for a discussion of 
legitimacy. 
 
The normative arguments relating to communication and legitimacy suggest 
that for communication to enhance legitimacy the audience and addressees 
ought to be the citizens. The empirical investigation found that ‘the citizens’ 
could comprise a range of actors. They could include national members of 
European-level organisations, and in turn their individual members; it could 
also include supporters of the organisation with a more informal relationship to 
the organisation itself. Beyond this, European and/or national publics might 
comprise the citizens. The audience for much of the communication activities 
taking place within the debate on the future of the EU was various subsets of 
the citizens via ‘downward-facing’ processes of communication. Audiences of 
other organisations or political elites appeared to be far less predominant. 
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The analysis of the concept of political communication, in addition to the 
empirical findings, demonstrates the overlap between communication on the 
one hand, and participation and representation on the other. Many activities 
otherwise defined as involving representation or participation can also be seen 
in terms of their communicative characteristics, which poses the question of 
whether communication as a concept is too broad to be useful.  
 
Communication could be seen as a new framework for looking at the activities 
of civil society organisations vis-à-vis citizens – which reflects a more 
democratic, input-oriented, two-way relationship. Furthermore, though there 
may be similar features or significant overlap, the extent to which an activity is 
‘communication’, ‘representation’ or ‘participation’ may depend on what the 
actors involved define it as. 
 
  
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
Civil Society and democratic linkage in the debate on the future 
of the EU: Implications for the democratic legitimacy of EU 
governance  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
The motivation for this investigation came from the rhetoric on ‘bringing 
citizens and EU institutions closer together’ which was a defining feature of the 
debate on the future of the EU. The perceived need for citizens and institutions 
to be brought closer does not literally mean increasing the proximity between 
citizens and institutions – although it is related to the principle of subsidiarity 
(whereby decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level of government). 
Rather, the ‘distance’ between citizens and EU institutions is understood here 
as a weakness or absence of democratic linkage. The need to strengthen 
linkages between citizens and EU institutions in turn enhances the legitimacy 
of EU governance. 
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In the aftermath of the Maastricht ratification process, academic and political 
commentators alike described a ‘legitimacy crisis’ from which the EU was said 
to suffer. Successive reforms since the Maastricht treaty sought to address this 
crisis of legitimacy, and the post-Nice process of reform was one of the most 
explicit and visible. The reform was couched in a broader initiative focused on 
the notion of having a ‘debate on the future of the EU’.  
 
Of course, the EU is not the only political system in the world to be facing (or 
to have ever faced) a crisis of legitimacy. The weakness of linkages between 
the governing and the governed has been a cause for concern for democratic 
political systems globally. In this respect my investigation has explored a 
problem with broader relevance beyond the EU context. Nevertheless, there are 
distinctive elements to the EU’s legitimacy crisis. Compared with national 
political systems there is a ‘double distance’ between EU institutions and 
citizens. The absence of an EU-wide demos has made connecting with citizens 
problematic (see Chryssochoou 1997, Weiler 1999). Furthermore, the 
weakness of representative democracy structures compared with national 
political systems hinders traditional modes of linkage between citizens and 
political institutions. 
 
In addition, the ways in which the EU institutions have attempted to address 
the perceived legitimacy problems by strengthening democratic linkage are 
interesting and bear further scrutiny. As we have seen, the rhetoric is heavy 
with references to the importance of involving civil society in the debates about 
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the EU’s future. But paying attention only to the rhetoric does not enhance our 
understanding of legitimacy in the EU. The objective here has been to take a 
closer look at some of the ways in which legitimacy issues have been 
addressed through the mechanisms of participation, representation and 
communication. 
 
In the following sections I summarise the findings of the chapters on debate; 
civil society; participation; representation and communication. In each case I 
consider the implications of these findings for the input-oriented and output-
oriented legitimacy of EU governance. Finally, I reflect on some of the 
normative implications of this empirical research and draw some concluding 
remarks on the contribution of this investigation to understandings of civil 
society and legitimate EU governance. 
 
 
7.2 Debate, democratic linkage and legitimacy 
 
 
In this investigation a distinction has been made between the notion of ‘debate’ 
as an idea or set of ideas on the one hand and the partial implementation of 
these ideas in the ‘debate on the future of the EU’ initiative on the other. The 
idea of debate is logically consistent with key components of the deliberative 
democracy literature – this views discussion (in other words ‘deliberation’ or 
‘debate’) as a key component of democratic decision-making. Indeed, theories 
of deliberative democracy have been employed here to help understand and 
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explain why the notion of debate was so prominent in the reform discourses 
and the ways in which debate could strengthen legitimate governance.  
 
One of the legitimating features of debate, as highlighted by the deliberative 
democracy literature, is that by nature, it involves multiple participants. The 
reform discourses made much of the need for a debate involving all the 
interested parties, as though to break with previous cases of treaty reform 
which, by tradition, have involved a relatively small and closed group of 
actors. By framing the reform agenda as a debate the institutions could be seen 
to be opening the discussion about the EU’s future to a much broader range of 
participants than had been the case in the past, and signalled that discussing the 
future direction and nature of EU politics and integration was a matter for all 
EU citizens, not only political elites. 
 
Another important aspect of the deliberative literature in this context is its 
treatment of legitimacy. Although the literature is far from unified, most 
deliberative theorists agree that political decisions are legitimate to the extent 
that they are the outcome of free, reasoned discussion (or deliberation). The 
idea that, by having a debate on the EU’s future, a consensus could be reached 
on the future direction and nature of integration, and that this consensus could 
be invested with the legitimacy of having been arrived at through an open 
process of discussion, was arguably very tempting for the institutions 
 
For these reasons, ‘debate’ is an attractive notion for politicians both in terms 
of seeking to address difficult questions and as a way of being seen to get 
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citizens involved. Since the December 2000 Nice Intergovernmental 
Conference the notion of debate permeated the EU’s reform agenda. The 
aftermath of the Nice IGC, notably the suggestion that the EU needed to find a 
new way of doing things can be seen as providing a window of opportunity for 
modes of decision based upon or at least preceded by debate. The Laeken 
declaration cemented this commitment to debate and institutionalised it in the 
Convention on the Future of the EU – an approximation of a deliberative 
forum. In addition the 2001 governance white paper stated the belief of the 
Commission that democracy depends on being able to take part in debate. 
 
However, there was some evidence of a discrepancy between the reform 
rhetoric on the importance of having a ‘public debate’ and how the institutional 
arrangements were made on the ground. Several of the civil society 
organisations that were interviewed expressed their disappointment that the 
measures put in place to facilitate their involvement in the debate amounted to 
little more than a website. There was a sense, expressed by one organisation, 
that the Forum had a marginalising effect, taking them away rather than 
bringing them closer to the Convention members. The institutional actors, for 
their part, were frustrated that the contributions of some of the civil society 
organisations to the debate – notably in the civil society plenary session of the 
Convention – lacked substance and told the Convention members nothing new. 
 
The source of some of the discrepancies can be seen in the way the ideas were 
translated into concrete actions. The Laeken declaration which called for civil 
society involvement, was written by the Belgian Presidency – in other words 
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Belgian civil servants - during the latter half of 2001. However the task of 
implementing the declaration fell to the secretariat of the Convention with no 
guidance from the individuals that had drafted the document on how to 
interpret the often vague and imprecise proposals. In this context, the 
institutional actors involved in the Convention and Futurum initiatives 
described the trade-offs between participation and efficiency they were faced 
with when designing the tools that would facilitate civil society involvement in 
discussions. Furthermore, the Union officials admitted that some of the 
measures taken to broaden the Convention debates were put into place for the 
primary reason of ‘keeping people happy’. Another consequence was that the 
lack of clear guidance afforded the Commission a degree of autonomy in 
designing tools of the Convention Forum and Futurum, and acted as an 
entrepreneur in carving out a role for itself in this respect.  
 
Despite the problems experienced as a result of trying to implement the notion 
of debate into effective institutional structures, it was the sense of most of the 
Union officials and civil society actors that were interviewed, that the process 
of drafting the constitutional treaty was preferable to previous treaty-drafting 
processes. Most of the organisations acknowledged that there had been an 
improvement in the opportunities open to them for getting involved in the 
reform process. In addition, Union officials agreed that it was a good thing for 
civil society to be involved in discussions about the EU’s future, and agreed 
that citizens and EU institutions ought to be brought closer together, though it 
is fairly inconceivable that they might openly disagree with this.  
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In parallel to the development of debate in political discourses, an academic 
discourse on deliberation has emerged over two decades. It has been argued 
that in recent years, the study of the EU has taken a ‘deliberative turn’. In the 
EU context, deliberative democracy can be seen as an idea whose time has 
come, and offers a useful explanatory framework for understanding the 
popularity of the notion of debate within EU treaty reform discourses. This 
analysis of the notion of debate and its legitimating potential, and the 
examination of some of the deliberative ideas found within the debate initiative 
can be seen as a contribution to this study agenda. One of the latest 
developments in this agenda appears to be a hope on the part of some 
academics (Risse & Kleine 2007) that the outcomes of the 2005 referenda in 
France and The Netherlands do not lead to a backlash against the Convention 
method and deliberative processes more generally as means of making 
decisions. 
 
Despite the ratification problems surrounding the constitutional treaty, ‘debate’ 
has proved to be a resilient concept and this makes a more significant 
conclusion about debate than the outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda. 
The response of the Commission to the referenda was to propose ‘Plan D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’ – based on the assumption that in the midst 
of uncertainty about the EU’s future it is important for the institutions to find 
out what citizens think about and want from the EU, all of which sounds very 
familiar. Debate therefore continues to define attempts on the part of the 
institutions to connect with citizens. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that future 
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processes of treaty reform would return to the closed intergovernmental 
process of Nice. Instead, debates about the EU’s future look likely to continue. 
 
 
7.3 Civil society, democratic linkage and legitimacy 
 
 
The involvement of civil society organisations in the debate initiative was 
characterised simultaneously by both continuity and change. Change can be 
seen in the widespread tendency to refer to the role of ‘civil society’ which has 
been a relatively recent development at the EU level (in the context of the 
broader integration process). Furthermore, the involvement of organisations 
which are seen to make up civil society at the EU level in constitutional (i.e. 
treaty reform) processes as opposed to policy-making processes represents 
change. However, there is a degree of continuity in terms of the similarities 
with existing processes of interest representation and in terms of the 
perspectives of the organisations involved on their own role in the debates 
compared with their other (‘non-debate’) activities. In the context of such 
continuity and change the perspectives of the organisations themselves 
highlight discrepancies between the role for civil society in linking citizens and 
EU institutions as outlined in the rhetoric and the capacities and willingness of 
individual organisations to play such a role. The absence of clarity in the 
rhetoric on what exactly this role should be is only partly overcome by this 
investigation and important questions remain. 
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Stating the important role played by civil society in helping to bring citizens 
and EU institutions closer together is a relatively recent phenomena. In this 
sense there has been a change, a break with the past even, in the terminology 
used to describe the actors involved and the processes they are meant to be 
involved in. In the past, associations were generally referred to as ‘organised 
interests’ or ‘interest groups’ and the processes in which they were involved 
were those of ‘interest representation’. Since around 2001, reference to the 
same associations in official documents has tended to use the term ‘civil 
society’ or ‘civil society organisations’. Smismans (2006) documents this 
change in terminology from interest groups, to special interests to civil society 
which, he points out, was pushed by the Economic and Social Committee. The 
Committee saw an opportunity enhance its own role in the context of an 
increasing concern with legitimate governance, re-naming ‘interest groups’ 
(with all their connotations of special or privileged interests) as ‘civil society 
organisations’ (a term more consistent with democracy and openness). The use 
of the term ‘civil society’ was subsequently adopted by the Commission and 
incorporated into the 2001 governance white paper, which secured the 
prominence of the term in the reform discourse of the institutions and the link 
with legitimate governance. 
 
In academic terms, a parallel shift in terminology has occurred, highlighted by 
Greenwood’s 2003 book ‘Interest Representation in the EU’, an updated 
version his 1997 work ‘Representing interests in the EU’. In the second chapter 
of the 2003 work Greenwood begins to refer to the different organised interests 
collectively as ‘civil society’, whereas this phrase was not used in the earlier 
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volume, despite the fact that he is looking at the same ‘interests’ or 
‘organisations’. In the 2007 edition, there is an even more explicit emphasis on 
the contribution of these organisations to democratic legitimacy. 
 
This change in terminology should be seen as a deliberate attempt to establish a 
role for these organisations in strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU – in terms of inputs as well as outputs. The review of the interest 
representation literature in Chapter 3 found that there is increasing empirical 
evidence, at national and EU level, which suggests that processes of ‘interest 
representation’ may undermine rather than enhance democracy. By contrast, 
the language of ‘civil society’ implies an open, bottom-up, democratic process.  
 
Nevertheless there’s nothing particularly new about the involvement of these 
so-called civil society organisations in processes of EU decision-making. In the 
case of the organisations interviewed however there appeared to be rather more 
continuity than change – in many ways there was simply a continuation of 
processes of interest representation. For most of the organisations interviewed 
getting involved in the debate initiative tended not to involve anything different 
to what they would otherwise be doing. Although there were some new 
structures, specifically the websites, contributions to these were often 
supplemented by more ‘tried and tested’ methods – namely going directly to 
individual decision-makers. So there was a great deal of similarity with 
processes of interest representation in terms of the activities used. Furthermore, 
the objectives of the organisations were broadly similar – namely, to influence 
decision-making or in other words, outcomes. As one of the trade unions put it; 
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they were not interested in taking part in a debate, they wanted to influence the 
Convention members. Other organisations were more sympathetic to the notion 
of debating for debate’s sake, but were nevertheless still focused on influencing 
outcomes. 
 
There was a degree of change rather than continuity in terms of the arena 
within which these organisations were involved. In the context of interest 
representation in the EU, the involvement of these organisations had tended to 
be limited to the policy-making process. However, the Laeken declaration 
formalised the involvement of civil society organisations in processes of treaty 
reform and constitution-making. For most of the organisations interviewed this 
was the first time they had been involved in a constitution-making as opposed 
to a policy-making arena. Some of the organisations acknowledged the 
‘newness’ of their situation. The main difference reported by the organisations 
was that the issues under discussion tended to be broader than those that the 
organisations would otherwise tend to work around.  
 
Other organisations claimed that their involvement in the debates was not 
hugely different to their everyday policy work. However one institutional actor 
suggested that because the nature of the issues was more ‘high-level’ than the 
organisations were used to it made their contributions less useful. He claimed 
that in the civil society plenary session of the Convention the spokespeople of 
the organisations tended to speak in declaratory language, making vague 
statements about the future of Europe rather than concrete suggestions of what 
should be discussed. Organisations acknowledged that this tended to be the 
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way at the start but claimed that as the debates progressed they got involved in 
more detail and in this way there were more similarities with policy-making 
process. 
 
All of the organisations interviewed had been involved in EU politics before 
their involvement in the debate initiative. Indeed, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether opening up access to the debate initiative encouraged 
organisations with no prior record of engagement with the EU institutions to 
get involved.  Furthermore, in the interviews most of the organisations thought 
that their involvement in the debate initiatives did not differ in a significant 
sense from their non-debate related interactions with EU institutions and many 
compared their activities in the Convention and Futurum initiatives with 
previous initiatives or other policy areas.  
 
The qualitative interviews with civil society organisations and Union officials 
highlighted some differing perspectives about the role played by these 
organisations in the debate initiative. It also exposed discrepancies between 
what the rhetoric infers about the contribution of civil society to legitimate 
governance (bringing closer) and the self-reported capacity and willingness of 
civil society organisations to perform this role. In particular it provides 
evidence that the internal structures of many organisations that are active at the 
EU level are inadequate for maintaining interactions ‘downwards’ with citizens 
– whether individual members, supporters or the public in general. There was 
also evidence of an absence of willingness to improve downward-facing 
structures or interactions with citizens. For most of the organisations their 
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priority was to engage with elite actors – Commissioners, MEPs and so on – 
that is precisely why they are based in Brussels.  
 
However there was some evidence to suggest the possibility of a 
transformation in the capacities and the willingness of organisations to focus 
on their downward-facing relationships. One of the think-tanks when 
interviewed claimed not to have the capacity to engage with citizens, instead 
addressing their message at the media as ‘multipliers’. Yet the same 
organisation was subsequently awarded funding under the Commission’s Plan 
D programme to organise debates with members of the public. This example 
suggests that there is potential for effective downward-facing relationships on 
the part of civil society organisations to become a pre-requisite for whether an 
organisation gains ‘insider status’ with the Commission. Because the majority 
of the organisations are motivated largely by the prospect of gaining access to 
the Commission, if the Commission made access dependent on organising 
debates with citizens, perhaps more organisations would organise debates. 
 
Nevertheless, whether the general tendency towards not maintaining 
downward-facing interactions fatally compromises the capacity of 
organisations to perform a linkage role and undermines the extent to which 
they can enhance input-oriented legitimacy is unclear. The representation of 
interests found within society as a whole during agenda-setting or decision-
shaping stages can be seen as bringing in genuine preferences of citizens. This 
also raises the question of whether the distinction between input and output 
legitimacy which can be made so clearly in an analytical sense, is actually so 
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apparent in practice. Even so, whether strengthened input legitimacy is 
necessary in order for citizens and institutions to be brought closer together is 
another question. It is clear that civil society organisations cannot solve the 
EU’s legitimacy problems single-handedly. They can however make a 
contribution and perhaps this contribution will tend to contribute more to 
output rather than input legitimacy.  
 
Assessing the contribution made by civil society actors to strengthening 
legitimate governance in the EU through linkage has been made difficult by 
confusion over what their role is or should be according to the rhetoric of the 
institutions. Of course, the discourses of the Laeken declaration and even the 
white paper on governance were all about establishing principles rather than 
hammering out details. However, because much of the discussion on the 
contribution of civil society to legitimate governance in the EU still rests on a 
number of highly contested concepts there is a danger of the importance of 
civil society organisations being confined to the rhetoric rather than 
implemented in a feasible and appropriate manner. Nevertheless, an analysis 
guided by these concepts goes some way in identifying what is a feasible and 
appropriate role for civil society in contributing to democratic legitimacy in the 
EU.  
 
 
7.4 Investigating democratic linkage  
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The notion of democratic linkage has guided this investigation of the 
contribution made by civil society organisations to legitimate governance in the 
EU. As outlined in the introductory chapter, the theme of democratic linkage 
has characterised recent reform agendas – namely, in their call for the citizens 
and EU institutions to be brought closer together. ‘Bringing closer’ can be seen 
as a euphemism for strengthening the bonds, or the linkages between 
institutions (the governing) and citizens (the governed).  
 
In this investigation the focus has been on democratic linkage outside these 
formal representative democracy structures. Civil society can be seen as an 
arena within which the linkages between citizens and political institutions can 
be strengthened, and the organisations that populate this space can play a role 
in facilitating linkage. The reform discourses suggest that the EU institutions 
subscribe to the view that civil society organisations act as agents of 
democratic linkage, or in the words of one Union official: 
 
Civil society organisations are a key actor, they are a link between 
the EU institutions and the citizens because all the citizens are part 
of organisations, everybody has got the social security for example. 
So at least we are sure to inform the citizens if we touch the 
organisations 
Union official #4, 28.03.06, Brussels 
 
The intention here has not been to measure how closely citizens and EU 
institutions are linked but instead to investigate the ways in which they are 
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linked or brought closer together. This has been done by considering various 
‘mechanisms’ of linkage. Three mechanisms of linkage have been identified 
here which correspond to roles played by civil society in democratic political 
systems – they are not an exhaustive list of the roles played by civil society, but 
instead are three different ways of looking at the role of civil society in 
democracies. These three mechanisms of linkage are concepts which can help 
explain the contribution of civil society organisations to enhancing legitimate 
governance in the EU and help guide the empirical analysis of the role of these 
organisations in the debate initiative.  
 
 The concepts of participation, representation and communication help describe 
and explain different ways in which linkage may occur and have been vital in 
moving from questions about the rhetoric on ‘bringing closer’ to studying 
empirically how this actually works. Characteristically, the rhetoric on 
‘bringing EU citizens and institutions closer together’ didn’t expand on the 
precise ways in which such greater proximity would be achieved. But 
operationalising linkage as participation, representation and communication 
makes it more concrete. Participation refers to the taking part of individual 
citizens and groups in the debates; Representation is about the ‘making 
present’ of citizens and/or their interests by organised civil society in the 
debates; Communication is the sending of messages by organised civil society 
to EU institutions and citizens. 
 
As concepts, participation, representation and communication help to explain 
how citizens and EU institutions may be brought closer together, with 
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reference to principles of normative democratic theory. Empirically they help 
characterise and categorise aspects of civil society’s role vis-à-vis citizens and 
the EU institutions. They emphasise that ‘linkage’ as performed by civil 
society organisations in the context of the debate initiative involves various 
activities each with different objectives. They highlight variations in the 
capacities and the willingness of the different organisations to provide linkage. 
And they expose the different opportunities for and constraints upon the 
behaviour of organisations by the rules and requirements of the debate 
initiative. It is important to remember that participation, representation and 
communication may overlap in both a conceptual and an empirical sense. 
 
In the following subsections I review the findings of Chapters 4-6. I also return 
to the initial question on how linkage through participation, representation and 
communication might improve the input legitimacy, and the output legitimacy 
of EU governance: here the empirical investigation found strengths and 
limitations. 
 
 
7.4.1 Participation  
 
Participation facilitates democratic linkage by involving citizens in decision-
making processes and in doing so can enhance both input and output 
legitimacy. In the view of the institutions, participation means bringing 
multiple perspectives into the discussions on the future of the EU, and indeed 
being seen to do so. For the organisations interviewed, participation was 
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viewed as an opportunity for them to lobby decision-makers. Whilst these are 
not necessarily conflicting aims, they have differing implications for whether 
participation strengthens input or output legitimacy arguments. 
 
The Convention and Futurum offered opportunities for participation to a 
greater degree than previous processes of treaty reform had, and the 
organisations interviewed were understandably very supportive of this. 
Information on the contributions to the respective websites indicates that a 
significant number and range of organisations were involved in both the 
Convention and the Futurum discussions. Web technologies thus allowed a 
wide range of preferences to be brought into the discussions and a tool for 
managing them in a way that didn’t undermine the efficient functioning of the 
Convention debates. In this way, a wide variety of perspectives from 
throughout civil society were fed into the formal discussions on the EU’s future 
and the drafting of the constitutional treaty. Input legitimacy can therefore be 
seen to have been strengthened by the participation of multiple organisations in 
the discussions preceding treaty reform. However in the view of the 
organisations interviewed, the reliance on web technologies did not provide an 
opportunity for the kind of direct participation through face-to-face contact 
with decision-makers. 
 
Participation in the Convention and Futurum was the domain of organisations 
rather than individual citizens. Furthermore, in very few cases did the 
participation of the organisation filter down to the members or supporters of 
the organisation, or the public in general. Only a handful of the organisations 
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that were interviewed outlined ways in which they attempted to facilitate the 
participation of citizens in their activities with respect to the debate initiative. 
As intermediary organisations the civil society actors interviewed for this 
research had strong connections ‘upwards’ to decision-makers – the 
institutional actors. However their connections ‘downwards’ to citizens were 
often weak. Several of the organisations interviewed were ‘umbrella’ or federal 
organisations and were therefore removed from individual members (where 
these even existed) or supporters by several ‘levels’ (national, regional and so 
on). Therefore the extent to which the organisations involved in the debates 
were imbued with the characteristics that would enable them to act as proxies 
for citizens on the whole, as suggested by the theoretical treatment of civil 
society, is questionable. There were, therefore limitations in the extent to which 
participation strengthened input-oriented legitimacy arguments. 
 
Nevertheless the research highlights that output legitimacy could be 
strengthened as a result of the participation of civil society organisations. By 
participating, organisations hoped to influence the outcomes of the discussions, 
resulting in a constitutional treaty that would be beneficial to ordinary citizens 
even though they hadn’t actively participated themselves. Some of the 
interviewees were aware of the problems associated with claiming credit for 
this or that particular article in the constitutional treaty but there was a sense 
that a better document was created as a result of their participation in the 
debates than would have been done without their participation. Indeed the 
ultimate raison d’etre of many of the organisations interviewed was to 
influence the outcomes of the debates – a subtle difference in emphasis from 
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bringing a contribution in to the discussions to securing something out of the 
discussions. 
 
The concept of participation invites reflection on the actors involved in the 
debates – or in other words who is doing the participation. This in turn has 
implications for whether participation contributes to a strengthening of input-
oriented and/or output-oriented legitimacy arguments. Again, the trade-off 
between participation and efficiency outlined by Dahl is heavily apparent. The 
commitment to the participation of ‘the citizen’ in the rhetoric was translated 
into the participation of civil society organisations in implementation, with 
citizenship framed in terms of ‘organised’ (or ‘elite’) as opposed to ‘individual’ 
citizens. Whilst the rhetoric made much of opening the debate to all citizens, in 
fact only a minority of elite citizens actually took part. Furthermore their 
contributions were confined to a limited number of outlets – the Forum, the 
civil society plenary and so on, presumably to avoid civil society interests 
undermining the efficient functioning of the Convention. Elite as opposed to 
mass participation need not necessarily undermine input legitimacy, but in 
practise it shifts the emphasis of the contribution of civil society from what 
they bring in to the debate to how they affect what comes out of it. 
 
 
7.4.2 Representation  
 
Linkage occurs through representation as a result of the voice, interests, 
preferences and so on of the people being ‘made present’ in some way in the 
Civil society, democrat ic legit im acy, dem ocrat ic linkage and debate 277 
 
decision-making process. Although the reform discourses make little explicit 
mention of the representation role played by civil society, there is an implicit 
assumption that the civil society organisations involved in the debate initiative 
in some way represent the citizens of the member states more broadly. There 
was significant variation between the organisations interviewed in terms of 
their claims of representativity and whilst some had a clear idea of who or what 
they represented and how, others had clearly taken this for granted. 
 
As in the case of participation, input legitimacy was well-served by the breadth 
of interests that were represented in the Convention and Futurum discussions. 
The contribution of a large number and range of civil society organisations to 
the discussions protected against the dominance of economic interests, and the 
monopolisation of the agenda by governmental actors. It also sent a powerful 
message about the number and range of interests potentially affected by the 
constitutional treaty. However the breadth of organisations involved also 
provided a challenge for input-oriented legitimacy. The basis upon which 
organisations could claim to represent or ‘make present’ citizens, or more often 
certain interests, in the discussions varied immensely. Some of the 
organisations interviewed were better equipped to represent citizens – whether 
members, supporters or the public in general – than others because of the 
interaction between the European and national or regional levels. But all of the 
organisations had equal access to the debates. 
 
This raises the question of what was being represented, being ‘made present’ in 
the debates preceding the decision-making process. The absence of formal 
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authorisation which provides the legitimation in structures of representative 
democracy is certainly a challenge for the extent to which organised civil 
society can contribute to input legitimacy. If the participation of civil society 
organisations in the discussions is as a proxy for citizen participation it is 
important to examine the nature of the relationship between the two. The trade 
unions had the strongest claim to represent certain citizens whereas some of the 
NGOs could claim to represent the interests of a certain group of citizens 
(women, students, female lawyers for example). Despite a movement away 
from the language of ‘interest groups’ and towards ‘civil society’ to imply 
greater inclusion, the notion of interest representation describes with greater 
clarity the processes taking place – it is certain interests, rather than the citizens 
to which they belong, that are being represented. 
 
Taking the concept of representation in isolation encourages reflection on what 
it means to ‘represent’ rather than to take for granted that organisations 
involved in the Convention and Futurum represented citizens or civil society. 
Whilst the notion of representation does not feature heavily in the rhetoric 
surrounding the debate on the EU’s future, as the notion of participation does, 
there appears to be an inherent assumption that EU civil society as envisaged 
by the institutions ‘represents’ EU citizens – whether this is descriptively by 
bringing women, young people and so on into discussions, or whether it is 
more in terms of defending interests that citizens may hold. 
 
Research on processes of interest representation in the EU has contributed to an 
understanding of the relationships between intermediary organisations and 
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institutional actors. It has also contributed to an understanding of the EU 
policy-making process in general. This investigation, motivated by the 
perceived need for these organisations to assist in bringing citizens closer to the 
EU decision-making process has turned attention towards the relationship 
between the organisations and ordinary citizens.  
 
 
7.4.3 Communication 
 
By passing messages between citizens and institutional actors organised civil 
society could strengthen input legitimacy by facilitating two-way 
communication. A focus on the importance of communication has been a key 
theme of more recent attempts by the EU institutions, particularly the 
Commission, to restructure their relationship with citizens. As such, the notion 
of communication did not feature heavily in the rhetoric of the debate on the 
future of the EU. Nevertheless, it provides an interesting framework within 
which to understand the role of civil society organisations in bringing citizens 
and EU institutions closer together. 
 
Understanding the role of organised civil society in terms of communicating 
messages from citizens to the institutions as part of a process of discussion 
preceding decision-making may allow for the preferences of citizens to be 
taken into account in a looser, more informal fashion than the notions of 
participation and representation might imply. Communicating messages in the 
other direction from institutional actors to citizens might help strengthen 
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accountability and enhance the understanding of how decision-making at the 
EU level affects citizens. 
 
The empirical investigation presented here calls into question the willingness 
of organisations to engage in communication with citizens. Several 
organisations expressed their reluctance to inform or educate citizens about EU 
issues. However the subsequent release of funding for organisations that 
organise debates with members of the public under the Commission’s ‘Plan D’ 
initiative saw civil society organisations making proposals to the Commission 
for organising debates with the public. This suggests that the capacity and 
willingness of organisations to perform a communication role may not be 
entirely fixed. When funding became available to engage in downward-facing 
communication activities, one of the organisations that was interviewed found 
it within their capacity to organise debates with citizens, something they had 
previously claimed to be unable to do. The capacity and willingness of 
organisations to play a communication role therefore appears to be determined 
in part by the structured context, and opportunities, specifically the funding, 
available.  
 
The distinction between input and output legitimacy is not as clear in the case 
of communication as a mechanism of linkage as it is for participation and 
representation. Furthermore, in operationalising the concept it becomes clear 
that there is an element of overlap with the concepts of participation and 
representation but it could also prove to be a useful way of understanding the 
relationship between the governed and governing in the EU. 
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7.5 Civil society organisations and the debate initiative: 
normative implications 
 
 
The aim of this investigation has been to contribute to an explanation and 
enhanced understanding of the EU political system, rather than to define or 
justify ideal criteria for its authority. However, the analysis has at times 
touched upon issues that are ‘irreducibly normative’ (Nentwich & Weale 
1998:1). I conclude therefore, by identifying some normative implications of 
this empirical research: the explanatory value of the concepts of input and 
output legitimacy; the de-legitimsing effects of the Commission’s ‘empty 
rhetoric’; the uncritical adoption by academic accounts of the notion of ‘civil 
society’; and more effective strategies for legitimising EU governance. 
 
The concepts of debate and civil society, participation, representation and 
communication have provided the backbone of this thesis. They have helped to 
structure the investigation and have guided the analysis of the data that has 
been generated. However, like most concepts in political science, they are 
contested. There are no firm, universally agreed definitions of these concepts 
but they have been operationalised for the purposes of this investigation. A 
problem that arises is that the definitions arrived at will never be perfect and 
will always result in disagreement and a gap between the ideal-type and 
empirical reality. 
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Drawing upon the concepts of participation, representation and communication 
has allowed me to isolate the different aspects or faces of democratic linkage, 
and the role of civil society organisations as agents of democratic linkage. 
Arguably, this has allowed a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the 
processes taking place. But it is important to acknowledge that though 
analytically distinct, the three are overlapping and interconnected. In practice, 
representation is part of participation – and vice versa. Communication 
involves elements of both participation and representation.  
 
Another analytical concept that I have relied upon heavily is the distinction 
between input and output dimensions of legitimacy. This distinction, made by 
Easton and applied extensively to the European Union by Scharpf, is a useful 
analytical tool in helping to understand the bases and dynamics of democratic 
legitimacy within EU governance. However, the separation between input 
legitimacy and output legitimacy was not always apparent when trying to 
assess the contribution of organisations. On the one hand, their involvement in 
discussions about the EU’s future could be seen in terms of strengthening input 
legitimacy through the bringing in of perspectives found within society. On the 
other hand, as the priority of the organisations tended to be the influencing 
outcomes their contribution could be better understood in terms of output 
legitimacy. Furthermore, discussions with civil society actors revealed that it 
was not a distinction they always recognised – since inputs and outputs were 
viewed as two parts of the same thing. Therefore the picture of input and 
output legitimacy looks different when viewed from the point of view of the 
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organisations themselves, calling into question the usefulness of an analytical 
tool that has been taken for granted. 
 
A second normative implication highlighted by this research is the discrepancy 
between institutional rhetoric and empirical ‘reality’. The rhetoric of the debate 
initiative was not intended to engage in the details of exactly how citizens and 
institutions would be brought closer together – rhetoric by its very nature is all 
about defining principles rather than hammering out details. However this 
investigation has been all about seeing how the rhetoric resembles what we can 
observe empirically on the ground and the empirical findings presented here 
suggest that the rhetoric of the EU institutions on ‘bringing citizens and EU 
institutions closer together’ was not reflected in concrete changes on the 
ground. To this extent it could be argued that the debate initiative was not 
successful in strengthening democratic linkage.  
 
However, the consequences of this divergence between the rhetoric of the 
debate and the actual experience of it could be more problematic than a simple 
missed opportunity. If the rhetoric says one thing about how debate and civil 
society actors can help bring citizens and institutions closer together, but the 
structures and the agency do not actually do this there is the problem of the 
rhetoric being simply that – empty. The result is that the EU institutions 
become known as purveyors of empty and meaningless rhetoric; and the 
Convention and Futurum initiatives look more like attempts to manufacture 
consensus on the constitutional treaty through the illusion of public debate 
rather than an attempt to enhance involvement in or democratic control over 
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discussions about the EU’s future. Ultimately it serves to undermine legitimacy 
rather than enhance it. 
 
The identification of ‘civil society’ as a partner in the reform exercise was an 
important part of the institutions’ rhetoric. As outlined earlier, the term ‘civil 
society’ was introduced into the vocabulary of the EU institutions in the late 
1990s and has been used continuously and extensively use ever since. 
References to civil society were particularly prevalent in the debate initiative 
and subsequently in the Commission’s Communication Strategy. Although the 
terminology was new to EU decision-making processes, the organisations to 
which it referred were not. Rather, the organisations that fell under the heading 
of civil society – trade unions, think-tanks, NGOs and so on – had a much 
longer history of working with the EU institutions, most notably the 
Commission. The deployment of the term ‘civil society’ therefore, was in 
effect, a new way of talking about a pre-existing phenomenon. 
 
The emergence of the term ‘civil society’ in the institution’s rhetoric on 
democratic reform has been accompanied by a shift in the academic literature 
away from discussion of ‘interests’ and ‘interest representation’ towards 
discussion of civil society organisations, and their contribution to legitimate 
governance31. But the empirical research presented in this thesis finds little 
change in the behaviour or self-understandings of the so-called ‘civil society’ 
organisations that were involved in the debate initiative (and for none of these 
                                          
31
 This is exemplif ied by the change in term inology between Greenwood’s 
1997 volume on Represent ing interests in the EU,  and his subsequent  2003 
volum e on I nterest  Representat ion in the EU,  and its updated second 
edit ion, published in 2007 (Greenwood 1997, 2003a, 2007b) . 
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organisations was the debate initiative their first encounter with the EU 
decision-making process). The primary motivation behind involvement in the 
debate initiative for the overwhelming majority of the organisations that I 
interviewed remained the prospect of influencing outcomes. Therefore, whilst 
the institution’s rhetoric on the debate initiative itself and the organisations 
involved in it suggested a break with the past, this was not supported by the 
accounts provided by the organisations themselves. This poses questions of 
why the institutions have changed the way they talk about these actors, and 
moreover, why the change in terminology has been taken up so readily by 
academic observers.  
 
The change in terminology on the part of the institutions, particularly the 
Commission, can be seen as part of the construction of the discourse on the 
‘bringing closer together’ of citizens and EU institutions. The term ‘civil 
society organisation’ is more consistent with the language of ‘citizens’, and 
‘publics’ than the term ‘interest groups’ which is reminiscent of ‘special’ or 
‘privileged’ interests. There has, therefore, been an attempt to move away from 
language that implies a closed or clientelistic approach to a more open, 
democratic and accessible one. 
 
Yet if the move towards the term ‘civil society’ was a deliberate strategy on the 
part of the institutions to convey a particular message, academic accounts that 
have adopted the term may have been too hasty and have generally done so 
without questioning whether it is appropriate. Civil society, as outlined in 
democratic theory, plays two important roles in the consolidation of political 
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democracy: one the one hand it contributes to the political socialisation of 
citizens, and on the other hand it acts as a counterweight to state power. The 
investigation of some of the organisations described as ‘civil society, that were 
involved in the debate initiative suggests that they had neither the capacity nor 
even the willingness to play these democratic roles and therefore to refer to 
them as organisations of civil society is inaccurate and even misleading. In 
adopting the change in terminology of the institutions uncritically, academe is 
contributing to the perpetuation of the discourse, and more fundamentally, a 
misunderstanding of the nature and potential role of these organisations in the 
EU decision-making process.  
 
To conclude, it is clear that civil society organisations have not and cannot 
single-handedly make EU governance more legitimate. This is not to say that 
EU governance cannot benefit from deliberation or the involvement of 
organised civil society. The empirical analysis demonstrates that there is 
potential for civil society organisations to act as agents for democratic linkage 
and in particular there is further support here for the suggestion that they 
contribute to output legitimacy. Where input legitimacy has not automatically 
been strengthened by the involvement of civil society organisations this may be 
because the mechanisms of linkage are more complex than anticipated and the 
means (i.e. rules of the debates) are sometimes inadequate and inappropriate, 
and the actors don’t have the capacity or willingness. Nevertheless in the 
absence of a demos, civil society is likely to remain of crucial importance in 
the attempts made by the EU institutions to ‘get closer’ to citizens.
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Screen shots of Convention and Futurum websites 
 
The report of the High-Level Group on the Information Society on ‘Europe and 
the Global Information Society (the so-called Bangemann report) set the agenda 
for using new ICT technologies in EU governance (Bangemann 1994). This report 
discussed the use of ICT with regards more efficient and effective governance, but 
more recently attention at the EU level has turned to the potential of ICT in 
enhancing democratic governance, so-called ‘e-democracy’ initiatives.  
 
The debate on the future of the EU can be seen as adopting such e-democracy 
initiatives alongside more traditional methods of discussion leading towards treaty 
reform. Web technologies were employed in two major ways to enhance 
democracy (Riley 2001): as a means towards greater openness on the one hand, 
and to facilitate the involvement of a broader range of actors in the debates on the 
other.  
 
Following the European Council meeting of June 2007, many of the websites 
related to the debate on the future of the EU were taken down and replaced with a 
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generic page on ‘Institutional Reform of the European Union’. Some of the 
websites mentioned in this thesis are therefore displayed here for reference.  
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Figure 1: The Convention website 
 
The panels on the left show the various materials that were available from the 
website – from information on the composition of the Convention to details of 
meetings and speeches made. 
Appendix I  291 
 
Figure 2: The Convention Forum website 
 
This screen shot shows the entrance page to the Forum website. Via the panel on 
the left, organisations were able to post contributions and read the contributions of 
other organisations.  
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Figure 3: The Youth Convention website 
 
A page on the Convention website was dedicated to the Youth Convention, with 
materials specific to the Youth Convention available from the links on the right 
hand side of the page. 
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Figure 4: The Futurum website 
 
The Futurum website included links to the Convention materials as well as 
information specific to the member states, public opinion, and the IGC. In the list 
towards the bottom of the page there was also a link referring to the ‘participation 
of civil society organisations’. This led to the pages for Futurum partners and an 
offline discussion where the contributions of organizations could be viewed. The 
‘discussion corner’ link towards the top left-hand side of the page linked to an 
online discussion forum where anybody could post comments on various issues 
related to the future of the EU. 
  
Appendix II 
 
Organisations and individuals interviewed  
 
Much of the data upon which my conclusions are based is drawn from 25 
qualitative interviews with civil society organisations that were involved in the 
Convention and/or Futurum. All of those individuals interviewed were happy 
to have their organisation associated with the research, but some did not want 
their comments attributed to them personally. To avoid different systems of 
attributing comments, all of the comments in the text are anonymised, but with 
indications given, where relevant, of the type of organisation the individual 
worked for. Here I outline all of the organisations that were interviewed for the 
research for reference: giving details of the type of organisation (using the 
categorisation employed by the Commission in the Forum and Futurum 
websites), the nature of the organisations’ involvement in the debates, the job 
title of the individual interviewed, and a brief description of the organisation. 
The information here is drawn from the websites of the organisations and so 
the URLs of the organisations’ own websites are also included. 
 
AEGEE 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation, registered in Convention Forum 
Individual interviewed: President 
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AEGEE is an acronym of ‘association des états généraux des étudiants de 
l’Europe’, and referred to as ‘European Students’ Forum’ in English. It is one 
of the biggest interdisciplinary student associations in Europe, and is 
represented in 241 academic cities, 42 countries and by 15,000 students. It 
aims to promote a unified Europe without prejudices; to strive for creating an 
open and tolerant society; and to foster democracy, human rights, cross-border 
co-operation, mobility and a European dimension in education. AEGEE’s 
activities are co-ordinated by the European level Head Office (based in 
Brussels), specifically a nine-member ‘Comité Directeur’ composed of 
students on sabbatical. There is no national administration, and the 241 
individual local organisations report directly to the European level. AEGEE’s 
activities include organising conferences and seminars as well as exchange 
trips and training courses. 
http://www.karl.aegee.org  
 
CEPS 
Academic and think-tank 
Contributed to Convention’s civil society plenary session 
Individual interviewed: Researchers (Interview conducted with two members 
of the organisation) 
CEPS (The Centre for European Policy Studies) was founded in 1983 as an 
independent policy research institute dedicated to producing sound policy 
research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe 
today. Its goals include providing a forum for discussion among all 
stakeholders in the European policy process; carrying out policy research; and 
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disseminating research findings. It has a research staff of around 30 (some of 
whom are academic staff and doctoral candidates at institutions across Europe), 
in addition to an administrative staff.  
http://www.ceps.be  
 
CESI 
Socio-economic 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: Press and Information Officer 
The Confédération Européenne des Syndicats Indépendants (European 
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions) is a European trade union 
organisation, encompassing Trade Unions from the member states and other 
European states, and was founded in 1990. It includes as members national 
individual and umbrella Trade Unions, European umbrella Trade Unions and 
European Trade Unions. It claims to fight for a strong, independent civil 
service and efficient institutions serving the citizen. 
http://www.cesi.org  
 
CRPM/CPMR 
Political or public authority 
Contributed to Convention’s civil society plenary session, Futurum partnership 
organisation, registered in Convention Forum. 
Individual interviewed: Secretary-General 
The Conférence des Régions Périphériques Maritimes/Conference of 
Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe is an organisation bringing together 
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150 regions located on Europe’s shorelines. It aims to promote a more 
balanced and polycentric development model for European territory (cohesion) 
and a greater involvement of sub-state players in defining and applying EU 
policies (convention/governance). The organisation is headed by a President 
who is elected from the member regions, and run by a secretariat-general based 
in Rennes, France. 
http://www.crpm.org 
 
Democracy Movement 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Registered with TEAM Europe, in turn registered in Convention Forum 
Individual interviewed: Campaign Manager 
At the time of the interviews, Democracy Movement was a member of TEAM 
Europe (The European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements). It is a UK-based 
non-party campaign which aims to protect liberal democracy in the UK and 
across Europe and believes that this is fundamentally undermined by the single 
currency and the creation of an EU constitution which will result in all major 
decisions being taken at the EU centre by undemocratic institutions. 
http://www.democracymovement.org.uk/  
 
EASPD 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Registered in Convention Forum 
Individual interviewed: Secretary-General 
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The European Association of Service Providers for Persons with Disabilities 
promotes the affairs of social firms and their umbrella associations, 
representing around 8000 members which provide services to approximately 
40 million people with a disability across Europe. The main objective of 
EASPD is to promote the equalisation of opportunities for people with 
disabilities through effective and high quality service systems. The work of the 
organisation is co-ordinated by a secretariat-general based at the headquarters 
in Brussels in addition to a Board, Exective Committee and President elected 
from within and by the members. 
http://www.easpd.eu 
 
European Citizens’ Network (ECN) 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: President  
A now defunct network arising out of a Convention of Young European 
Citizens held July 2001. This brought together 71 young Europeans from the 
member states and applicant states, all non-experts, with the aim of producing a 
European Constitution. Participants felt that the representative democratic 
system had to be reformed and that citizens of Europe should have a voice and 
be able to influence the creation of Europe. The Constitution document that the 
conference produced was sent to Futurum but little other activity ever took 
place. 
Website no longer available 
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EPC (European Policy Centre) 
Academic and think-tank 
Futurum partnership organisation, contributed to Convention’s civil society 
plenary session  
Individual interviewed: Chief Executive 
The EPC is an independent, not-for-profit think tank. It is committed to making 
European integration work and works at the ‘cutting-edge’ of European policy-
making providing its members and the wider public with rapid high quality 
information and analysis on the EU policy agenda. The EPC aims to promote a 
balanced dialogue between the different constituencies of its membership, 
spanning all aspects of economic and social life. Members of the EPC include 
companies, professional and business associations, trade unions, local and 
regional authorities and NGOs. Its work is co-ordinated by a Management 
Team alongside Analysts and Advisors. 
http://www.epc.eu/ 
 
ESIB (now ESU The European Students’ Union) 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individuals interviewed: Secretary-General and Communications Officer 
The European Students’ Union was known by the acronym ESIB at the time of 
the interview (an acronym that was ditched in May 2007). It is the umbrella 
organisation of 47 national unions of students from 36 countries and through 
these members represents 10 million students. The aim of the ESU is to 
represent and promote the educational, social, economic and cultural interests 
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of students at a European level towards all relevant bodies and particularly the 
EU, the Council of Europe and UNESCO. A Brussels-based Secretariat co-
ordinates the work of the Executive Committee, a six-member board elected 
from among the membership. 
http://www.esib.org/ 
 
ETUC 
Socio-economic 
Futurum partnership organisation, formal Convention Observers 
Individual interviewed: Advisor 
ETUC was established in 1973 to promote the interests of working people in 
Europe and to represent them to the European institutions. ETUC has 
membership in 81 National Trade Union Confederations from 36 countries as 
well as 12 European industry federations making a total of 60 million 
members. It is recognised by the EU institutions (as well as the Council of 
Europe and EFTA) as the only representative cross-sectoral Trade Union 
organisation at the European level.  
http://www.etuc.org/ 
 
EurActiv 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: Editor-in-Chief 
EurActiv is an online media portal giving up to date news on European affairs. 
It had a mini-site devoted to the debate on the future of the EU at the 
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commencement of Futurum initiative and was approached by Commission to 
link to Futurum site – thereby becoming a Futurum partner organisation. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/HomePage 
 
Eurocities 
Political or public authority 
Futurum partnership organisation, registered in Convention Forum 
Individual interviewed: Governance Project Manager 
Eurocities is a transnational network of major cities from across Europe. It 
brings together the local governments of around 130 cities in 30 countries, 
providing a platform for its members to share knowledge and ideas, exchange 
experiences, analyse common problems and develop solutions through Forums, 
Working Groups, activities and events. It acknowledges that whilst having 
different cultural, socio-economic and political realities, Europe’s cities share 
common challenges and solutions. A staff of around 30 work in the Brussels 
office which is responsible for supporting the Forums and Working Groups, for 
preparing meetings and conferences and providing information to members. 
http://www.eurocities.org/main.php 
 
Europe 2020 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation  
Individual interviewed: Director 
Europe 2020 describes itself as a ‘website dedicated to political anticipation’. It 
aims to promote research on European issues and to circulate the findings of 
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this research widely. It supports initiatives for the democratisation of Europe 
and the invention of a common external policy. It is run by a team of co-
ordinators and researchers. Two of Europe 2020's ‘fields of intervention’ are 
Information (elements for a public debate in Europe) and Debate (articulation 
between citizens, experts and institutions). 
http://www.europe2020.org/ 
 
European Blind Union 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Registered in Convention Forum  
Individual interviewed: Director 
The European Blind Union is a non-governmental, non profit-making 
European organisation which was founded in 1984. It is the only organisation 
representing the interests of blind and partially sighted people in Europe. EBU 
aims to protect and promote the interest of blind and partially sighted people in 
Europe. EBU currently has 44 member countries each with its own delegation. 
The central office, based in Paris, is responsible for communication within 
EBU and information to the general public. 
http://www.euroblind.org/fichiersGB/summ.htm 
 
European Womens’ Lobby 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Contributed to Convention’s civil society plenary session  
Individual interviewed: Director 
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The European Womens’ Lobby (EWL) is the largest co-ordinating body of 
national and non-governmental women’s organisations in the EU, with over 
4000 member associations in the 25 member states. The EWL’s goal is to 
achieve equality between women and men in Europe and to serve as a link 
between political decision-makers and women’s organisations at the EU level. 
The membership comprises ‘national co-ordinations’ and European 
organisations. The full membership meets once a year and elects a Board of 
Administration which takes key decisions. It is assisted by a Secretariat based 
in Brussels which co-ordinates and oversees the work programme of the 
organisation.  
http://www.womenlobby.org/ 
 
European Women Lawyers’ Association 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: Director 
EWLA is a non-profit making international non-governmental organisation 
having philanthropic, scientific and pedagogical aims. It brings together 
women lawyers from across the EU and aims to improve understanding of 
European legislation with reference to equality, in particular to women, and its 
effects. It comprises a Board, elected from the membership, and working 
groups on a range of issues. 
http://www.ewla.org/  
 
Friends of Europe 
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Academic and think-tank 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: Secretary-General 
A Brussels-based think tank without national or political bias that promotes 
discussion, research and new thinking on European policy issues. It explains 
that its goal since 1999 has been to stimulate new thinking on the future of 
Europe and widen the debate by making it more controversial and lively, by 
covering a large spectrum of issues, by promoting the use of media 
technologies and by encouraging media involvement. The president of Friends 
of Europe is Etienne Davignon but the work of the organisation is co-ordinated 
by a Brussels based team. 
http://www.friendsofeurope.org/ 
 
Institute for Citizenship 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: European Projects Officer 
A UK-based independent charitable trust which aims to promote informed, 
active citizenship and greater participation in democracy and society through a 
combination of community projects, research, education and discussion and 
debate. 
http://www.citizen.org.uk/index.html 
 
JEF Europe (Young European Federalists) 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
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Contributed to Convention’s civil society plenary session, registered in 
Convention Forum 
Individual interviewed: Secretary-General 
The Young European Federalists (Jeunes Européens Fédéralistes) is a 
supranational political movement active in most European countries. As the 
youth movement of the Union of European Federalists, it is an autonomous 
youth organisation with no political affiliations or commitments. JEF claims to 
work for increased international democracy and to implement the principle of 
federalism. It runs seminars, training days and demonstrations across Europe. It 
comprises an Executive Bureau made up of several elected representatives 
(drawn from the organisation’s membership), a number of individual national 
sections, and a Secretary-General based in Brussels who is responsible for the 
day-to-day running of the organisation.  
http://www.jef-europe.net/ 
 
Notre Europe 
Academic and think-tank 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: Secretary-General 
Notre Europe is a think tank based in Paris dedicated to European unity. As a 
research and policy group created 5th July 1996 it has the objective to study, 
research and educate about Europe, its history and its future prospects. The 
steering committee is charged with making recommendations to develop the 
idea and spirit of European integration in public opinion. Notre Europe wishes 
to contribute to the creation of a European public space. It has a number of 
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‘presidents’ including Jacques Delors, and Pascal Lamy, and an administrative 
and management team. 
http://www.notre-europe.eu/en/ 
 
Permanent Forum of European Civil Society 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation, registered in Convention Forum 
Individual interviewed: Events organiser 
The Forum was created in 1995 by the Conference of the presidents of the 
national councils of the International European Movement at its meeting in 
Bonn. It describes itself as a meeting and debating place of the associative 
world, whose objectives are: an active European citizenship; a new form of 
governance enhancing synergies between the European institutions and civil 
society; a European representative, participative and equal democracy in full 
respect of the principle of subsidiarity. 
http://www.europe-maintenant.org/forume/ 
 
Robert Schuman Foundation 
Academic and think-tank 
Futurum partnership organisation, contributed to Convention’s civil society 
plenary session  
Individual interviewed: Research Director 
The Robert Schuman Foundation was founded in 1991 as a centre for research 
on the European Union and gives itself the task of maintaining the spirit and 
inspiration of one of the founding fathers of Europe, namely Robert Schuman, 
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and of promoting European values. It carries out its work programme through a 
publications programme and the organisation of events such as conferences and 
round tables. Based in Paris, the staff carry out the day-today running of the 
organisation assisted by a board of directors and scientific council. 
http://www.robert-schuman.eu/ 
 
Scotland Europa 
Political or public authority 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: EU Policy Executive 
Scotland Europa is a partnership of public, private and voluntary bodies that 
have combined to provide a central point of contact for Scotland in Europe. 
With offices in both Glasgow and Brussels it aims to promote Scotland’s 
interests to the key institutions of the EU and have direct links to the regions of 
Europe. It also provides specialised information and services to its members 
which include business, local government, and education interests. 
http://www.scotlandeuropa.com/ 
 
Social Platform 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Contributed to Convention’s civil society plenary session  
Individual interviewed: Director 
The Platform of European Social NGOs (short name Social Platform) is an 
alliance of representative European federations and networks of non-
governmental organisations active in the social sector. Established in 1995 it 
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brings together around 40 organisations representing the interest of a wide 
range of civil society. The Social Platform channels the concerns of European 
citizens who have come together in these organisations throughout the Union 
on issues of common interest. The work of the Platform is conducted by the 
team, based in Brussels, and overseen by the Director. In addition it has a 
management committee, composed of individual from member organisations 
elected by the members. 
http://www.socialplatform.org/ 
 
Youth Forum 
Other, civil society, NGOs and schools of thought 
Futurum partnership organisation 
Individual interviewed: Press Officer 
The European Youth Forum is an international organisation established by 
national youth councils and international non-governmental youth 
organisations to represent the interests of young people from all over Europe. It 
is the youth platform in Europe representing youth organisations in 
international institutions. It serves to channel the flow of information and 
opinions between young people and decision-makers. It has a presidency, 
elected by the members, as well as a secretariat which is based in Brussels and 
organises the work programme. 
http://www.youthforum.org/en/ 
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In addition to these organisations I also interviewed six individuals from the 
EU institutions, all of who had worked on issues relating to the Convention 
and/or Futurum. These individuals were: 
 
Mr Josep Coll I Carbo 
Directorate General Communication, European Commission 
 
Mr Patrick Fève 
Head of Unit: Relations with civil society organizations and constitutional 
affairs, European Economic and Social Committee 
 
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard 
Secretary-General of the European Convention 
 
Mr Gerard Legris 
Head of Unit, Public debate and the future of Europe debate, European 
Commission 
 
Mr Guy Milton 
In-house historian/drafter, Convention secretariat-general 
 
Ms Ariane Moret 
Directorate General Communication, European Commission 
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